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INTRODUCTION: "AN EAR FOR AN EYE"'

While American legal discourse has embraced a range of figurative expressions evoking all sorts of sensory experience, 2 it has
* Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; B.A. (Juris.), Oxford
University, 1983; LL.B., Dalhousie University, 1984; LL.M., University of Toronto, 1986;
LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1988. I am very grateful to Jody Armour, Harry Flechtner,
Candice Hoke, and Jules Lobel for both their support of this novel project and their insightful comments on various preliminary drafts. I am also indebted to Wes Pue, who
invited me to present a version of this paper at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association in Phoenix, Arizona in June 1994. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to
thank my research assistants, Gary Wenig and Leah Schmulewitz, for their numerous and
invaluable contributions to the cause. Responsibility for any mistakes or errors of interpretation contained herein is, of course, mine alone.
1 MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 130
(1964).

2 E.g., "free speech" (hearing); "hard cases" (touching); taking the "bitter with the
sweet" (tasting, used by then Justice Rehnquist to describe a statutory limitation of a statutorily granted procedural right in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974)).
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long favored visual metaphors. We frequently consider law as a
matter of looking: we "observe" it; we evaluate claims "in the eye
of the law"; 3 our high courts "review" the decisions of inferior
tribunals. Alternatively, we speak of law as something one would
usually look at: it is a "body," a "text," a "structure," a "bulwark of
freedom,' ' a "seamless web,''5 and even a "magic mirror. ''6 We
identify particular legal concepts with striking visual images: property rights are a "bundle of sticks";7 a long-standing constitutional
principle is a "fixed star";8 a sequence of ownership is a "chain of
title." 9 We associate legal reasoning with the manipulation of visible geometric forms: we try to "square" precedents with one another; 10 we repeatedly agonize over "where the line [between
different doctrines and situations] can be drawn."' 1 We discuss legality in terms of light and darkness: we search for "bright-line"' 2
tests; we consider an area of concurrent jurisdiction to be a "zone
of twilight"; 3 we seek to extend constitutional protections by probing the shadowy "penumbras' 4 of well-known guarantees. With
the aid of metaphor, we go so far as to give law the visual quality of
hue: we may make a property claim under "color of title";' 5 we
3 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). For a more recent use of the
phrase, see Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993).
4 For a discussion and critique of this metaphor for law, see MILNER S. BALL, LYING
DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY 23-27 (1985).
5 See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1975); Kenneth W. Starr, The
Seamless Web of State and FederalLaw, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 175 (1985).
6 The "[1]aw, wherein, as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only our own lives,
but the lives of all men that have been! When I think on this majestic theme, my eyes
dazzle." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., The Law, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 20, 21 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962)
(1913). More recently, see KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (i989).
7 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). For an extended discussion of
this metaphor, see Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1055-63
(1989).
8 See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
9 See, e.g., Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376, 391 (1990).
l0 See, e.g., General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159, 169 (1955).
11 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926). More recently, see Joseph L. Hoffman, On the Perils of Line Drawing:Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229 (1989).
12 See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1914 (1992); see also Albert
W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227
(1984); cf Cary v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268 (1964) (referring to a
"blurred line").
13 See Youngstown Sheet & .Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
14 See generally Burr Henly, "Penumbra": The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1987).
15 See generally Monica K. Kalo, The Doctrine of Color of Title in North Carolina, 13
N.C. CENT. L.J. 123 (1982).
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discourage "yellow dog" contracts 16 and make securities trading
subject to "blue sky" 8laws; 17 for good or ill, we frequently adhere to
"black letter" rules.'
This visual language has become far too well-entrenched and
is far too convenient to be universally or summarily abandoned. In
recent years, however, a noteworthy number of legal scholars (if
not yet many judges or practitioners) have cast some of their best
writing in aural metaphors. Most of these individuals subscribe to
a broadly "critical" legal philosophy; many are exponents of distinctively feminist, African American, Hispanic, or Jewish approaches to jurisprudence. Their work characterizes law as a
matter of "voice": 19 'afigurative "speaking," and even, on occasion, a "singing"" in which institutions, groups, and individuals
should all be articulate participants. Some voices are strong, some
are weak, and some-generally those of the oppressed or the
marginalized-must first be freed from the shackles of "silence."'"
Fairness demands "hearing" and carefully "listening" to all of these
voices. 22 The new legal literature's metaphorical emphasis on the
See, e.g., NLRB v. Sevette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 48 n.2 (1964).
See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 308 n.4 (1988). See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Origin of the'Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1991).
18 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 536 (1982); John A. Ellis, Quasi-estoppel: Black-Letter Rule of Law in Family
Law Cases, 20 BEVERLY HILLS B. Ass'N J.156 (1986).
19 See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Voice, Perspective, Truth, and Justice: Race and the
Mountain in the Legal Academy, 38 Loy. L. REv. 61 (1992); Richard Delgado, When a
Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L REV. 95 (1990); Julius G.
Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L. REV. 577 (1988); Benita Ramsey, Excluded Voices: Realities in
Law and Law Reform, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1987); Mark G. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of
Hoon": The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TEX. L. REV. 589 (1988).
, 20 See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams, Sing Muse: Legal Scholarshipfor New Law Teachers, 37
J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1987); Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy:An Essay on
Legal Interpretation,43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 542 (1989) (discussing "Law's Song"); Karl
Johnson & Ann Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Reasons Why We Sing,
16 N.M. L. REV. 433 (1986); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1861 (1987) (observing that "[l]egal language, like a song, can be
hummed by someone who did not write it and chanted by those for whom it was not
intended").
21 For discussions of "silence" and "silencing," see Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women's
Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 886 (1989); Robin West, Feminism, Critical.Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 59.'
22 See, e.g., Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, IndustrialRelations in Transition: The
Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE L:J. 1803, 1806 (1993); James M. O'Fallon '&Cheyney
C. Ryan, Finding a Voice, Giving an Ear: Reflections of Masters/Slaves, Men/Women, 24
GA. L. REV. 883 (1990); Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored BandAid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue and Norms, 28 Hous. L. REV. 791, 807, 813-14
(1991).
16
17
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complementary exercises of speaking and listening simultaneously
reflects and fosters a tendency to regard law, rights, legal reasoning, legal writing, legal language, legal doctrine, judicial review,
constitutional federalism, the judicial process, and the attorney-client relation as so many forms of "rhetoric, '' 23 "discourse, ' 24 "storytelling, 25 "talk, 26 "dialogue, 27 or "conversation. 28 Ultimately,
the interplay of multiple voices in multiple settings is supposed to
produce a legal pluralism that some have lyrically termed
"polyphony. 29
I believe that this jurisprudential turn from metaphoric visuality towards metaphoric aurality represents not a passing semantic
fad, but a significant-if still nascent-reconfiguration of American legal discourse. The purpose of this Article is to analyze this
reconfiguration and ultimately offer some explanations for it. In
23 See, e.g., W. Cole Durham, Rhetorical Resonance and ConstitutionalVision, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 893 (1993); James B. White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of
Culturaland Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985).
24 See, e.g., Eve Cary & Mary R. Falk, People v. Scott & People v. Keta: "Democracy
Begins in Conversation", 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1279 (1993) (state constitutional law as discourse); George P. Fletcher, Law as Discourse, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1992).
25 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Toni M. Massuro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989); Sandra C.
McKenzie, Storytelling: A Different Voice for Legal Scholarship, 41 KAN. L. REV. 251
(1992); Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal
Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1988).
26 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991); Perry Dane, The Maps of
Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 965 (1991) ("sovereignty-talk");
Paul A. LeBel, Rights-Talk and Torts-Talk: A Commentary on the Road Not Taken in the
IntellectualHistory of Tort Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 811 (1991); Steven D. Smith, In
Defense of Traditional Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Schlegel, Weisberg, and DanCohen, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 627, 627 (1992) ("doctrine talk"); Joseph P. Tomain, Contract
Compensation in Nonmarket Transactions,46 U. PiTr. L. REV. 867, 872 (1985) ("contracts
talk").
27 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659, 696-97 (1987-88) (attorneyclient relation as dialogue); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977) (constitutional federalism as dialogue); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577,
653 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court,1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-12 (1986) (judicial process as dialogue).
28 See, e.g., Teresa G. Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089, 1102 (1986)
(law/legal writing as conversation); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 622 (1986)
(rights as conversation); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 51 (1984) (legal reasoning as conversation).
29 See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and ConstitutionalPossibilities,87 MICH. L.
REV. 2280, 2288-95 (1989); Elizabeth P. Hodges, Writing in a Different Voice, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 629, 640 (1988); Carol Weisbrod, PracticalPolyphony: Theories of the State and Feminist Jurisprudence,24 GA. L. REV. 985 (1990).
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Part I, I briefly establish the importance of these undertakings in
light of the nature of metaphor and its central role in thought and
legal reasoning. In Part II, I explore the cultural, sociological, and
phenomenological roots of American jurists' traditional preference
for visual legal metaphors. I show how visualist legal language has
both reflected and reinforced three fundamental circumstances:
first, Americans' long-standing cultural prejudice in favor of visual
expression and experience; second, the legal and political power of
certain gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups which at least in
the American context have demonstrated a particular respect for
visuality; and third, the correspondence between traditional American legal values and the values supposedly supported by vision itself. In Part III, I investigate the multiple factors behind the
growing vogue of aural metaphors in American legal discourse, especially among critical theorists seeking liberation from orthodox
outlooks, elites, and values. I attribute the new figurative aurality
to three factors: first, American culture's increasing interest in aural expression and experience; second, the novel and self-assured
"turn towards experience" being taken by a growing number of
legal scholars from previously marginalized gender, racial, ethnic,
and religious groups which at least in the American context have
demonstrated a particular respect for aurality; and third, the existence of a "fit" between the central tenets of critical jurisprudence
and the supposed phenomenological biases of sound and hearing.
In the Conclusion of the Article, I return to the theme of reconfiguration and consider the future of both aural and visual legal
metaphors in American legal discourse.
I.

METAPHORS IN LIFE AND LAW

Metaphors embody and configure both the abiding and the
changing preoccupations of an age.3 °

Metaphors explicitly or implicitly identify one phenomenon
with another phenomenon from which the first is literally distinct.
A game of chess may thus be characterized as a "battle" of wits; a
leading citizen may be described as a "pillar" of the community. In
each instance, the metaphor suggests an image31 or experience that
emphasizes a specific quality (here, competition or support) of its
30 BARBARA

M.

STAFFORD, BODY CRITICISM: IMAGING THE UNSEEN IN ENLIGHTEN-

465 (1993).
31 The frequent association of metaphor with image has led some commentators to
suggest that all metaphors are necessarily visual. Most modern scholars nonetheless believe that metaphors can theoretically appeal to any (or any combination) of the senses,
thereby allowing for the possibility of the "aural metaphors" discussed in this Article. See,
MENT ART AND MEDICINE
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referent. Metaphors are generally offered to illuminate their referents' sense or significance; they are most useful and most successful
in this respect when they associate an unfamiliar and/or abstract
referent with something familiar and/or concrete. At the same
time, the very specificity, familiarity, and tangibility that may recommend a metaphor may incidentally enable it to obscure and-distort. Calling chess a battle distracts attention from the cooperative aspects of that game; calling a leading citizen a pillar of
the community hides the benefits she derives from leadership. Paradoxically, the better a metaphor is, the worse this kind of problem
threatens to become. In extreme circumstances, a good metaphor
may be so compelling that it altogether subverts its referent's original meaning. No longer recognized as a metaphor, it redefines
32
truth on its own limited terms.
Metaphors appear in virtually all branches of discourse. Assuming metaphors to be products of the imagination, conventional
wisdom has traditionally identified them with the arts of poetry
and literature. Many metaphors certainly appear in these contexts,
but metaphors can also be found in other more overtly analytic
realms. Historians routinely call a portion of the early medieval
period the "Dark Ages." There was, of course, no more darkness
in the "Dark Ages" than in any other time, before or since; the
term "Dark" is a metaphor designed to suggest ignorance and barbarism. Scientists similarly speak of super-dense collapsed stars as
"black holes." But "black holes" are not really holes; the term
"hole" is a metaphor chosen to communicate the fact that neither
matter nor light can escape the gravitational pull of these bodies.
A string of recent articles and books has stressed that metaphors are commonplace in law.33 The multiple visual and aural
metaphors with which I began this Article help to create and sustain what has imaginatively been described as "a magical world...
where liens float, corporations reside, minds hold meetings, and
e.g., I.A. RICHARDS, PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 119 (1925); PAUL RICOEUR, THE
RULE OF METAPHOR 207-15
32 See generally Douglass

(Robert Czerny trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 1977) (1975).
Berggren, The Use and Abuse of Metaphor,I, 16 REV. META-

PHYSICS 237, 244-45 (1962).
33 See, e.g., BALL, supra note 4; HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1992); ALEXANDER E. SILVERMAN, MIND, MACHINE AND METAPHOR: AN
ESSAY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING (1993); Michael Boudin,
Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395 (1986); Gary Minda, The
Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 807 (1993); James E. Murray, Understanding Law as Metaphor, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 714 (1984); Ross, supra note 7; Steven L. Winter,
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371
(1988).
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promises run with the land. ' 34 To say that jurisprudential metaphors exist and even flourish is not, however, to say that they have
been uniformly welcomed, even by the most creative lawyers and
jurists. In the eighteenth century, England's Lord Mansfield commented that "nothing in law is so apt to mislead than a metaphor. '35 In the early years of this century, Yale legal theorist
Wesley Hohfeld agreed.36 In 1926, Benjamin Cardozo was willing
to tolerate metaphors in law, but held that they had "to be narrowly watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they
37
end often by enslaving it."
As we have come to appreciate that metaphor is omnipresent,
we have come to take it very seriously. 38 Today, few would dismiss
it as mere semantic decoration, ornament, or rhetorical device.
Some scholars have indeed gone so far in the other direction as to
suggest that metaphors are fundamental tools of thought and reasoning-so much a part of the deep structure of our mentality that
"our ordinary conceptual system . . . is . . . metaphorical in
nature.

39

As an aspect of our mentality's deep structure, our metaphors
can reveal a great deal about us, both as individuals and as members of a broader culture. I may use a certain metaphor because I
am, or at least my culture is, familiar with the metaphor's subject
matter. Coming readily to my mind as a pole of comparison, the
metaphor will be meaningful to others sharing similar life experiences or backgrounds. For example, using the metaphoric expression "I struck out" to communicate failure suggests a personal and/
or cultural familiarity with baseball. Alternatively, I may use a particular metaphor because I and/or my society value or devalue its
subject; using the metaphor can therefore accentuate positive or
negative reaction to the metaphor's referent. For instance, were I a
libertarian, or were I living in a libertarian culture, I might label
government a "parasite." My choice of metaphor would not only
communicate my dislike of government, but, by association, my
dislike of parasites as well.
34

Ross, supra note 7, at 1053.

35 Quoted in id. at 1057 n.9.

Id.
37 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). For a similar comment by
Justice Frankfurter, see Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943).
38 See, e.g., Gerald W. Casenave, Taking Metaphor Seriously: The Implications of the
Cognitive Significance of Metaphor for Theories of Language, 17 S.J. PHIL. 19 (1979).
39 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 3 (1980).
36
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"Modal" metaphors of the sort examined in this Article can be
particularly revealing of our circumstances and values. Modal metaphors directly or indirectly evoke specific modes or forms of
human sensory experience: sight, sound, touch, smell, or taste. For
example, if I call an attitude an "outlook," I am using a modal metaphor referring to a visual experience. Alternatively, if I refer to
the "texture" of an argument, I am using a modal metaphor referring to a tactile experience. Over time, individuals may develop or
demonstrate a penchant for modal metaphors favoring a particular
sense. Far from being arbitrary, such a penchant may (as we shall
see) reflect a broad cultural bias for that sense, an association with
a group which in a specific historical or social context has indulged
or has been forced to privilege that sense, and/or an inclination
towards values which that sense has been deemed to phenomenologically support or promote.
Ironically, we may reveal more of ourselves by our general
and our modal metaphors than by statements and sayings that are
the products of more calculated deliberation. Insofar as metaphors
are privy to our most profound thoughts and experiences, they may
tap into cultural or personal truths of which we are not at first
aware, and into notions of which we may not even approve. Calling a mental crisis a nervous "breakdown" may unwittingly manifest a modern tendency to regard the mind as a machine;40 calling
an African American football player "a little monkey" may unwittingly manifest racism.41 In this context, metaphors operate as the
"sonar" of our minds, revealing deeply submerged-but nonetheless fundamental-realities that we cannot or will not consciously
acknowledge.
As an integral part of our mentality, metaphors can also shape
our thoughts and even our actions.42 Calling chess a battle (or
hearing someone else call it a battle) certainly encourages me to
conceive of it, however inaccurately, as a harsh, even potentially
violent confrontation between grim-faced opponents. The psychological impact of the metaphor may be all the more powerful if I
have had little or no previous experience with the game. The way I
think about chess may in turn affect my behavior. In light of the
metaphor, maybe I will decide to play, or maybe I will choose to do
40 Id. at 27-28.
41 This unfortunate label recalls an "unintentional" but highly controversial "Freudian

slip" made by noted TV sportscaster and inveterate metaphor-monger (-mangler?) Howard Cosell in 1983. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 339 (1987).
42 BALL, supra note 4, at 6; LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 4-5.
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something less aggressive. If I do choose to play, the metaphor I
used or heard might well influence how I play. For instance, if
chess is a battle, an intimidating, combative strategy may seem appropriate. If the "battle" metaphor becomes popular, an entire
culture may be led to the same conclusion, and play chess
accordingly.
Modal metaphors can have an especially strong impact on how
we think and what we do. If, for example, I call "thought" itself
"reflection," I am figuratively characterizing thought as a visual enterprise. Insofar as reflection literally presumes a visual subject,
the metaphor may subtly encourage thinkers to believe that they
should look for intellectual stimulation, rather than listen for it; in
other words, the metaphor may affect their epistemological orientation. The same visual metaphor may alternatively imply that
only individuals from visually biased backgrounds can properly engage in thought, prompting individuals from other traditions that
prize other senses to be dismissed (or not to regard themselves) as
legitimate or competent participants in intellectual inquiry. In this
context, the "casual" choice of a "simple" metaphor may have profoundly divisive social implications. Describing thought as "reflection" may even induce thinkers to behave in a manner considered
appropriate to a visual process: for example, the metaphor may
suggest that thinkers should passively watch the world, rather than
become actively engaged with it.
Regardless of whether metaphors are considered as consequences or causes, the partial or total displacement of one metaphor by another is a significant cultural event. As a general matter,
such displacement may reflect the development of new conditions
or values, some of which may not, as yet, have risen above the horizon of awareness. Alternatively, or even additionally, displacement may help bring about new conditions or values. In law, a
shift in metaphor may indicate or promote a new doctrine or even
a new jurisprudential theory that cannot easily be brought into the
fold of existing figures of speech. The reconfiguration of American
legal discourse that is the topic of this Article is, however, even
more fundamental than this, for it involves the partial displacement
of one entire family of modal metaphors (indirectly appealing to
the eye) by another (indirectly relating to the ear). If the preceding overview of the cognitive, cultural, and behavioral significance
of metaphors in general-and modal metaphors in particular-is
accurate, such a sensory shift would seem both to reflect and por-
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tend major paradigmatic changes in American law and society. 43
For this reason, it is well worth exploring.
II.

"MIRRORS OF JUSTICE": VISUALITY AND LEGAL DISCOURSE

As our age translatesitself back into the oral and auditory modes
...

we become sharply aware of the uncriticalacceptance of vis-

ual metaphors and models by many past centuries.44

Understanding the contemporary shift away from visual towards more aural legal metaphors requires an initial explanation of
our traditional preference for visually oriented legal language. In
this part of the Article, I suggest that this preference is a product of
three overlapping factors: first, a longstanding American cultural
bias towards visual expression and experience that is arguably
based on the social prominence of the written word; second, the
traditional numeric and political domination of American law and
legal literature by members of gender, racial, ethnic, and religious
groups which through their special command, control, or endorsement of writing have in the course of American history developed
and/or demonstrated a particular respect for visuality; and, third,
the accord that exists between orthodox American legal values and
the values we have come to associate with vision as a phenomenon.
In the pages that follow, I will consider each of these factors in
turn.
A. Seeing Culture
In Part I of this Article I argued that metaphors can reflect the
circumstances and attitudes of the society that generates them. In
light of this point, it seems reasonable to suggest that the traditional popularity of visual metaphors in American legal language
has much to do with the bias towards visual expression and experience that has traditionally characterized American culture and, inevitably, American law.
The traditional American bias towards the visual is aptly captured by the observation that "[i]n our society, . . . to be real, a
thing must be visible. '45 We 46 demonstrate our visual bias in nu43 To this point, the only work of legal scholarship to have given even passing consideration to the implications of choosing one scheme of modal metaphors over another is
O'Fallon & Ryan, supra note 22, at 896-97. The authors of that piece notably recommend
that the prevailing metaphorical model of "seeing" be replaced by one of "listening."
44 MARSHALL McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY 72 (1962).
45 Edmund Carpenter & Marshall McLuhan, Acoustic Space, in EXPLORATIONS IN
COMMUNICATION 65, 65 (Edmund Carpenter & Marshall McLuhan eds., 1960). McLuhan

once noted that to question this proposition "is to undermine the American way of life."
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merous ways and in numerous contexts, usually without recognizing that such a bias even exists. Every time we sing the first line of
the national anthem, we ask a question about looking: "Oh say can
you see ... ?" We pay for goods and services with dollar bills that
bear a staring eye on their backs.47 We go on vacation not to hear
the sounds, but to "see the sights"; we take along cameras, not tape
recorders.48
We give aesthetic priority to visual effect. Our glass and steel
buildings are monuments to the power of sight, rather than sound
or touch.4 9 Our idea of personal beauty is primarily visual.5 0 So is
our idea of art, to the point where, in ordinary discourse, that term
denotes purely visual painting, not music or dance.5 ' Our visual
orientation even colors our approach to art forms which, at least in
theory, are not altogether dependent on visual appreciation: we
regularly highlight the visuality of sculpture-and, at the same
time, neutralize its tactility-by posting signs in our museums and
art galleries that. read "Do Not Touch." Is it any wonder that in
such a context, our sculpture should have become "painterly,""2
i.e., designed much more for seeing than feeling?
Less obviously, but more fundamentally, our visuality shapes
our sense of social identity and difference. We tend to group one
Letter from Marshall McLuhan to Maurice Stein (May 15, 1964), in LETTERS OF MARMolinaro et al. eds., 1987).
Article will demonstrate, some Americans tend to be
more visually biased than others. The term "we" may nonetheless be used in this context
insofar as all Americans, regardless of their specific identities or affiliations, work and live
within a national social and political structure that has encouraged or required them (at
least for limited purposes) to adopt a significant number of visualist habits.
47 For a brief discussion of this eye and its symbolic significance, see E.H. Gombrich,
The Visual Image, in MEDIA AND SYMBOLS: THE FORMS OF EXPRESSION, COMMUNICATION
AND EDUCATION 241, 261"(David R. Olson ed., 1974).
48 On the pervasive visuality of modern tourist experience, see SUSAN SONTAG, ON
PHOTOGRAPHY 9-10 (1977.); Kenneth Little, On Safari: The Visual Politicsof a Tourist Representation, in THE VARIETIES OF SENSORY EXPERIENCE: A SOURCE BOOK IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SENSES 148 (David Howes ed., 1991) [hereinafter VARIETIES].
'49 A lean skyscraper, its glass-sheathed walls reflecting the tinted clouds of twilight, is beautiful to behold from the outside.... But the senses other than sight
tend to be underfed. The place has neither odor nor sound other than the
muted noises of office work or of soft canned music; and it discourages touch.
YI-Fu TUAN, SEGMENTED WORLDS AND SELF: GROUP LIFE AND INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS 114 (1982).
50 ANTHONY SYNNO1-r, Beauty and the Face: Truth and Goodness, Mirrors and Masks,
in THE BODY SOCIAL: SYMBOLISM, SELF AND SOCIETY 73 (1993).
51 ARNOLD BERLEANT, ART AND ENGAGEMENT 53 (1991).
52 See ROBERT GOLDWATER, PRIMITIVISM IN MODERN ART 35 (1986); see also CLEMENT GREENBERG, ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 142 (1961) ("Under the modernist 'reduction,' sculpture has turned out to be almost as exclusively visual in its essence as
painting itself.").
SHALL McLUHAN 299, 300 (Matie
46 As the next section of this
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another more on the basis of similar visual appearance than on,
say, similar accent.5 3 This is most obvious when we categorize individuals according to the color of their skin: in our visualist culture,
most Americans are "white" or "black." Visual identity has indeed
become so important to us that we not only differentiate, but actually discriminate against one another on a visual basis. Having skin
of a certain color may in practice entitle us to, or alternatively, it
may disqualify us from educational opportunity, economic wealth,
and political power.
In light of our cultural preoccupation with the visual, it is not
at all surprising that we are far more concerned with personal deficiencies in our sense of sight than with deficiencies in our other
sensory departments. We insist on wearing glasses or contact
lenses to correct minor flaws in our vision while we would not
think of, say, wearing a hearing aid to correct similar minor defects
in our hearing.5 4 We fear losing our sight more than we fear losing
any of our other faculties. We harbor great pity for the blind,
while deaf persons often arouse our irritation and impatience. 6
Visuality penetrates our very language. We routinely rely on
visual metaphors to communicate understanding and knowing, or
phenomena understood and known.57 When we comprehend
something, we say "I see." Someone who does not understand
"can't see" what we mean; he or she may even be "blind" to the
obvious. We describe good leaders in metaphorical terms that suggest that they see far or well: they are "visionary"; they have "insight" or "foresight"; they have "perspective" or a "world view."
We also associate knowledge and understanding with light, the
physical presence of which is necessary for seeing. If I want some53 See generally James Jones, The Concept of Racism and Its Changing Reality, in IM-

(Benjamin Bowser ed., 1981) ("Western
society has had a tendency to categorize human groups according to simple visible traits
and to infer mental, behavioral, and sociocultural capacities and tendencies from them.")
54 In part because it is less necessary in a visualist society; wearing a hearing aid carries
a significant stigma. JILLYN SMITH, SENSES AND SENSIBILITIES 45 (1989).
55 Anthony Synnott, The Eye and I: A Sociology of Sight, 5 INT'L J. POL. CULTURE &
SoC. 617, 618 (1992).
56 HECTOR CHEVIGNY & SYDELL BRAVERMAN, THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE BLIND 151
(1950).
57 See generally WALTER ONG, "I See What You Say": Sense Analogues for Intellect, in
PACTS OF RACISM ON WHITE AMERICANS 27, 40

INTERFACES OF THE WORD: STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CUL-

121 (1977); Marcel Danesi, Thinking Is Seeing: Visual Metaphors and the Nature of
Abstract Thought, 80 SEMIOTICA 221 (1990); Alan Dundes, Seeing Is Believing, NAT. HIsT.,
May 1972, at 8; Gordon G. Gallup & Patricia A. Cameron, Modality Specific Metaphors: Is
Our Mental Machinery "Colored" by a Visual Bias?, 7 METAPHOR & SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY
93 (1992); Stephen A. "Tyler, The Vision Quest in the West, or What the Mind's Eye Sees, 40
J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 23 (1984).
TURE

241

MAKING SENSE OF METAPHORS

1994]

one to explain a topic, I might ask them to "illuminate" it or "shed
light" on it. In the same vein, smart people are "bright." Darkness, on the other hand, inhibits seeing and therefore denotes ignorance. If I don't know what's going on, I'm "in the dark." As a
general matter, not-so-smart people are "dimwits."
American law has both reflected and actively contributed to
our overall cultural visuality. Even in American trial courts which
have resounded with the voices of lawyers, litigants, judges, and
jurors, seeing has traditionally been given priority over the other
senses.5 8 Great effort has gone into making testimony and arguments visible in writing. Eyewitnesses testifying to what they have
seen have been preferred over "earwitnesses" testifying to what
they have heard.5 9 Frequently, earwitnesses have been barred as
bearers of inadmissible hearsay.60 Our judges and juries have generally given greater weight to visual evidence (in the form of both
writings and exhibits) than to oral evidence. 6 ' The existence of
some visible written instrument has traditionally precluded oral
testimony as to that instrument's meaning (the parol evidence
rule). On appeal, disputed cases have come before appellate
judges who have been expressly tasked with resolving them in writing. The appellate process still requires these judges to read visible
58 "The strategic organizing principle of the courtroom is a didactic one. It is that of
the visibility of justice rather than of its audibility." Peter Goodrich, Attending the Hearing: Listening in Legal Settings, in RECEPTION AND RESPONSE: HEARER CREATIVITY AND
THE ANALYSIS OF SPOKEN AND WRIT-rEN TEXTS 11, 18-19 (Graham McGregor ed., 1990).

59 "Earwitness testimony, in contrast to eyewitness testimony, has not received a great
amount of attention from ... the courts, possibly because of the greater reliance on information processed visually rather than orally." A. Daniel Yarmey, Earwitness Evidence:
Memory for a Perpetrator'sVoice, in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 101, 101 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994).

60 Of course, the hearsay rule is formally premised on a presumption that has little to
do with visuality or aurality: that an out-of-court statement should not be taken as evidence of the truth asserted in the statement if its maker is not available for in-court crossexamination. Thus construed, the hearsay rule can preclude the admissibility of a witness's
testimony as to what the witness has seen, read, or heard. In practice, however, the rule
tends to apply most frequently and forcefully against reports of third-party speech. In that
context, it may reflect the distinctly visualist concern that speech per se is a casual phenomenon having limited probative value outside of very specific circumstances-thus, the exception of the "dying declaration."
61 One evidence expert has called this indulgence of the visual
the "wax museum" effect. People are fascinated by the real thing. The bullets
that were found lodged in the victim's heart, the actual handwritten memorandum that was used to seal the agreement, the remains of the automobile gas
tank that ruptured on impact burning the occupants of the car.
...

Until we see something tangible, [the event] is something that did not

happen, or at least did not happen to real people ....
ASHLEY S. LIPSON, ART OF ADVOCACY: DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE §

2.02 (1994).
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briefs, precedents, and statutes rather than listen to live witnesses
or (given severe time limits on oral argument) even attorneys.62
In part because our judicial process has been so skewed towards visuality, American courts and legislators have traditionally
shown particular sensitivity to visible declarations, visible claims,
and visible injury. Written deeds, wills, and contracts have been
readily and literally enforced; 63 unwritten, such "instruments" have
tended to be void or at least problematic.. Judicial recognition of
property rights has often depended on whether property-claimants
have visibly manifested their claims by formal registration or, adversely, by "open and notorious" possession.64 Under the doctrine
of "substantial interference," nuisance plaintiffs demonstrating visible harm from soot, smoke, or other pollutants have usually been
better off than those complaining about noise or odor. 65 In negligence law, visible injury has historically been more compensable
than less visible, often invisible emotional distress.66 In defamation
law, visible libel has been taken far more seriously than oral slander.67 In civil rights law, "visible minorities" have received more
attention and protection 68 than have other subjugated groups (such
as the deaf) 69 whose identities have been less visually defined.
62 ROBERT J. MARTINEAU,

APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND'AND THE UNITED

STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

109 (1990).

On the traditional literalism of American wills law in particular, see Thomas C. Grey,
The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 224-26 (1988).
64 CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY,
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 269 (1994).
65 This tendency accords with our primarily visual understanding of pollution itself.
Findings suggest that the strongest physical stimuli influencing awareness of air
pollution are particulates, soiling of buildings and household objects by dustfall,
and reduced visibility caused by haze. Awareness of air lpollution obviously
depends heavily upon visual perception. This finding takes on particular significance because many toxic gaseous pollutants cannot be seen.
Gary W. Evans & Stephen V. Jacobs, Air Pollution and Human Behaviour, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS 105, 111 (Gary W. Evans ed., 1982).
66 See Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U.
FLA. L. REV. 333, 336-40 (1984); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers
and the Law of Fright:A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
63

67 NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 27-28 (1986).
68 Marshall McLuhan recognized the relationship in our society between visuality and
remedy in the early 1960s- "Especially the child, the cripple, the woman and colored per-

son appear in a world of visual ...

technology as victims of injustice." McLUHAN, supra

note 1, at 31.
69 Advocates of "deaf rights" have repeatedly commented on the problems associated
with bearing an "invisible" disability in a visualist environment. For example,
[tihe person with a speech, language or hearing disorder is entitled to the same
legal rights and consideration that the disabled person with a more visible impairment receives. The paralytic person in a wheelchair, the amputee on
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American legal scholarship has similarly assumed a strongly
visualist cast. American legal scholars have traditionally preferred
to study written appellate decisions rather than the oral arguments
of lawyers or the oral charges of trial judges. Visibility of effort has
become a critical scholarly standard for members of the American
legal professoriate; for tenure and promotion purposes, what matters most is what, how much, and how well one writes on the visible
page ("scholarship"), rather than what, how much, or how well one
speaks into thin air ("teaching"). Scholarly convention has moreover tended to suppress even the written semblance of aurality.
For example, most American law books and articles take the forms
of analysis and essay. Both of these expository styles may be characterized as narrowly "visual" insofar as they are, for a variety of
structural and mnemonic reasons, virtually unknown in oral experience. Until very recently, alternative forms such as story, parable,
poem, and lyric which have powerful aural antecedents,70 and
which even in writing are strongly evocative of aural expression,7 '
have been either eschewed in legal literature or published only for
the dismissive purposes of entertainment and parody.72 In some
instances, American legal scholars have gone so far towards visuality as to. introduce semiverbal or nonverbal diagrams and graphs
into their works.73
crutches, the blind man or woman with a white cane immediately trigger concerns about possible violation of the rights of the handicapped. But when
someone appears able-bodied and clear-eyed, questions of inaccessibility to
buildings and discrimination in education do not always appear so pressing.
Russell J.Love, Breaking the Sound Barrier, HUM. RTs., Spring 1980, at 27, 27.
70 See generally H. MUNRO CHADWICK & N. KERSHAW CHADWICK, THE GROWTH OF
LITERATURE (1936); RUTH FINNEGAN, ORAL POETRY: ITS NATURE, SIGNIFICANCE AND
SOCIAL CONTEXT (2d ed. 1992); ALBERT B. LORD, EPIC SINGERS AND ORAL TRADITION
(1991); ISIDORE OKPEWHO, AFRICAN ORAL LITERATURE (1992).

71 For instance, "[i]n a good story, we can almost hear the voice. It's as if, reading and
assimilating the qualities of a voice's language, we're translating the written word into the
spoken. one, using our eyes to listen ..... LOOK WHO'S TALKING: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
VOICES IN THE MODERN AMERICAN SHORT STORY at xxi (Bruce Weber ed., 1986). Likewise, poetry has been described as "still bound to the oral tradition of sound more than
sight, even though our access is most often through the eye than the ear." BERLEANT,
supra note 51, at 151.
72 See, e.g., J. GREENBAG CROKE, LYRICS OF THE LAW (San Francisco, Sumner
Whitney 1884); LANGDELL LYRICS OF 1938 (W. Barton Leach ed., 1938). See also the
various verses penned by such legal luminaries as Karl Llewellyn and Fred Rodell, reproduced in THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST (William L. Prosser ed., 1952). The best survey and
discussion of modern light legal verse as a genre is J. Wesley Miller, Legal Poetry, in THE
LAWYER'S ALCOVE: POEMS BY THE LAWYER, FOR THE LAWYER, AND ABOUT THE LAW.

at i (Ina R. Warren ed., 1990).
73 See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Teaching Parol.Evidence, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 647,

YER

650-51 (flow charts); John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client
Interests, ProfessionalRoles, and Social Hierarchies,76 MICH. .L. REV. 1111, 1130 (1978)
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In this context, it is hardly surprising that American jurists
have relied heavily on visual metaphors when describing legal concepts and relations. In a cultural environment which has favored
seeing, such figures of legal speech have been semantically convenient. Beyond mere convenience, however, visual legal metaphors
have arguably helped to make American law familiar and legitimate. A law expressed in visual terms is psychologically more accessible to members of a visually biased society than a law
expressed in aural or tactile metaphors (consider, for instance, the
relative inaccessibility of a judicial "refeel," as opposed to a judicial
"review"). A visually phrased law is more experientially recognizable, and hence easier to follow. It is more acceptable and less
oppressively alien. It is more likely to be regarded as being of the
people, not just for the people.
But if American legal discourse has traditionally favored visual metaphors in part because American culture has been biased
towards visual expression and experience, one naturally wonders
why American culture has been so visualist. It might immediately
be suggested that our visuality is the predictable product of our
society's fascination-even obsession-with the images we constantly encounter in photographs, movies, and television."4 Certainly our embrace of images has contributed to our visuality.
There are, however, two problems with the "imagism" hypothesis,
standing alone. First, our visuality, historically considered, predates America's relatively recent turn toward images. Second, if
imagism were at the root of our predisposition towards the visual,
one would think that in the age of TV (not to mention MTV) the
visual legal metaphors which are supposedly visuality's by-product
would be enjoying an increasing vogue instead of losing ground to
aural figures of speech. In the context of both these points, I would
like to pursue a less obvious, but I believe ultimately more rewarding line of argument and propose that the visuality that informs and supports our visual legal metaphors is primarily a

("multidimensional scalogram"); Jacob Rabkin & Mark H. Johnson, The Partnership
Underthe Federal Tax Laws, 55 HARV. L. REV. 910, 910a (1942) (chart); Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 347 (1949)
(Venn diagrams); Laurens Walker et al., Order of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216,
220 (1972) (graph).
74 See generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN
AMERICA (1961); STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS OF STYLE IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (1988).

19941

MAKING SENSE OF METAPHORS

product of our culture's profound dependence on the written
word.
This proposal is admittedly counterintuitive. We tend to think
of the written word as "verbal," not "visual" (i.e., as language
rather than image). This dichotomy is trenchant and often helpful,
but it can be overstated. Certainly the written word is verbal, but
in critical respects it is a visual medium as well. 76 To appreciate it
or to manipulate it (braille aside), we need to see it.77 As a society
puts more of its essential information in written form, its members
become more focused on the visual sense which enables them to
retrieve that information by reading.78 Even for those who cannot
read, the visual surface becomes a primary source of meaning as
writers recognize that pictures are the most convenient permanent
substitutes for written words. For readers and nonreaders alike,
seeing becomes knowing. Because the visual understanding of
texts or images does not necessarily require a viewer to hear,
touch, smell, or taste, those senses may moreover become secondary to seeing as cultural and individual resources. When a society
becomes sufficiently saturated with writings and other visual
materials, its members may even feel that they can afford to deprecate or condemn the other senses as culturally superfluous
capacities.
The intimate connection between writing and visuality has
been indirectly and directly demonstrated at numerous junctures in
Western cultural and legal history. Members of societies having
little or no experience with writing have tended to value a variety

75 This hypothesis is not entirely new. Although unfamiliar to most legal scholars, it
has been advanced by such noted communications theorists as Walter Ong and Marshall
McLuhan, although neither man ever articulated or analyzed it fully. See, e.g., WALTER J.
ONG, THE PRESENCE OF THE WORD: SOME PROLEGOMENA FOR CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY 8 (1967) (noting that "[w]riting... shifts the balance of the senses away

from the aural to the visual"). Most recently, see Robert D. Romanyshyn, The Despotic
Eye and Its Shadow, in MODERNITY AND THE HEGEMONY OF VISION 339, 340 (David M.
Levin ed., 1993) [hereinafter MODERNITY] (noting that "the ocularcentrism of modernity,
the hegemony of vision, the installation of the reign of the despotic eye, is also a verbocentrism, the consciousness of the book").
76 "[T]he word is never simply a word but is always also an image." MARK C. TAYLOR
& ESA SAARINEN, IMAGOLOGIES: MEDIA PHILOSOPHY 27 (1994). See generally Richard
Shusterman, Aesthetic Blindness to Textual Visuality, 41 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM
87 (1982).
77 This is so even if, as in some societies, reading and writing also involve speaking and
listening. See infra notes 84, 98, 134 and accompanying text.
78 JAMES CURTIS, CULTURE AS POLYPHONY: AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE OF PARADIGMS

99 (1978).
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of senses.79 They may not have held all in equal esteem, but relative to contemporary America, their members have generally
placed less emphasis on sight and more emphasis on sound.8° On
the other hand, members of societies having more experience with
writing have given increased weight to visuality and visual
experience. 81
Take, for instance, the marginally literate society of pre-Hellenistic Greece.82 Its centerpieces were great oral epics (the Iliad
and the Odyssey) which continued to be performed long after they
were written down around 700 B.C.83 The relatively few Greek
texts that existed were almost always regarded as records of speech
that needed to be read aloud. 84 Greek philosophers down to the
time of Plato were not writers as much as they were talkers. While
not unfamiliar with visual metaphors for thought, 85 they also con79 See generally Bernard J. Hibbitts, "Coming to Our Senses": Communication and
Legal Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873 (1992).

80 This is not to imply that any one culture or group ever exceeds any other in its
members' ability to see, hear, feel, etc. It is merely to suggest that the attention and respect accorded to the various sensory channels is not physiologically or psychologically
fixed in humans, but rather is contingent on historical and social circumstances. For elaborations of this root hypothesis, which is now accepted by a variety of historians, sociologists, and anthropologists, see CONSTANCE CLASSEN, WORLDS OF SENSE: EXPLORING THE
SENSES IN HISTORY AND ACROSS CULTURES (1993); DONALD M. LOWE, HISTORY OF
BOURGEOIS PERCEPTION (1982); McLUHAN, supra note 1; ONG, supra note 75; VARIETIES,
supra note 48.

81 Visuality may consequently "be taken as-a symptomatology of the history of thought.

The use and often metaphorical development of vision becomes a variable which can be
traced through various periods and high points of intellectual history ...." DON IHDE,
LISTENING AND VOICE: A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOUND 6 (1976).
82 Although the extent of literacy in pre-Hellenistic Greece has historically been the
subject of protracted and even heated debate, it now appears to have been quite low. One
recent estimate has placed the level of literacy in fifth century B.C. Attica (the region
which included Athens) at between 5% and 10% of the total population. WILLIAM V.
HARRIS, ANCIENT LITERACY 114 (1989).
83 On the actual and structural orality of the early Greek epics, see generally ERIC
HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO (1963).
84 On aural reading in ancient Greece, see JESPER SVENBRO, PHRASIKLEIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF READING IN ANCIENT GREECE (Janet Lloyd trans., Cornell Univ. Press
1993) (1988); G.L. Hendrickson, Ancient Reading, 25 CLASSICAL J. 182 (1929).
85 See, e.g., Hans Blumenberg, Light as a Metaphorfor Truth: At the PreliminaryStage
of Philosophical Concept Formation, in MODERNITY, supra note 75, at 30; Dorothy Tarrant, Greek Metaphorsof Light, 10 CLASSICAL Q. 181 (1960). The extent of pre-Hellenistic
Greek visuality has traditionally been overestimated, partly because of the attention that
modern scholars interested in the origins of Western philosophy have paid to pre-Hellenistic "light" metaphors, partly because of misapprehensions concerning the extent and influence of pre-Hellenistic literacy (see supra note 82), partly because virtually all of our
knowledge of ancient Greek life comes from surviving visible texts, images, and artifacts,
and partly because ancient Greek culture -has repeatedly been described and defined by
contrast with the seemingly more aural society of the ancient Hebrews (see, e.g., THORLIEF
BOMAN, HEBREW THOUGHT COMPARED WITH GREEK

(1960)). See generally MARTIN

JAY,

19941

MAKING SENSE OF METAPHORS

247

sidered that as a "dialogue carried on by the mind with itself"; 6
they repeatedly expressed the idea of "knowing" in terms of "hearing" and "listening. '8 7 Plato's own Dialogues were a literary extension of his discipline's actual and figurative aurality.8 8 Early Greek
scientists conceived of the universe as having an aural as well as a
visual presence: Pythagoras became famous for speculating on the
"music of the spheres."89 Taking their cue from myth, Greeks from
all walks of life routinely associated silence and muteness with desolation and death. 90 Reflecting the prevailing cultural circumstances, early Greek law depended heavily on ceremonies and
ritual procedures that implicated the ear, the hand, and the mouth,
as well as the eye. 91 The classical Greek word for law, nomos, was
itself derived from the verb nemein, meaning "to recite" or "to
read aloud."'92 In this context, it should not be surprising that
Greek law was long understood as having intimate ties to oral poetry,93 and, via an alternative rendering of nomos as "tune,". even
DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRENCH
THOUGHT 28 (1993) (noting that "the Greek celebration of sight was more equivocal than

is sometimes claimed").
86 PLATO, The Sophist 2'63e (Francis M. Cornford trans.), inPLATO: THE COLLECTED
DIALOGUES OF PLATO 957, 1011 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961); see
also PLATO, Theaetetus.190a (Francis M. Cornford trans.), inPLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra, at 845, 895-96 ("when the mind is thinking, it is simply talking
to itself"). Homer literally depicted the thought process of his epic characters in this way.
See generally Joseph Russo & Bennett Simon, Homeric Psychology and the Oral Epic.Tradition, 29 J. HIST. IDEAS 483 (1968); R.W. Sharples, "But Why Has My Spirit Spoken with
Me Thus?": Homeric Decision-Making, 30 GREECE & ROME 1 (1983)..
87 In the sixth century B.C., for instance, Heraclitus denoted "knowing" by a verb that
could also mean "hearing" and believed that revelation required "listening to the Logos."
See PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, HERACLITUS 102-10 (1959); Evelyn F. Keller & Christine R.
Grontworski, The Mind's Eye, in DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 207, 221
(Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983). For a general discussion of the significance of aurality in the thought of Heraclitus, see Frances Dyson, The Genealogy of the
Radio Voice, in RADIO RETHINK 167 (Diana Augaitis & Dan Lander eds., 1994).
88 JAY D. BOLTER, WRITING SPACE: THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT AND THE
HISTORY
OF WRITING 110-11 (1991).
89 See generally JAMIE JAMES, THE MUSIC OF THE SPHERES: MUSIC, SCIENCE AND THE
NATURAL ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE 20-40 (1993); LEO SPITZER, CLASSICAL AND CHRiISTIAN IDEAS OF WORLD HARMONY 717 (1963)..
90 YI-Fu TUAN, PASSI14G STRANGE AND WONDERFUL: AESTHETICS, NATURE AND CUL-

73 (1993); Carol G. Thomas & Edward K. Webb, From Orality to Rhetoric: An Intellectual Transformation, in PERSUASION: GREEK RHETORIC IN ACTION 3, 16 (Ian
Worthington ed., 1994).
91 LOUIS GERNET,THE ANTHROPOLO GY OF ANCIENT GREECE 143-215 (1981).
92 SVENBRO, supra note 84, at 4, 114.
93 Perhaps not coincidentally, one of the first Athenian lawgivers, Solon, was a poet. In
the second century A.D., the Greek biographer Plutarch claimed that Solon had originally
attempted to set his laws in verse, beginning:
TURE
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music.9 4 At one point in The Republic, Plato metaphorically described the just man as one who "must have put all three parts [of
his soul] in tune with him, highest and lowest and middle, exactly
like the three chief notes of a scale. 95
From the fifth well into the twelfth century A.D., medieval
Europe was likewise dependent on the full range of human senses.
Early medieval religion was a highly tactile experience which for
many individuals culminated in contact with a relic of the saints.96
The words of God and man were primarily received from the lips
of preacher and poet. 97 The limited number of available writings
were not perused as much as pronounced. 98 It followed that early
medieval "wise men" were those who "heard well." 99 Early medieval law depended for its efficacy on an orchestration of diverse sensory experiences-gestures, words, deliveries, blows, and even
tastes-that enabled transactions to be remembered months, years,
First let us pray to Zeus, royal son of Cronos
To grant my laws success and wide renown.
Solon 3.3, in THE RISE AND FALL OF ATHENS: NINE GREEK LIVES BY PLUTARCH 43, 45 (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans., Penguin Books 1960).
94 In the fourth century B.C., Aristotle actually speculated that nomos meant both
PLUTARCH,

"law" and "tune" "because before men could write, they sang their laws, to avoid forgetting them ...." ARISTOTLE, PROBLEMS 920a, at 395 (Walter S. Hett trans., 1961).
95 PLATO, The Republic 443d, in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 125, 244 (Eric H.
Warmington & Philip G. Rouse eds., W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1956).
96 On the high tactility of early medieval religion, see Heather Phillips, John Wyclif's
De Eucharistia in its Medieval Setting 37 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto) (on file with author).
97 Oral delivery undoubtedly had an impact on what was said. In the Anglo-Saxon epic
Beowulf, for instance,
action is presented less by visual particulars than by means of its material effects-often sound effects. There is consistent metonymy: we hear the footsteps of Beowulf, the scream of Grendel, the horn of Hygelac, the jingle of a
mail-shirt. It would be easier to imagine Beowulf as an oratorio than as a ...
film.
Michael Alexander, Introduction to BEOWULF 9, 43 (Michael Alexander trans., Penguin
Books 1973).
98 Well into the ninth century, the lack of word separation in most manuscripts made
this aural strategy virtually imperative. IVAN ILLICH & BARRY SANDERS, ABC: THE ALPHABETIZATION OF THE POPULAR MIND 46 (1988). See generally Paul Saenger, The Separation of Words and the Physiology of Reading, in LITERACY AND ORALITY 198 (David R.
Olson & Nancy Torrance eds., 1991).
99 In pre-Christian Norse mythology, for instance, the guardian of heaven, Heimdellr,
was so wise that "he could hear the wool grow on the sheep and the grass grow in the
fields." Alexander F. Chamberlain, Primitive Hearing and "Hearing-Words", 16 AM. J.
PSYCH. 119, 119 (1905). Right through the Middle Ages, Benedictine monks lived according to a Rule which analogously described Spiritual wisdom as hearkening to the call of
God. Norvene Vest, Ear of the Heart, 19 PARABOLA 42 (1994).
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and even decades after the fact. °° Jurisprudence thrived on oral
stories' 0 1 and vaguely poetic phrases. 0 2 Like early Greek law, law
in the early Middle Ages also seems to have enjoyed a metaphorical connection with music. 0 3 This connection was made especially
prominent in the legal writings of churchmen who apparently were
influenced by both the neo-Pythagorean philosophy of the Late
Roman bishop Augustine and their own everyday musical experiences in the chantries of cathedrals and monasteries."° In the
mid-sixth century, the monk Cassiodorus opined that "when we
commit injustice, we are without music." In 1096, Bishop Ivo of
Chartes actually entitled the prologue to his collection of canons
De consonantia canonum, "Of the Consonance [literally, a "sounding-together"] of the Canons."'10

5

Circa 1140, the monk Gratian

evoked the Latin term chorda or "string" (of, e.g., a lyre) when he
gave his Decretum the long-form title of Concordia discordantium
canonum, or "The Concordance [or "Harmonizing"] of Discordant
Canons." 0 6
As both ancient Greece and medieval Europe became more
familiar with and more dependent upon the written word, vision
100 M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND 1066-1307, at 3543 (2d ed. 1993); Hibbitts, supra note 79.
101 In this context it may be no coincidence that in Anglo-Saxon law, a litigant's formal
statement of claim was described as a talu-literally, a "tale." ANGLO-SAXON CHARTERS
366 (A.J. Robertson ed., 1956).
102 See, e.g., F.E. HARMER,. ANGLO-SAXON WRITS 85-92 (1952); Dorothy Bethurum,
Stylistic Features of the Old English Laws, 27 MOD. LANGUAGE REV. 262 (1932).
103 For instance, the singular form (lag) of the term log, which meant "law" in Old
Norse, also meant "tune." Philip Moseley, Laying Down the Law: Bruce Chatwin's The
Songlines and Australian Aboriginal Concepts of Land, in 3 LAW AND SEMIOTICS 267, 274
(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1989).
104 See generally PETER JEFFERY, RE-ENVISIONING
PAST MUSICAL CULTURES:
ETHNOMUSICOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF GREGORIAN CHANT (1992); Stephen G. Nichols,
Voice and Writing in Augustine and in the Troubadour Lyric, in Vox INTEXTA: ORALITY
AND TEXTUALITY IN THE MIDDLE AGES (A.N. Doane & Carol B. Pasternack eds., 1991).
105 STEPHEN KuTrNER, Harmony from Dissonance:An Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law, in THE
AGES 1, 4 (1980).

HISTORY OF IDEAS AND DOCTRINES OF CANON LAW IN THE MIDDLE

106 Of course, concordia is etymologically derived from cor, cordis, 'the heart' and
stands for 'an agreement of hearts, peace, order,' but the association with
chorda, 'string,' leading to the idea of a 'harmony of strings,' gives the word 'a
poetic ambivalence which allows for a kind of metaphysical punning'; indeed
we find an interchangeable use of 'consonance' and concordiain the Vulgate, in
St. Augustine, in Boethius, to name only a few. If we consider the importance
of musical theory for St. Augustine as a key to the understanding of the divine
order of creation and salvation, it is surely no idle playing with words to point
out these musical implications (should we say 'overtones'?) of Gratian's
thought.
Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
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gained in intellectual and social status. In the early fourth century
B.C., just as Greek literacy rates started to surge beyond marginality, 107 Plato had already declared sight to be "the source of the
greatest benefit for us."'10 8 Later in the fourth century, Aristotle
agreed that "seeing ...is ...the superior sense."' 0 9 The unprecedentedly literate Hellenistic period" 0 which began in Aristotle's
lifetime and continued for three centuries after his death saw
Greek painting displace more tactile sculpture and relief as the
leading artistic form"' and even become the conceptual model for
poetry. 1 2 Contemporaneously, Greek law began to accord a
greater privilege to visual expression. 1 3 Legal actions now had to
be commenced by a written complaint. 1 4 More and more agreements were concluded by contracts made under seal." 5 Aristotle's
metaphors for justice were notably visual rather than aural. In the
Ethics, he figuratively described the ideal judge as a geometer:
"Now the judge restores equality; it is as though there were a line
divided into unequal parts, and he took away that by which the

107

On the early fourth-century surge in Greek literacy, see

HARRIS,

supra note 82, at

115.

Timeus 47a (Benjamin Jowett trans.), in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIAsupra note 86, at 1151, 1174. On visualist expressions and metaphors in
the works of Plato, see HANS JONAS, THE PHENOMENON OF LIFE: TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL BIOLOGY 135 (1966); Keller & Grontworski, supra note 87, at 210-11. But see
also EVA C. KEULS, PLATO AND GREEK PAINTING 47 (1978) ("The sense of sight and the
one art which relates exclusively to vision, painting, furnish Plato's favorite metaphors for
everything which he considers relative, transitory and deceptive.").
109 1 ARISTOTLE, On Sense and the Sensible 437a (J.I. Bearle trans.), in THE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 673, 673 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., 1952).
110 On literacy and the uses of writing in the Hellenistic period, see generally PETER
108 PLATO,

LOGUES OF PLATO,

BING, THE WELL-READ MUSE: PRESENT AND PAST IN CALLIMACHUS AND THE HELLENIS-

TIC POETS

(1988).

111 Simone Besques-Mollard, Historical Summary: Greek Art, in LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PREHISTORIC AND ANCIENT ART 291
112 The analogy between painting and poetry,

(Rend Huygh6 ed., 1962).
prompted in part by the growing tendency
to write or inscribe poetry on a surface, can be traced back to Plato ("[T]he poet is ...the
counterpart of the painter." PLATO The Republic 605a, in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 86, at 575, 830) and, beyond him, to the sixth century B.C.
poet Simonides ("Painting is silent poetry; poetry is painting that speaks." Quoted in C.M.
BOWRA, THE GREEK EXPERIENCE 155 (1957)). Simonides's qualifications to the comparison accurately reflected the more attenuated relationship between painting and poetry in
his less literate age.
113 ROSALIND THOMAS, LITERACY AND ORALITY IN ANCIENT GREECE 89 (1992).
114 George M. Calhoun, Oral and Written Pleading in Athenian Courts, 50 TRANSACTIONS & PROC. AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS'N 177 (1919).
115 HARRIS, supra note 82, at 73, 120; see also Robert J. Bonner, The Use and Effect of
Attic Seals, 3 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 399 (1908).
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greater segment exceeds the half, and added it to the smaller segment .... [T]he judge ... is one who bisects ....
Europe experienced a similar turn towards the visual after its
literacy levels increased dramatically in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries A.D." 7 New architectural styles brought unprecedented
amounts of light-much of it filtered through colorful stained
glass"18-into churches and cathedrals that could now be stocked
with a vast array of images intended to serve as the "books of the
illiterate. '"" 9 Sight became the principal metaphor of spiritual
knowledge and revelation; 20 the taking of the Holy Eucharist was
reconceived as a primarily visual experience that depended on the
12
Moability of the congregation to see the elevation of the Host.
nastic scribes began to reorganize the layout of texts to facilitate
purely visual (i.e., silent) reading.' 22 Heraldry evolved into a complex visual code of chivalric identification and allegiance. The scientific community became fascinated with optics.' 23 Befitting the
increased importance of writing in this period, someone invented
reading glasses. 24 At roughly the same time, the mirror became a
fixture in life and, via metaphor, in literature: in the later Middle
Ages a flood of works on a multitude of subjects incorporated the
116 ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea 1132a (W.D. Ross trans.), in INTRODUCrION.TO ARISTOTLE 308, 406 (Richard McKeon ed., 1947).
117 J.HUIZINGA, THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 284 (1954) ("One of the fundamental traits of the mind of the declining Middle Ages is the predominance of the sense of
sight... ."); see also R.W. SCRIBNER, FOR THE SAKE OF SIMPLE FOLK: POPULAR PROPAGANDA FOR THE GERMAN REFORMATION 3-5 (1981). On literacy levels in the late medieval period, see generally HARVEY J. GRAFF,THE LEGACIES OF LITERACY: CONTINUITIES
,
AND CONTRADICTIONS IN WESTERN CULTURE AND SocIETY 53-74 (1987).

118 On the late medieval fascination with light and color, see UMBERTO Eco, The Aesthetics of Light, in ART AND BEAUTY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 43 (Hugh Bredin trans., Yale
Univ. Press 1986) (1959).
119 On the late medieval "explosion of images," see JACQUES ELLUL, THE HUMILIATION
OF THE WORD 186-92 (Joyce M. Hanks ed., 1985); HUIZINGA, supra note 117, at 151-52.
On images as the "books of the illiterate" (a concept originally propounded by Pope Gregory I in the sixth century, but increasingly influential in this period), see CARLOS M.N.
EIRE, WAR AGAINST THE IDOLS: THE REFORMATION OF WORSHIP FROM ERASMUS TO

CALVIN 19 (1986).
120 See generally CAROLLY ERICKSON, THE MEDIEVAL VISION: ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND

PERCEPTION (1976).
121 See, e.g., MIRI RUBIN, CORPUS CHRISTI: THE EUCHARIST IN LATE MEDIEVAL CULTURE 60-63 (1991).
122 IVAN ILLICH, IN THE VINEYARD OF THE TEXT: A COMMENTARY TO HUGH'S DIDASCALICON 93-107 (1993); see also MICHAEL CAMILLE, IMAGE ON THE EDGE: THE MARGINS

OF MEDIEVAL ART 18-20 (1992); Paul Saenger, Silent Reading: Its Impact on Late Medieval
Script and Society, 13 VIATOR 367 (1982).
123 See generally KATHERINE H. TACHAU, VISION AND CERTITUDE IN THE AGE OF OCKHAM: OPTICS, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SEMANTICS 1250-1345 (1988).

124 Edward Rosen, The Invention of Eyeglasses, 11 J. HIST. MED. 13 (1956).

[Vol. 16:229

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

word "mirror" (in Latin, speculum) into their titles. 125 European
law became notably "spectacular" as lawyers and jurists adopted
brightly colored robes 126 and began to sit in courtrooms decorated
with allegorical paintings.127 Rules, procedures, and precedents
were increasingly set down in treatises, customals, and codes, the
finer copies of which were illuminated with detailed pictures of
legal situations 128 and allegorical tables of legal relations. 129 Heraldry's popularity suggested the term "by color of office" (later extended to "color of law" and "color of title") as a metaphor for the
appearance, if not the fact, of legal right and power. 30 In response
to another aspect of contemporary visuality, several late medieval
legal texts, and even several famous late medieval lawyers, were
metaphorically described as "mirrors" that reflected what was
131
good or right for the community.
125

See generally

HERBERT GRABES, THE MUTABLE GLASS: MIRROR-IMAGERY IN

Ti-

TLES AND TEXTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND ENGLISH RENAISSANCE (1973).
126 W.N. HARGREAVES-MAWDSLEY, A HISTORY OF LEGAL DRESS IN EUROPE

60, 104-11 (1963); J.H. Baker, A History of English Judges' Robes, 12
(1978).
127 SAMUEL Y. EDGERTON, JR., Icons of Justice, in PICTURES AND

COSTUME

PUNISHMENT: ART

AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING THE FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE

21 (1985);

CRAIG

A

STUDY

HARBISON, THE LAST JUDGMENT IN SIXTEENTH CENTURY NORTHERN EUROPE:
OF THE RELATION BETWEEN ART AND THE REFORMATION
CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN ITALY,

128

See generally HALLDOR

4-8, 4627, 29-32

51-64 (1976);

JOHN LARNER,

1290-1420, at 79-80 (1971).

HERMANNSSON, ILLUMINATED MANUSCRIPTS OF THE JON-

SBOK (1940); ANTHONY MELNIKAS, THE CORPUS OF MINIATURES IN THE MANUSCRIPTS OF
DECRETUM GRATIANII (1975); Malcolm Letts, The Sachsenspiegel and Its Illustrators, 49
LAW Q. REV. 555 (1933); Jean-Claude Schmitt, Le miroir du canoniste: Les images et le
texte dans un manuscrit mddiival, 6 ANNALES: -CONOMIES, SOCItTS, CIVILISATIONS 1471

(1993). On occasion, individual legal documents were also illustrated. A charter recording
Edward I's grant of hunting rights to one Roger of Pilkington in 1291 "is surrounded on all
four sides with good coloured drawings of animals, birds and trees, as if to embody the
privileges it grants." CLANCHY, supra note 100, at 195. Such depictions became increasingly useful as legal texts began to circulate more generally among members of what were
still only semiliterate populations. Michael Camille, At the Edge of the Law: An Illustrated
Register of Writs in the PierpontMorgan Library, in ENGLAND IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 1, 5-6 (Nicholas Rogers ed., 1993).
129 For example, a thirteenth-century French manuscript of Gratian's Decretum sets the
"Table of Consanguinity" in the allegorical embrace of Time, drawn as a king. Reproduced
in JACQUES LE GOFF, MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION: 400-1500, at plate 16 (Julia Barrow trans.,
Basil Blackwell 1988) (1964). In a fifteenth-century work, the same "table" is allegorically
presented as a "Tree of Affinities." Reproduced in Gombrich, supra note 47, at 256.
130 Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 396
(1992).
131 Perhaps the most famous example of a legal "mirror"-text is the German Sachsenspiegel, or "Mirror of the Saxons," composed in the early thirteenth century; also note the
rather more dubious English work, Mirrorof Justices, written in Law French circa 12851290, and the canon law text, Speculum Abbreviatum ("Abbreviated Mirror"), composed
in Germany in the early fourteenth century. As to lawyers being identified as "mirrors,"
note the thirteenth-century French canonist Guillaume Durand, known as Speculator
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The ascendancy of sight that marked Hellenistic Greece and
late medieval Europe did not, however, automatically lead to denigration of the other senses and their manifestations. So long as
manuscripts were rare and expensive and literacy was still far from
"universal," these societies continued to be characterized by a sensory partnership of sorts. 132 While giving overall first place to the
sense of sight, Aristotle insisted that "for developing [intelligence]
...hearing.., takes the precedence."' 133 Rhetoric remained at the
heart of both Hellenistic and late medieval education. Outside the
medieval universities (and occasionally even inside), private reading still took the form of reciting, and inscription was frequently
accompanied by dictation.13 1 Written formats continued to echo
venerable aural habits. Dialogues remained popular, 35 as did writ1 36
ten poetry dealing with both fictional and scholarly subjects.
Some literary works explicitly claimed aural origins: both Chaucer's Canterbury Tales and Boccaccio's Decameron were presented
to their publics as the products of oral storytelling sessions. Authors addressed their readers as if the latter could hear the words
they had written (as they often could, given the habit of recitative
reading); 137 in many written works, "informing" was metaphorically expressed as "speaking," and "learning" was expressed as
"hearing."
(probably for.his 1271 work, Speculum judiciale), the early fourteenth-century Italian canonist Joannes Andrae, called speculum et lumen juris canonici ("mirror and light of the
canon law"), and the contemporary Italian commentator Bartolus, referred to simply as
speculum juris ("mirror of the law"). See generally DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO LAW 384, 1169-70 (1980).
132 For extended discussions of the "equilibrium" of the aural and the visual which
marked the later Middle Ages, see CLANCHY, supra note 100, at 266-72; D.R. Woolf,
Speech, Text and Time: The Sense of Hearing and the Sense of the Past in Renaissance
England, 18 ALBION 159, 166-71 (1986).
133 1 ARISTOTLE, supra note 109, 437a, at 673. See generally Anfinn Stigen, On the Alleged Primacy of Sight-With Some Remarks on Theoria and Praxis-in Aristotle, 37
SYMBOLAE OSLOENSES 14 (1962).
134 On the intersection of speaking, writing, and reading from the twelfth century, see
CLANCHY, supra note 100, at 266-72; Joyce Colemen, The Solace of Reading: Late Medieval
Views on the Reading Aloud of Literature, 46 ARV: SCANDINAVIAN Y.B. FOLKLORE 123
(1990); Ruth Crosby, Oral Delivery in the Middle Ages, 11 SPECULUM 88 (1936).
135 On the fortunes of the dialogue form in Europe from the twelfth to the mid-fifteenth
century, see K.J. Wilson, The Continuity of Post-ClassicalDialogue, 21 CITHARA 23 (1981);
see also W.A. Davenport, Patterns in Middle English Dialogues, in MEDIEVAL ENGLISH
STUDIES PRESENTED TO GEORGE KANE 144 (Edward D. Kennedy et al. eds., 1988).
136 On the medieval use of poetry as a scholarly form, see Lynn Thorndike, Unde Versus,
11 TRADrnO 163 (1955).
137 Thus, the repeated formula in Froissart's Chronicles (circa 1400): "as you have
heard." Woolf, supra note 132, at 159.
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Hellenistic and later medieval law reflected the ambivalent
sensory situation of their societies. In both contexts, many of the
old multi-sensory ceremonies and rituals appear to have survived-if not always in their original forms, then at least in fashions that accommodated the written word. 138 Legal Writing
reflected contemporary literary practices by evoking aurality in
several ways. Little Hellenistic legal literature has survived, but it
may be significant that most of Aristotle's surviving works, including those on law and justice, have come down to us as lecture
notes. 1 39 Late medieval statutes were often labelled and recalled
by their incipits, i.e., the first few words of their texts as heard
when read aloud. 140 A variety of late medieval legal manuals, treatises, and law reports were set down as dialogues.' 4 ' Finally, late
medieval jurists repeatedly referred to themselves or to the authors
of earlier legal works as "speaking" presences, 42 described legal
knowledge or opinions as things "said" or "heard,' 1 43 understood
statutory language as speech as opposed to text,'" and, on a
number of occasions, even cited poetic verses. 45
138 In late medieval England, for example, conveyances that might previously have involved the transfer of a symbol, such as a knife, were instead based on the transfer of a
document with the symbol physically attached. See CLANCHY, supra note 100, at 39.
139 JONATHAN BARNES, ARISTOTLE 3 (1982). Four of Aristotle's books on justice, now
lost, were apparently written as dialogues. T.A. Sinclair, Introduction to ARISTOTLE: THE
POLITICS 9, 11 (T.A. Sinclair trans., 1962).
140 Thus, the famous thirteenth-century English property statute Quia Emptores ("Because the purchasers"). Compare this style of naming With the contemporary habit of referring to the Christian "Lord's Prayer" (still more often heard than read) as the "Our
Father."
141 Note, for example, the thirteenth-century Court Baron, Sir John Fortescue's fifteenth-century In Praiseof the Laws of England, and Christopher St. Germain's early sixteenth-century Doctor and Student. Dialogue format was also employed in the early
English Year Books. T.F.T. PLUCKNETr, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 102 (1958).
142 In the late thirteenth century, for instance, Phillippe de Beaumanoir wrote that the
chapters in his Coutumes de Beauvaisis would "speak to" different topics, and frequently
looked back on past subjects with the words: "We have spoken of .... " THE COUTUMES
DE BEAUVAISIS OF PHILLIPPE DE BEAUMANOIR 5, 21 (F.R.P. Akehurst trans., 1992). Contemporary illuminated manuscripts actually depicted Beaumanoir as speaking or reciting
to an audience. CAMILLE, supra note 122, at 2.
143 Thus Littleton (in translation from Law French): "It is commonly said, that there be
three warranties .
L..."
LrrLETON'S TENURES sec. 697, at 312 (Eugene Wambaugh ed.,
1903). "I have heard say, that in the time of King Richard the Second .... " Id. sec. 720, at
322. "And upon this I have heard reason ....
i Id. sec. 739, at 333.
144 Again, Littleton: "Also, it is spoken in the end of the said statute of Gloucester,
which speaketh of the alienation with warranty made by the tenant by the curtesy ....
Id.
sec. 728, at 326.
145 See, e.g., 1 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND fol. lb (George E.
Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968); SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS
LEGUM ANGLIAE 15 (S.B. Chrimes trans., 1942) (1545-1546); LITTrLETON, supra note 143,
sec. 384, at 184; sec. 443, at 210; sec. 749, at 338.
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The invention of the printing press in the mid-fifteenth century
and its spread throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries encouraged a further increase in personal and social literacy levels and, with that, a further increase in cultural respect for,
and interest in, vision. 146 In the changing spirit of the time, the
English poet Robert Herrick wrote "[w]e credit most our sight; one
eye doth please/Our trust . . . more than ten eare-witnesses
[sicl."'1 47 The French philosopher Ren6 Descartes pointedly analogized vision and thought: "We shall learn how to employ our
mental intuition by comparing it with the way that we employ our
eyes.' 48 A child of the black and white printed text rather than of
the colorful iconographic manuscript, Descartes was more interested in the disembodied "mind's eye" of the imagination 4 9 than in
50
the physical perception of images,'
but he regarded cogitation as
5'
a "seeing" notwithstanding.'
Consistent with the textUalized immateriality of Cartesian vision, seals gave way to signatures on ordinary legal documents. 52
Law books gradually lost most of their illustrations and allegorical
settings,5 3 while courtrooms across Europe (like many churches)
See generally McLUHAN, supra note 44. See also HAROLD A. INNIS, THE BIAS OF
138 (1951) ("The discovery of printing in the middle of the fifteenth
century implied the beginning of... a type of civilization dominated by the eye rather than
the ear."); ROBERT K. LOGAN, THE ALPHABET EFFECT: THE IMPACT OF THE PHONETIC
ALPHABET ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 185 (1986) ("Print reinforces the visual bias of the alphabet. It makes literary material more available and hence
creates a greater dominance over the spoken word than manuscript writing does.").
147 Synnott, supra note 55, at 618.
148 Quoted in -Keller & Grontworski, supra note 87, at 214.
149 Id.
150 For more on the epistemological shift from pictorial "image" to text-driven "imagination" and its cultural and legal implications in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
see JAMES FENTRESS & CHRIS WICKHAM, SOCIAL MEMORY 13-14 (1992); Steven Wilf,
ImaginingJustice: Aesthetics and Public Executions in Late Eighteenth Century England, 5
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 51 (1993). Print was ultimately (if not initially) unfriendly to images
and the medieval pictorial tradition in part because the boost which its low cost and mass
availability gave to popular literacy made pictures less necessary as textual equivalents, and
in part because it could not readily reproduce either the colors or the fine texture of the
old illuminations. See, e.g., BOLTER, supra note 88, at 73 (discussing how print technology
encouraged a segregation of image and text which effectively subordinated the image by
confining it to a specific small portion of the book (the "Plates")); ANNE HOLLANDER,
MOVING PICTURES 33-38 (1991) (discussing how print's growing popularity and cultural
power contributed to a certain suppression of color in post-sixteenth-century European
painting).
151 See generally JAY, supra note 85, at 69-82.
146

COMMUNICATION

152 MICHEL PASTEREAU, FIGURES ET COULEURS: tTUDES SUR LA SYMBOLIQUI
SENSIBILITE MIDI9VALES 72
153 For instance, the early

ET LA

(1986).
editions of Coke on Littleton contained a "Table of Consanguinity" that, although possessing an allegorical element (this time emphasizing the patri-
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were stripped of much of their artwork. 154 The working robes of
many lawyers and judges faded to a combination of black and
white that incidentally evoked the colors (and in doing so, perhaps
also the authority) of the printed page. 55 The ancient figure of
56
Justice was blindfolded to save her from distracting images.'
Under the impetus of line and letters, the general visuality of law
was nonetheless preserved and even magnified. Following in the
footsteps of Continental rhetorician Peter Ramus, leading English
legal scholars such as Sir Edward Coke and Henry Finch promoted
the usage of schematic, dichotomizing diagrams to clarify legal concepts and arguments. 57 Jurists became more willing to deal with
legal treatises as visual and not figuratively aural works. 158 They
archal power of the father), was neither framed nor subordinated by allegory in the same
way that earlier Tables had been. See EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND sec. 13, at 19 (photo. reprint 1979) (1628). In 1766, the
allegorical aspects of the "Table of Descent" included in the first edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries would be minimal, being limited to the representation of handshakes denoting marriages, and ropes indicating lines of relation. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 240 (photo. reprint 1979) (1766).
154 This process continued into the late eighteenth century, culminating in the radical
de-iconization of the Parisian Palais de Justice after the French Revolution. In the long
run, however, the French government came to regret its initial asceticism, and in the nostalgic days of Napoleon III's Second Empire restored at least a measure of iconic grandeur
to the criminal courts of the Palais. See generally KATHERINE F. TAYLOR, IN THE THEATRE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PALAIS DE JUSTICE IN SECOND EMPIRE PARIS (1993).
155 See generally HARGREAVES-MAWDSLEY, supra note 126, at 9-14, 89-91, 110. See
also J.H. Baker, History of the Gowns Worn at the English Bar, 9 COSTUME 15 (1975);
Baker, supra note 126, at 27, 32-38.
156 Peter Goodrich, CriticalLegal Studies in England: Prospective Histories, 12 OXFORD
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 195, 225 (1992) ("Visual representations of faith were outlawed ... at
the same time that English law became a textual tradition and Justitia was rendered sightless. In the specific terms of English law the text came to take the place, not least by virtue
of the facilities and reproductional capacities of print technologies, of the image."). The
apparent contradiction between a blindfolded figure of Justice and increased respect for
texts may be resolved if one recalls that when Justice was blindfolded in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, texts still tended to be read aloud. See William Nelson, From 'Listen, Lordings' to 'Dear Reader,' 46 U. TORONTO Q. 110, 113 (1976-77).
157 On Ramist rhetoric and the popularization of visual diagrams in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, see WALTER J. ONG, RAMUS, METHOD AND THE DECAY OF DIALOGUE: FROM THE ART OF DISCOURSE TO THE ART OF REASON 83-91, 107-10 (1958);
Walter J. Ong, From Allegory to Diagram in the Renaissance Mind, 17 J. AESTHETICS &
ART CRITICISM 423 (1959). On Ramism and Henry Finch, see Wilfred Prest, The Dialectical Origins of Finch's Law, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 326 (1977).
158 For instance, Coke followed the traditional pattern in frequently referring to Littleton as having "spoken," or having "said" something, but he occasionally departed from
this phraseology by saying, "Littleton showeth here," or the like, indicating an approach to
the words as visual text. See, e.g., COKE, supra note 153, sec. 2, at 10; sec. 247, at 167; sec.
248, at 168; sec. 286, at 185; sec. 288, at 186. Likewise, Coke at one point remarked, "let us
heare what our Author will say." Id. sec. 241, at 164. At another point he announced, "let
us turne our eye to." Id. sec. 241, at 165.
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frequently, if not yet consistently, regarded themselves and their
readers as "observers. 159 Some expressly offered the public a
"view" or "image" of the law; 160 a few conceived of legal wisdom as
a metaphorical matter of light. 16 Referring to a surveyor's measuring instrument, Coke at one point called law a "golden
metwand."' 62 Late in the seventeenth century, the German legal
philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz elaborated the
ancient Aristotelian notion of law as geometry. 163
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, writing and visuality matured together. European and American literacy rates
reached unprecedented levels. 64 Philosophers actually proclaimed
the 1700s the "Age of Enlightenment." In the 1800s, paeans to
sight became commonplace. 65 John Ruskin wrote that "[tihe
greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world is to see something .... To see clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion, all in
one." 66 Ralph Waldo Emerson declared that at the moment of
See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
cap. 1, at 21, 29, 31, 33, 44; cap. 5, at 63; cap. 7, at 74 (photo. reprint 1979) (1641).
But see also id. cap. 1, at 24; cap. 8, at 82; cap. 9, at 97; cap. 38, at 211; cap. 53, at 259; cap.
73, at 317, for instances where Coke refers to himself and his readers as "speakers."
160 Thus, John Doderidge wrote that he had composed his work for those "who covet to
contemplate with their inward eye the express and perfect image of an English Lawyer
[and who desire] to view [various aspects of law] in their particular charge and duty."
JOHN DODERIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER 1 (London, Assignes of J. More, Esq. 1631).
161 COKE, supra note 153, Epilogus, at 395 (wishing his students "the gladsome light of
Jurisprudence"); see also HENRY FINCH, LAW OR A DISCOURSE THEREOF 5 (photo. reprint
159

ENGLAND

1978) (1759) (writing of "reason" in relation to law: "[T]hrough Adam's fall ... that excel-

lent image of reason is now so wonderfully defaced, even in the best and wisest, that the
light of this, as the light of the moon, shineth more obscurely, but yet shineth, so that from
it all the other laws receive their light.").
162 For a brief discussion of visual metaphors in Coke's writing, see STEPHEN D. WHITE,
SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH" 1621-1628, at 51
(1979).
163 See generally M.H. Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to
Langdell, 30 AM. J.LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986). See also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1983).
164 See generally JAMES S. ALLEN, IN THE PUBLIC EYE: A HISTORY OF READING IN
MODERN FRANCE, 1800-1940 (1991); WILLIAM J. GILMORE, READING BECOMES A NECESSITY OF LIFE: MATERIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE IN RURAL NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835
(1989); GRAFF, supra note 117, at 173-372; DAVID F. MITCH, THE RISE OF POPULAR LITERACY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE INFLUENCE OF PRIVATE CHOICE AND PUBLIC POL-

ICY (1992).
165 It has been said that "the nineteenth century was among the most visual periods of
western culture, the most given to precise observation-a spectator-like view shared by

novelists, painters, scientists, and, to an extent, by poets, who became 'visionary,' although
poetic vision did not always mean observation." WYLIE SYPHER, LITERATURE AND TECHNOLOGY: THE ALIEN VISION 74 (1968).
166 DIANE ACKERMAN, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SENSES

Ruskin's Modern Painters).

227 (1990) (quoting John
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epiphany, "I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see
all.' 1 67 In a variety of contexts, vision became a sensory cipher for
the exercise of power. Styles of landscape gardening that provided
the upper-class householder with a pleasing view of his estate gave
him power over nature. 68 Designs for asylums and prisons (such
as Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon") that enabled authorities to
continually survey their inmates gave the sane power over the insane, and the law-abiding power over the criminal.169 Vision even
became an instrument of imperialism, as didactic and theatric exhibitions at home of exotic colonial lifestyles abroad gave Europeans
psychological power over their overseas possessions. 70
In English law, William Blackstone set his Commentaries in a
metaphoric language that was strikingly visualist, especially considering that his work was born as a series of lectures wherein aural
metaphors would have been tolerated and even naturally expected.
Blackstone repeatedly made "observations,"' 171 analyzed legal powers from various "views" or "points of view,''' 72 and reported that
truths "appear.' 1 73 He notably regarded himself as offering the
167 RALPH W. EMERSON, NATURE 8 (1849). On visuality in mid-nineteenth-century
American literature generally, see, for example, RICHARD RUDISILL, MIRROR IMAGE: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE DAGUERREOTYPE ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 16-24 (1991) (discussing
how preexisting American visuality guaranteed a "favorable climate for the daguerrotype
to exert a profound influence on the nation"). On visuality in mid-nineteenth-century
English literature, see, for example, Audrey Jaffe, Spectacular Sympathy: Visuality and Ideology in Dicken's A Christmas Carol, 109 PuB. MOD. LANGUAGE Ass'N 254 (1994).
168 On the predominantly "visual" gardening styles of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, see CLASSEN, supra note 80, at 26-29; YI-Fu TUAN, TOPOPHILIA: A STUDY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES AND VALUES 140 (1974).
169 On surveillance and the prevailing concept of madness, see MICHEL FOUCAULT,
MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 70 (Richard Howard trans., Random House 1965) (1961) ("During the classical period, madness
was shown, but on the other side of bars; if present, it was at a distance, under the eyes of
reason that no longer felt any relation to it and that would not compromise itself by too
close a resemblance. Madness had become a thing to look at .... "). On surveillance and
eighteenth-century criminal punishment, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 170-228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1979) (1975).
170 See generally Timothy Mitchell, The World as Exhibition, 31 COMP. STUD. Soc. HIST.
217 (1989); Joseph Roach, The Artificial Eye: Augustan Theater and the Empire of the Visible, in THE PERFORMANCE OF POWER: THEATRICAL DISCOURSE AND POLITICS 131 (Sue
Ellen Case & Janelle Reinett eds., 1991). For a discussion of how visual (photographic)
images still serve to express and consolidate the West's power over Third World cultures,
see generally CATHERINE A. LUTZ & JANE L. COLLINS, READING NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (1993).
171 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 49,
87, 97, 129, 230, 282 (photo. reprint 1979) (1765).
172 See, e.g., id. at 183, 220.
173 See, e.g., id. at 145, 203.

1994]

MAKING SENSE OF METAPHORS

259

prospective law student "a general map" of the law,'7 4 which he
later described in visual terms as a magnificent, if somewhat antiquated, "Gothic castle.' 1 75 In American law, visuality similarly
manifested itself in the form, and even arguably in some of the
1 76
features, of the written Constitution approved at Philadelphia.
Thomas Jefferson proclaimed that the Constitution was "a good
canvas, on which some strokes only want retouching"; 177 he called
the principles protected in the Bill of Rights a "bright constellation" which had guided the republic through the course of revolution and reformation. 178 Early in the nineteenth century, Chief
Justice John Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence was fraught
with visual metaphors, some of which were inspired by the very
visibility of the document he was construing. 179 Later in the nineteenth century, such English and American legal educators as Albert Venn Dicey, Frederick Pollock, and Christopher Columbus
Langdell employed the radically disembodied visual metaphor of
174 Id. at 35. A comment of Walter Ong's may help to put this metaphor in context in a
way that underlines the relationship between print and visuality: "Only after print and the
extensive experience with maps that print implemented would human beings, when they
thought about the cosmos or universe or 'world' [or here, law], think primarily of something laid out before their eyes, as in a modem printed atlas ....
WALTER J. ONG,
ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD 73 (1982).
175 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

268 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1768).
176 On the technological and cultural roots of America's written Constitution, see
MICHAEL WARNER, Textuality and Legitimacy in the PrintedConstitution, in THE LETrERS
OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 97 (1990); Patrick H. Hutton, The Print Revolution of the Eighteenth Century
and the Drafting of Written Constitutions,56 VT. HIST. 154 (1988); Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Oral

and Written Cultures: North Carolina and the Constitution 1787-1791, in THE SOUTH'S
ROLE IN THE CREATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTs 77 (Robert J. Haws ed., 1991).
177 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956).
178 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 323-24 (James D. Richardson ed., 1908).
179 Thus in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall
declared:
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered ... are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their
eyes on the constitution, and see only the law.

Could it be that the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in
using it the constitution should not be looked into?
In some cases, then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges.
Id. at 178-79 (emphasis added); see also Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the
Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 931 n.8 (1988).
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law as geometry 8 ° to reconceive freedom "as a set of barriers
81
against coercive intrusion into zones of autonomous conduct.'
English legal historian Frederic Maitland pioneered the similarly
abstract characterization of law as a visible "seamless web."' 82 It
was nonetheless another jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who
best reflected the sensory bias of the age. Holmes repeatedly approached law, not to mention life and language, 83 as a matter of
looking. It was he who first described law as a "magic mirror"; 184 it
was he who first
advanced the notion that law could be found in a
"penumbra."' 85 Such metaphoric language gave law, not to mention his own words, extraordinary power and presence in an unprecedentedly visualist culture.
The added boost that print provided to the social and intellectual status of vision gradually undermined the position still occupied by the other forms of sensory experience in the Western
tradition. In societies no longer so unfamiliar or uncomfortable
with the visible word that they needed sound, touch, or savor to
ensure their own survival, those senses could be abandoned as primary carriers of information; in some instances they could even be
condemned. Aurality suffered especially. From the seventeenth
through the nineteenth centuries (with perhaps a brief interruption
during the consciously nostalgic days of Romanticism), 86 speech
180 On the history of the idea of "law as geometry" in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, see Grey, supra note 163, at 16-20; Hoeflich, supra note 163.
181 Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise,1870-1920, in PROFESSION AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 90 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
182 Ethan Katsh, Law in a DigitalWorld: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL.
L. REV. 403, 403 n.3 (1993).
183 Holmes once described life as "painting a picture." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., The

Class of '61, in

THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,

supra

note 6, at 160, 161. He later suggested that "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S.
418, 425 (1918). In connection with Holmes's penchant for visual metaphors, it is interesting to note that "he developed a religion of books," once again suggesting the link between
visuality and attachment to the written word. Peter Gibian, Opening and Closing the Conversation, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 186,214 (Robert W. Gordon
ed., 1992).
184 See supra note 6.
185 See Henly, supra note 14, at 83. On other occasions, Holmes invited his interlocutors
to envisage law as "a princess.., eternally weaving into her web dim figures of the everlengthening past" (HOLMES, supra note 6, at 22), and to "look at [law] as [would] a bad
man" (Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 407, 459 (1897)).
186 See generally MICHAEL S. MACOVSKI, DIALOGUE AND LITERATURE: APOSTROPHE,
AUDITORS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF ROMANTIC DISCOURSE (1994) (discussing the aurally
evocative style of much Romantic prose and poetry).
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was radically severed from writing and reading; the latter became
almost universally understood as silent practices having a distinct
and superior syntactic style. 87 Rhetoric was transformed into the
more visual study of composition and belles-lettres.'88 At least
among the "reading" middle and upper classes, silence became a
powerful norm of social etiquette and order. 189 Aural concepts
such as the "music of the spheres" were driven from the realm of
Newtonian science. 190 Written literature cast off most of the aural
forms it had previously assumed. The dialogue first became
strangely "monologic,"' 19 and then was virtually abandoned as a
leading literary device.' 91 Poetry, to the extent it was not supplanted by less aurally appealing prose, 9 3 was increasingly written

187 On the largely eighteenth-century separation of written English style and syntax
from spoken English style and syntax, see IAN A. GORDON, The Reaction Against Speech,
in THE MOVEMENT OF ENGLISH PROSE 144 (1966).
188 GEORGE KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRA-

240 (1980); Ronald F. Reid, The Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and Oratory, 1806-1904: A Case Study in Changing Concepts of
Rhetoric and Pedagogy, 45 Q. J. SPEECH 239 (1959).
189 See generally RICHARD SENNETr, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 214-16 (1976) (discussing silence as a bourgeois mechanism for controlling the less literate working class).
190 See generally JOHN HOLLANDER, THE UNTUNING OF THE SKY: IDEAS OF MUSIC IN
ENGLISH POETRY, 1500-1700 (1961) (discussing the implications of this expulsion for the
content and language of English verse).
191 It is perhaps scarcely surprising that the dialogue of Ramus' age [the sixteenth
century] should have tended away from true dialogue towards an elaborate
monologue, turning its speakers from active protagonists into the custodians of
a method elaborated, far from the clamour of their voices, by the writer's solitary pen.
VIRGINIA Cox, THE RENAISSANCE DIALOGUE: LITERARY DIALOGUE IN ITS SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL CONTEXTS, CASTIGLIONE TO GALILEO 104 (1992).
192 See generally id. at 99-113.
193 Prose had notably emerged as a European literary form around the time of the upsurge of literacy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. See generally WLAD GODZICH &
JEFFREY KrrrAY, THE EMERGENCE OF PROSE (1987). On the rising fortunes of prose in
the early print era, see generally JANEL M. MUELLER, THE NATIVE TONGUE AND THE
WORD: DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLISH PROSE STYLE 1380-1580 (1984); GEORGE WILLIAMDITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES

SON, THE SENECAN AMBLE: PROSE FROM BACON TO COLLIER (1951).
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not for the ear, but for the eye. 94 Once again, the form as a whole
was analogized to painting-ut pictura poesis.195
Law was inevitably caught up in the new antipathy to sound.
Between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, many traditional legal ceremonies in which aural declarations had reinforced
visual or tactile gestures were either abandoned or reduced to the
status of archaisms. In England, law showed noticeably less respect for customary property "rights" based only on oral tradition. 96 Judges increasingly refused to admit hearsay evidence. 97
In a society where the spoken word had lost a critical measure Of
its traditional power, slander (which had been taken very seriously
right through the Middle Ages) 198 was increasingly marginalized as
a legitimate cause of action. 199 Dialogues all but disappeared from
legal literature. 2°° Law finally dissolved its ancient relationship
with poetry: Blackstone's The Lawyer's Farewell to his Muse,20 1 a
verse of dubious quality written in the early 1740s on the occasion
of the future commentator's abandonment of poetry for law, is a
20 2
rough but convenient marker of a broader historical transition.
194 The English poet William Blake lamented what he considered to be the aural poverty of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century English poetry in these lines addressed to
the ancient Muses:
How have you left the ancient love
That bards of old enjoy'd in you!
The languid strings do scarcely move,
The sound is forced, the notes are few.
Quoted in ERNST R. CURTIUS, EUROPEAN LITERATURE AND THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES
246 (Willard R. Trask trans., Harper & Row 1953) (1948).
195 See generally JEAN H. HAGSTRUM, THE SISTER ARTS: THE TRADITION OF LITERARY
PICTORIALISM AND ENGLISH POETRY FROM DRYDEN TO GRAY (1958). See also supra note
112.
196 BOB BUSHAWAY, BY RITE: CUSTOM, CEREMONY AND COMMUNITY IN ENGLAND,

1700-1880 (1982); Peter King, Gleaners, Farmers and the Failure of Legal Sanctions in England 1750-1850, 125 PAST AND PRESENT 116 (1989).
197 On the history of the hearsay rule, see 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 214-19 (1944); 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1364
(Chadbourn rev. ed., 1974).
198 See, e.g., CARL LINDAHL, EARNEST GAMES: FOLKLORIC PATTERNS IN THE CANTERBURY TALES 73-86 (1987); R. H. Helmholtz, Introduction to 101 THE PUBLICATIONS OF
THE SELDEN SOCIETY: SELECT CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600, at xi (R. H. Helmholtz
ed., 1985).
199 From the late seventeenth century, slander plaintiffs were burdened by a requirement of proving "special damage" that did not apply to libel plaintiffs. ALAN HARDING, A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 294 (1966).
200 One of the last major works in this form is EDWARD WYNNE, EUNOMUS, OR DIALOGUES CONCERNING THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND (London, Benjamin
White and Son 1775).
201 Reprinted in LEWIS C. WARDEN, THE LIFE OF BLACKSTONE 48-52 (1938).
202 Afterwards, poetry played no serious role in English law except as a mnemonic device for struggling law students. In 1742, for instance, one J. Worrall published a version of
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The ancient and ailing system of aural lectures and exercises at the
Inns of Court in London finally collapsed, leaving law students to
learn most of their law from printed texts. 20 3
In America, oral tradition had a significant impact on law and
20 4
legal composition through the end of the eighteenth century;
when Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence in
1776, his draft contained marks indicating breaths and pauses appropriate to an oral reading of the document.20 5 In the nineteenth
century, however, oral practices and procedures fell out of legal
favor. An early judicial indulgence of "unwritten" sources of constitutional authority based on broad contextual understandings of
the Framers' intent soon gave way to a more strictly visual "textualism. ' 206 At mid-century, the United States Supreme Court began
to limit time for oral argument, preferring to place more weight on
written briefs.20 7 Legal apprenticeship, which had traditionally
been premised on the multisensory virtues of listening, observation, and discussion, was first transformed into an opportunity to
read the master's books,208 and then was largely abandoned in
favor of a form of classroom instruction that revolved around the
reading of appellate decisions and the writing of examinations.20 9
Legal language reflected material change: by the end of the 1800s,
the figurative references to "harmony" and "voice" that had once
Sir Edward Coke's Reports done into verse; the text was republished in a second edition in
1825, and in a third edition in 1826. FREDERICK C. HICKS, MEN AND BOOKS FAMOUS IN
THE LAW 81-82 (1921); Miller, supra note 72, at v-vi.
203 DAVID LEMMINGS, GENTLEMEN AND BARRISTERS: THE INNS OF COURT AND THE
ENGLISH BAR, 1680-1730, at 91-92 (1990).
204 See generally A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS:
CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE 1680-1810 (1981). See also RHYS ISSAC, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740-1790, at 91-92 (1982).
205 JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE

4-15 (1993). Fliegelman astutely notes that the oral
readings of the Declaration which Jefferson's markings overtly contemplated made it "an
event rather than a document. They [i.e.,
the readings] gave it a voice, which ... was
AND THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE

experienced emotionally and responded to vocally. Read out loud, the document that de-

nounced a false community would galvanize the bond of a true one." Id. at 26.
206 See Grey, supra note 63; Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extra-Textual Interpretation,53 ALB. L. REV. 297 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987); Sylvia Snowiss, From Fundamental Law to
the Supreme Law of the Land: A Reinterpretationof the Origin of Judicial Review, 2 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 1 (1987).
207 See Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Arguments in the Supreme Court: The Felt Necessities
of the Time, 1985 SuP. CT. HIST. Soc. Y.B. 22.
208 See generally Charles R. McKirdy, Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124 (1977).
209 See ROBERT STEVENS, HarvardSets the Style, in LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION
IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 50 (1983).
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21 ° and the
been scattered through the pages of the FederalistPapers
211
works of legal luminary Joseph Story were largely gone. Metaphorically, at least, American law fell all but silent.
Contemporary America is heir to both the technology and the
sensory bias of the recent past. Despite numerous signs that both
our facility and our comfort with writing are declining,212 the
United States is still one of the most print-saturated and print-oriented nations on earth. Our continued cultural dependence on the
written word undergirds our own visuality as I have described it-a
visuality that today is supported (even if, in the process, it is being
transformed) by such new "visual" technologies as motion pictures,
television, and computers. In this context, the visualist legal language that our culture has spawned and still sustains may ultimately be regarded as one of the most powerful, if also one of the
least recognized, legacies of writing.

B.

Visuality and Power

The traditional visuality of American legal metaphor has,
however, been more than just a function of general cultural circumstance. It has also been the product of power: the power of American men over women, the power of American whites over blacks,
the power of American "Anglos" over Hispanics, and the power of
American Protestants over Catholics and Jews. By making special
use of the written word to secure or extend their cultural authority,
210 For a list of the eight references to "harmony" in the FederalistPapers, see THE
FEDERALIST CONCORDANCE 237 (Thomas S. Engeman et al. eds., 1980). For a list of the 21

references to "voice" or "voices," see id. at 596. But see also the relatively more abundant
references to "enlightened" (23); "eye" or "eyes" (25); "reflect," "reflected," "reflecting,"
"reflection," or "reflections" (45); "light" or "lights" (46); "observation" or "observations"
(78); and "view," "viewed," "viewing," or "views" (168). Id. at 166, 190, 303-04, 359, 454,
593-94.
211 See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES 387 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES] (declaring that in
constitutional interpretation, "[w]here the words admit of two senses.., that sense is to be
adopted, which ... best harmonizes with the nature and objects ... of the instrument");
JOSEPH STORY, Course of Legal Study, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 69
(William W. Story ed., Da Capo Press 1972) (1852) (referring to maritime law as exhibiting
a "harmony of principles"); JOSEPH STORY, Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra, at 504 (referring to the "harmony of civil
society"); see also 3 COMMENTARIES, supra, at 754 (declaring that "our constitutions of
government ... are to speak in the same voice now, and for ever").

212 As to our facility, "something in excess of 60 million Americans are wholly or functionally illiterate." Jeremy Murray-Brown, Video Ergo Sum, in VIDEO ICONS & VALUES
17, 19 (Alan M. Olson et al. eds., 1991). As to our comfort, it has been noted repeatedly

that "increasing numbers of undergraduate students simply do not enjoy reading any
more." Alan M. Olson, Video Icons and Values: An Overview, in VIDEO ICONS & VALUES,
supra, at 1, 3.
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members of the former groups have gained a special respect for
vision and the visual that they have unilaterally made the standard
for "American" culture as a whole. In conditions where their literacy has been involuntarily restricted or their own traditions have
set limits to their trust of writing, members of the latter groups
have either been forced or have chosen to grant relatively more
respect to aural expression and experience.213 As American men,
whites, Anglos, and Protestants have used their cultural authority
to first monopolize, and then numerically and politically dominate
the ranks of the American legal profession, they and those whom
they have coerced or co-opted have indulged their visuality in,
among other things, a consistent preference for visual legal metaphor. They have literally shaped American legal language in their
own images.
Generalizing about the circumstances or perspectives shared
by the members of any group is a risky business. One must steer
between the Scylla of "essentialism" and the Charybdis of "antiessentialism," recognizing on the one hand that individuals falling
into a single category may, as individuals, be different in many respects,214 while acknowledging on the other hand that diverse individuals sharing a particular identity may, fortunately or
unfortunately, have had similar experiences or developed similar
views by virtue of that identity or society's reaction to it. 215 In this
portion of the Article, I nonetheless focus on differences between
Explicit reference in this paragraph to a select number of less visually biased, relatively more aurally oriented American groups (and the discussion of them below) is not
meant to deny the existence of other groups fitting the same description for the same reasons, such as Native Americans and, less obviously, Asian Americans. See, e.g., SMOOTHING THE GROUND: ESSAYS ON NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL LITERATURE (Brian Swann ed.,
1983) (discussing the significance and manifestations of oral tradition in Native American
societies); Linda C. Sledge, Oral Tradition in [Maxine Hong] Kingston's China Men, in
REDEFINING AMERICAN LITERARY HISTORY 142 (A. LaVonne Brown Ruoff & Jerry W.
Ward, Jr. eds., 1990) (discussing the significance of aurality in Asian American culture).
Members of the latter groups, however, have had even less opportunity than members of
the groups mentioned in the text to influence American legal thought and legal language.
To consider them at length now would not significantly advance or affect the argument I
will eventually offer on the relationship between aural cultural traditions and the use of
aural legal metaphors.
214 For instances of legal scholarship emphasizing differences between individuals in the
same group, see Nitya Duclos, Lessons of Difference: Feminist Theory on CulturalDiversity, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1990) (considering women); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1778-87 (1989) (considering people of
color).
215 For an instance of legal (feminist) scholarship emphasizing similarities between individuals based on shared group membership, see Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law,
Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25
(1990).
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groups more than on differences between individuals because I
fear that following the latter course would compromise our appreciation of important power relationships that have historically operated for and against certain Americans by virtue of their gender,
racial, ethnic, and religious associations. Here I should stress a
point I previously made in passing: 216 the group generalizations to
be discussed are strictly limited by being contingent constructs of
culture, not inevitable incidents of biology. They moreover illustrate differences of degree, rather than of kind. They reveal, if you
like, human differences mediated by human sameness. 217 Keeping
all this in mind, I will spend the next few pages exploring how
greater exposure to, dependence on, and even literal faith in writing have traditionally encouraged some American groups to embrace visuality more enthusiastically than have others. I will then
examine how the members of these former groups have imposed
their visuality on American legal culture and, in that course, on
American legal language.
I begin with the observation that American men's culture has
traditionally enjoyed a closer, more intense association with the
written word than has the culture comprised of American wo219
men.218 This was true from the earliest days of the republic.
Many American men absorbed the finer points of reading, writing,
and literate learning as youngsters in grammar schools and universities which for a long time were open only to them. As adults, a
good number engaged in businesses or professional callings (most
of which, again, were open only to men) that required them to
spend some portion of the day reading or writing correspondence,
contracts, or other texts. Into the twentieth century, American
men frequently assumed responsibility at home for reading such
See supra note 80.
On the particular danger of group-based "differences of kind" being exploited for
prejudicial or discriminatory purposes, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 818 n.69 (1993);
see also Kennedy, supra note 214, at 1816-18.
218 This is patently not to say, however, that individual American men have uniformly
been more writing-oriented than individual American women, or that men have uniformly
been more writing-oriented than women in particular American communities. For a study
of two contemporary Southern towns in which women are more writing-oriented than
men, see SHIRLEY B. HEATH, WAYS WITH WORDS: LANGUAGE, LIFE AND WORK IN COM.
MUNITIES AND CLASSROOMS (1983). See also Anita Puckett, "Let the Girls Do the Spelling
and Dan Will Do the Shooting": Literacy; the, Division of Labor, and Identity in a Rural
Appalachian Community, 65 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 137 (1992).
219 "[lIt is indisputable that literateness (in the fullest sense of the term) was more valued, encouraged and achieved in early America by men than by women." CATHY N. DA.
VIDSON, REVOLUTION AND THE WORD: THE RISE OF THE NOVEL IN AMERICA 61 (1986).
216
217
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standard writings as the Bible and the newspaper aloud to female
members of their families. Today some American feminists still
consider the written word-at least in its traditional 22semantic
and
0
syntactic incarnations-to be fundamentally "male.
It may be argued that the extent of their involvement with
written material has led American men as a group-like men in
other Western societies-to take a great interest in the phenomenon of visual observation that has been the source of so much of
their textual knowledge and authority. 221 As modern feminist
scholarship has taken pains to emphasize (if not necessarily explain), the "gaze" has historically been more of a "male" than a
"female" medium. 222 In the American tradition, men have been
primarily responsible for reducing the world-and, in the process,
women-to visual, two-dimensional texts, paintings, photographs,223 electronic images,224 diagrams, and equations.225 In their
220 One feminist solution to the perceived "maleness" of writing has been to consciously
disrupt traditional syntactic forms and "rewrite" the dictionary (on which written language
is based) so as to accommodate the hitherto unarticulated or semantically suppressed

realities of women's lived experience.
METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM

See, e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE

(1978); see also MARY

DALY, WEBSTER'S FIRST NEW

INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1987).

221 In Western societies, "[slexual dominance is ... intimately related to visual dominance." David Howes, Sensorial Anthropology, in VARIETIES, supra note 48, at 167, 189;
see also ARTHUR KROCKER, SPASM: VIRTUAL REALITY, ANDROID MUSIC AND ELECTRIC
FLESH 49 (1993) ("[T]he eye has a penis. It is a privileged organ of the male sex .... ).
222 Lorraine Gamman & Margaret Marshment, Introduction to THE FEMALE GAZE:

(Lorraine Gamman & Margaret Marshment eds., 1989); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:
Toward FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS 635, 636 (1983); Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasureand
Narrative Cinema, in VISUAL AND OTHER PLEASURES 14 (1989). Most recently, and more
abstractly, see DANA C. JACK, SILENCING THE SELF: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION 94, 108-27
(1991) (positing the existence of a moral "Over-Eye" that represents patriarchal notions of
what is "good" and "right" for women).
*223 Contemporary feminist opposition to pornography is at least partly based on the fact
that it is purely visual, disconnected from any other form of sensory engagement:
The man who stares at a photograph of a nude woman is a voyeur. He can look
freely and turn away when he wishes. He can run his hands over the twodimensional surface, but he will not be touched. He can know the body of a
woman, and yet encounter a knowledge that will not change him ....
SUSAN GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE 34
(1981); see also SONTAG, supra note 48, at 24 ("The knowledge gained through still photographs will always be ... a semblance of knowledge, a semblance of wisdom; as the act of
taking pictures is a semblance of wisdom, a semblance of rape. The very muteness of what
is, hypothetically, comprehensible in photographs is what constitutes their attraction and
provocativeness."). This feminist critique of visuality has recently been extended to embrace the now famous photograph of the whole Earth taken from space. See Yaakov J.
Garb, Perspective or Escape? Ecofeminist Musings on Contemporary Earth Imagery, in
REWEAVING THE WORLD: THE EMERGENCE OF ECOFEMINISM 264 (Irene Diamond & Gloria F. Orenstein eds., 1990). "[Tihe whole earth image," writes Garb in language that purposefully evokes Sontag's, "has no telling: it is verb-less, a snapshot, a single frozen
WOMEN AS VIEWERS OF POPULAR CULTURE 1
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capacities as school administrators, college professors, historians,
curators, and archivists, American men have long been in charge of
preserving and perpetuating the corpus of American visual culture
over time. As scientists and philosophers, they have further indulged their visuality by using mostly visual metaphors to describe
the central intellectual operations of thinking and knowing: they
have made "observations," offered "perspectives," and "specu226
lated" on the nature of reality.
The desire and even the need to look that has animated American male experience has frequently been coupled with a limited
and somewhat selective devaluation of aurality and evocatively aural forms. At least since the late eighteenth century, most American men have rejected dialogue and story as respectable vehicles
for the communication of important written information.227 More
generally, American men as a group have been eager to prescribe
silence as a positive personal and social value for others, if not necessarily for themselves.228 This latter strategy has been feasible in
part because many American men have had access to a visual medium of communication (writing) which in their experience has not
depended on sound to provide its sense. The strategy has moreover been politically useful because it has enabled American men
to consolidate their control of other groups that have been more
dependent on aural expression. The command that women (not to
mention children) be "seen and not heard"-implicitly evoked
from the anti-scolding laws of the seventeenth century229 through
instant .... It is not farfetched to call this image the magnum opus of patriarchal consciousness." Id. at 267, 275.
224 See Rosalind P. Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics
of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263 (1987).
225 In most popular representations it seems that men look and women are looked
at. In film, in television, in the press and in most popular narratives men are
shown to be in control of the gaze, women are controlled by it. Men act; women are acted upon. This is patriarchy.

Gamman & Marshment, supra note 222, at 1.
226 See Keller & Grontworski, supra note 87.
227 Thus, Linda Greene's initial concern about the reception that Derrick Bell's dialogically structured Chronicles would get from traditional (and mostly male) legal academics:
"After all, some would say, isn't it a bit contrived to discuss a subject as important as
equality through conversations ...[?]" Linda Greene, A Short Commentary on the Chronicles, 3 HARV. BLACKLE-rTER J. 60, 62 (1986).
228 Studies have indeed suggested that men talk more than women in a variety of
different settings. See generally Deborah James & Janice Drakich, UnderstandingGender
Differences in Amount of Talk: A Critical Review of Research, in GENDER AND CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION 281 (Deborah Tannen ed., 1993).
229 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, FEMININITY

113 (1984).
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the marital evidence laws of the nineteenth century23 0-has been a
prime guarantor of patriarchal power.
Over the course of American history, many American women
learned how to read and write during childhood, but well into this
century most spent their adult lives segregated in the home. Surrounded there in close quarters by nonliterate infants, semiliterate
children, and other women, they had limited incentive and limited
opportunity to use or develop their own literate skills. 231 During
the colonial period, what American women wanted or needed to
know to run their households was generally not written down. 32
In the years immediately following the Revolution, "republican
mothers" were encouraged to do more reading for the sake of their
children's good moral upbringing.233 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many American women read books and popular
magazines for their own instruction and diversion, organized and
joined reading clubs and literary societies,234 established public libraries, and actively (if somewhat surreptitiously) participated in
literary culture by writing letters and diaries; 235 an eclectic minority
even overcame the "anxiety of authorship ' 236 and wrote for general publication. Given restricted access to higher education,237
230 Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF.L. REv. 1, 12 (1990).
231 Most eighteenth- and nineteenth-century women lived within a world bounded

by home, church, and the institution of visiting-that endless trooping of women to one another's homes for social purposes. It was a world inhabited by
children and other women. Women helped one another with domestic chores
and in times of sickness, sorrow, or trouble. Entire days, even weeks, might be
spent exclusively with other women. Urban and town women could devote
virtually every day to visits, teas, or shopping trips with other women. Rural
women developed a pattern of more extended visits that lasted weeks and
sometimes months ....
CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 61 (1985).
232 RICHARD D. BROWN, KNOWLEDGE Is POWER: THE DIFFUSION OF INFORMATION IN
EARLY AMERICA, 1700-1865, at 162 (1989).
233 Id. at 165.
234 See generally THEODORA P. MARTIN, THE SOUND OF OUR OWN VOICES: WOMEN'S
STUDY CLUBS

1860-1910 (1987).

235 BROWN, supra note 232, at 167-81; Barbara Sicherman, Sense and Sensibility: A Case

Study of Women's Reading in Late-Victorian America, in READING IN AMERICA: LITERATURE AND SOCIAL HISTORY 201 (Cathy N. Davidson ed., 1989).
236 On how this anxiety burdened women who, by writing, proposed to enter a primarily
male preserve and in so doing proposed to dissociate themselves from their own bodies
and their own culture, see SANDRA M. GILBERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN
THE ATrIC: THE WOMAN WRITER AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY LITERARY IMAGINATION 3-16 (1979).
237 See generally BARBARA M. SOLOMON, IN THE COMPANY OF EDUCATED WOMEN: A
HISTORY OF WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA

(1985).
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textual materials, and publishing technology-not to mention a
proverbial male aversion to women who have worn the optical aids
frequently necessary for full participation in a visualist society 238 _
the visuality of American women's culture has nonetheless been
qualified. The failure of the available male-dominated visual media to adequately address women's concerns or women's reality has
only ensured that unmediated looking has not been as important or
meaningful to American women
as a group, as it has been to
23 9
American men as a group.

In this context, American women's culture has been relatively
more dependent on, or at least relatively more respectful of, aural
modes of communication. Compared to men, American women as
a group have historically shared a greater proportion of their
knowledge, experiences, and thoughts with one another by talking
and listening,240 telling stories,241 and engaging in the intimate, detailed dialogue that men have pejoratively called "gossip. '"242 As
238 "Men don't make passes at girls who wear glasses."
239 Compare the words of feminist Luce Irigaray, speaking from the somewhat analogous perspective of twentieth-century France: "Investment in the look is not privileged in
women as in men." Quoted in Craig Owens, The Discourse of Others: Feminists and
Postmodernism,in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CULTURE 70 (Hal Foster ed., 1983); see also Luce Irigaray, The Sex Which Is Not One, in NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS: AN ANTHOLOGY 99, 101 (Elaine Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds., 1980).

("Woman's desire... does not speak the same language as man's desire ....
the prevalence of the gaze ...

In this logic,

is particularly foreign .... ).

240 On talk or "dialogue" as "the essence of friendship" among American women, see
DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: MEN AND WOMEN IN CONVERSATION 80, 85 (1990); Carl S. Becker, FriendshipBetween Women: A PhenomenologicalStudy

of Best Friends, 18 J. PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 59 (1987). On talk as the primary

medium by which women have passed on significant bodies of scientific, as well as personal, information (concerning, for instance, the practice of midwifery), see Ruth Ginzberg, Uncovering Gynocentric Science, in FEMINI1SM & SCIENCE 69, 74-75 (Nancy Tuana
ed., 1989).
241 On women's storytelling and storytelling strategies, see Barbara Bate, Themes and
Perspectives in Women's Talk, in WOMEN COMMUNICATING: STUDIES OF WOMEN'S TALK

303 (Barbara Bate & Anita Taylor eds., 1988); Deanna L. Hall & Kristin M. Langellier,
Storytelling Strategies in Mother-DaughterCommunication, in WOMEN COMMUNICATING:
STUDIES OF WOMEN'S TALK, supra, at 107; Susan Kal~ik, "...
like Ann's gynecologist or

the time I was almost raped": PersonalNarrativesin Women's Rap Groups, in WOMEN AND
FOLKLORE 3 (Claire R. Farrer ed., 1975); Michael Presnell, Narrative Gender Differences:
Orality and Literacy, in DOING RESEARCH ON WOMEN'S COMMUNICATION: PERSPECTIVES
ON THEORY AND METHOD 118 (Kathryn Carter & Carole Spitzack eds., 1989). The partic-

ular association of storytelling with women in the Euro-American tradition notably goes
back to the seventeenth century when rapidly increasing levels of male literacy left women
largely responsible for continuing the oral traditions of Western culture. PETER BURKE,
POPULAR CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 51 (1978).
242 On the role of gossip in women's culture, see TANNEN, supra note 240, at 96-122;
Mary E. Brown, Soap Opera and Women's Culture: Politics and the Popular, in DOING
RESEARCH ON WOMEN'S COMMUNICATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THEORY AND METHOD,
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readers and writers, American women have traditionally tended to
favor forms of literature (such as the novel and poetry) that have
featured or strongly evoked the human voice.243 The extent to
which American women still define and experience their lives in
aural terms is evident in the emphasis that contemporary American
feminists place on women's talk (especially "consciousness raising") as a technique of validation and empowerment, 244 and on actual silence (or "silencing") as a form of oppression.245 It is also
apparent in the prominence of oral history in feminist studies,246 in
the tenor of feminist art history which rejects the notion of art as a
purely visual experience unmediated by language,247 in the continsupra note 241, at 161, 175-77; Deborah Jones, Gossip: Notes on Women's Oral Culture, 3
WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L Q. 193 (1980).
243 On the popularity of novels with American women in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in particular, see DAVIDSON, supra note 219, at 112-25; see also BROWN,
supra note 232, at 195-96. To some extent, women during this period may have preferred
novels because they had limited access to other forms of printed matter. At the same time,
novels-many of which revolved around female characters-had a special appeal to female readers insofar as they enabled them to feel "part of a community and tradition of
women who talk well about their lives and link them, by language, to larger subjects."
RACHEL M. BROWNSTEIN, BECOMING A HEROINE: READING ABOUT WOMEN IN NOVELS
24 (1982).
244 "Many women report feelings of craziness when their own experience fails to comport with the dominant theory of what they should feel. The way out of this craziness is
talk with other women about women's experience. This talk, or consciousness raising, has
taught women several things." Mari J. Matsuda, LiberalJurisprudenceand Abstracted Visions of Human Nature:A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV.
613, 620-21 (1986) (footnotes omitted); see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 536 (1982).
245 See, for example, King-Kok Cheung, "Don't Tell": Imposed Silences in The Color
Purple and The Woman Warrior, 103 PUB. MOD. LANGUAGE Ass'N 162 (1988) and other
examples cited therein. For a brief discussion of the feminist literature of silencing, see
West, supra note 21, at 67-75.
246 "If cultural historians are to construct a fully inclusive and historically accurate picture of... women's creative heritage ... we will need to look ... to sources outside writing
itself, to the traditions of the spoken arts." Jean H. Humez, "We Got Our History Lesson":
Oral HistoricalAutobiography and Women's Narrative Art Traditions, in TRADITION AND
THE TALENTS OF WOMEN 125, 125 (Florence Howe ed., 1991); see also WOMEN'S WORDS:
THE FEMINIST PRACTICE OF ORAL HISTORY (Sherna B. Gluck & Daphne Patai eds., 1991);
Kathryn Anderson et al., Beginning Where We Are: Feminist Methodology in Oral History,
in FEMINIST RESEARCH METHODS: EXEMPLARY READINGS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 94
(Joyce M. Nielsen ed., 1990). For recent examples of women's oral histories, see KATHLEEN CASEY, I ANSWER WITH My LIFE, LIFE HISTORIES OF WOMEN TEACHERS WORKING
FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (1993); GWENDOLYN ETrER-LEWIS, MY SOUL IS MY OWN: ORAL
NARRATIVES OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONS (1993); JULIE JONESEDDY, HOMESTEADING WOMEN: AN ORAL HISTORY OF COLORADO, 1890-1950 (1992);
PATRICIA P. MARTIN, SONGS MY MOTHER SANG TO ME: AN ORAL HISTORY OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN (1992); MARY ROTHSCHILD, DOING WHAT THE DAY BROUGHT:
AN ORAL HISTORY OF ARIZONA WOMEN (1992).
247 Griselda Pollock, Trouble in the Archives: Introduction, 4 DIFFERENCES at iii, iv

(1992). Note also the prominence of "ear-as-subject" in the Works of feminist artist Mira
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uing popularity of women's "reading groups" whose members discuss and sometimes even read aloud portions of selected texts,248 in
women's complementary experiments in "dialogic" or "collective"
writing,2 49 and in the pointedly personal, consciously conversational style of much feminist scholarship.250
Most important for present purposes, however, the relative
aurality of American women's culture is reflected in the aural metaphors American women often choose to define themselves, their
condition, and their world. Psychologist Mary Field Belenky and
her colleagues recently noted that
[i]n describing their lives [to us], women commonly talked about
voice and silence: "speaking up," "speaking out," "being silenced," "not being heard," "really listening," "really talking,"
"words as weapons," "feeling deaf and dumb," "having no
words," "saying what you mean," "listening to be heard," and so
on in an endless variety of connotations .... We found that

women repeatedly used the metaphor of voice to depict their
251
intellectual and ethical development ....

Schor. See generally PEGGY PHELAN, UNMARKED: THE POLITICS OF PERFORMANCE 51-60
(1993).
248 See, e.g., RACHEL W. JACOBSOHN, THE READING GROUP HANDBOOK 5, 17, 55

(1994); Elizabeth Long, Textual Interpretationas Collective Action, in THE ETHNOGRAPHY
OF READING 180, 196-203 (Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1992); Elizabeth Long, Women, Reading,
and CulturalAuthority: Some Implications of the Audience Perspective in CulturalStudies,
38 AM. Q. 591 (1986) [hereinafter Long, Women, Reading, and Cultural Authority]. As
Long's work emphasizes, reading groups are not now, nor have they ever been, an exclusively female enterprise. Contemporary American men nonetheless seem to be less attracted to them despite the precedents for such groups in the history of American and
European men's culture (ranging backwards from the "correspondence societies" of nineteenth-century male artisans, to the eighteenth-century English coffeehouses, to the medieval monasteries which featured vocal readings of scripture during communal meals).
249 CHERIS KRAMARAE, WOMEN AND MEN SPEAKING: FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYSIS 15-

16 (1981).
250 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Pride and Prejudice: Feminist Scholars Reclaim the First
Person, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 1991, at 15.
251 MARY F. BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SELF, VOICE AND MIND 18 (1986); see also JACK, supra note 222, at 30-37 (describing loss

of "voice" as women's metaphoric equivalent for loss of "self"); Elizabeth Bernstein &
Carol Gilligan, Unfairnessand Not Listening: Converging Themes in Emma Willard Girls'
Development, in MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL WORLDS OF ADOLESCENT
GIRLS AT EMMA WILLARD SCHOOL 147 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the

use of "not listening" as a metaphorical expression for "unfairness" in the language of
eleventh- and twelfth-grade girls in a private girls' school in New York State).
In another recent study, Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan have noted the tendency
of American adolescent girls to draw more visual metaphors into their speech just as they
are entering their first romantic relationships with boys who bring with them the visualist
biases of American men's culture. See LYN M. BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT
THE CROSSROADS 167, 184, 210-12 (1992). Elizabeth Long has also noted how women in
reading groups tend to be drawn towards visual metaphors, which "seems to support Ong's
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More than a mere matter of conversational idiom, aural metaphors
have also been strikingly prominent in the language of some of
America's most accomplished female scientists. Barbara McClintock, a Nobel laureate in genetics and cytology whose scientific
modus operandi has been described by her biographer as an exemplar of gendered "difference," repeatedly described the task of a
scientist not just as "looking at hypotheses," but also "listening to
the [research] material.

' 25 2

Understanding required the scientist to

"let the experiment tell you what to do. '253 Nature was thus envisaged as a speaker; in relating to nature, the scientist was not merely
an observer, but also a hearer. 254 Biologist Rachel Carson drew on
the same notion of a speaking' nature in her famous book Silent
Spring, where "silence" was not only a literal fact, but a metaphor
for the destruction of the ecosystem. Most recently, aural metaphorical language has been picked up and amplified in a wide variety of feminist writings25 5 which have explicitly and implicitly
claim that the increasing influence of the written word in our culture has privileged the
visual.., over the oral/aural in the human sensorium." Long, Women, Reading, and Cultural Authority, supra note 248, at 605.
252 EVELYN F. KELLER, A World of Difference, in REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 158, 162, 176 (1985).
253 Id. at 162. Compare the words of biophysicist Cynthia Haggerty, quoted in LINDA J.
SHEPHERD, LIFTING THE VEIL: THE FEMININE FACE OF SCIENCE 83 (1993) ("What does
this material tell me about the life process and about whatever pathology is going on?").
In a similar metaphoric vein, cancer researcher Sigrid Myrdal has characterized her scientific approach as "just sort of listening-just listening, without knowing how you're listening." Id. at 84.
254 In this context, it is interesting to note that traditional, male-generated, scientific
language labels irrelevant data "noise," metaphorically suggesting the undesirability, or at
least the extraneous nature, of hearing and things heard.
255 See, e.g., Nancy S. Love, Politics and Voice(s): An Empowerment/Knowledge Regime,
3 DIFFERENCES 85, 90 (1991) ("[A]s feminist theorists approach an extra-foundationalist,
or political, epistemology, vocal metaphors become increasingly prominent in their
work."); Rosanne Traficante, Breaking the Silence: The Voice Metaphor, a Statement of
Self-Identity and Education (1993) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Rutgers University).
The most famous feminist work to feature aural metaphors is undoubtedly CAROL GILLI.
GAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT

(1982). More recently, see Carol Gilligan et al., Epilogue: Soundings into Development, in
MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL WORLDS OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS AT EMMA
WILLARD SCHOOL, supra note 251, at 314 (using metaphors from music-"theme," "coun-

terpoint," "fugue," and "plainsong"-as vehicles for discussing adolescent girls' psychology). On the level of title alone, without extending the list to include the plethora of
feminist works that employ aural metaphors in their content, see also CLAUDIA BEPKO &
Jo-ANN KRESTAN, SINGING AT THE Top OF OUR LUNGS: WOMEN, LOVE AND CREATIVITY

at xv (1993) (in which the authors pointedly reject a visual metaphor for female fulfillment-a woman smiling-in favor of the aural metaphor of a women singing); CRIES OF
THE SPIRIT: A CELEBRATION OF WOMEN'S SPIRITUALITY (Marilyn Sewell ed., 1991); STEPHANIE DEMETRAKOPOULOS, LISTENING TO OUR BODIES: THE REBIRTH OF FEMININE
WISDOM (1983); BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK
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sought to evoke a sense-reality intimately familiar to most American women from their own personal and cultural experience.256
Somewhat analogously to the relative circumstances of American men's and women's culture, white American culture has historically been more dependent on the written word than has African
American culture. The first white American colonists came from
European countries that by the seventeenth century had already
developed significant textual traditions. 7 The first white American settlements were themselves creatures of authoritative writings-royal charters or (in the case of the Pilgrims) the Mayflower
Compact. Learning to read was a hallmark of white American education from its beginning. 258 Over the years, literacy and familiarity with a wide range of written materials gradually encouraged the
white American community to privilege sight and seeing. Through
the lens of books and newspapers, tracts and magazines, its members learned to literally look out at the world; they conveniently
came to regard texts and paintings as primary measures of cultural
worth. Thus was born the phenomenon that some African American intellectuals
have pejoratively, if accurately, labelled the
"white gaze. ' 259
In favoring the visual, white American culture did not reject
aurality completely. 26° For instance, for a long while the culture

(1989);

RITA C. MANNING, SPEAKING FROM THE HEART: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON

(1992); MANUELA D. MASCErrl, THE SONG OF EVE (1990) (discussing goddesses
and religious aspects of feminism); KATHLEEN NOBLE, THE SOUND OF A SILVER HORN:
RECLAIMING THE HEROISM IN CONTEMPORARY WOMEN'S LIVES (1994); To SPEAK OR BE
SILENT: THE PARADOX OF DISOBEDIENCE IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN (Lena B. Ross ed.,
1993). On the related aural phenomenon of "dialogue" as a recurrent metaphor of power
relationships in feminist writing, see Alice Templeton, The Dream and the Dialogue:Rich's
Feminist Poetics and Gadamer's Hermeneutics, 7 TULSA STUD. WOMEN'S LIT. 283 (1988).
256 Having said this, I do not wish to imply that feminist metaphors have been uniformly
aural. A variety-"lifting the veil," "removing the blindfold," or "looking behind the mirror," used as figures of empowerment, or "invisibility," used as a figure of disempowerment-have been strikingly visual. Visual metaphors nonetheless seem to fill a less
distinctive role in feminist rhetoric.
257 See GRAFF, supra note 117, at 108-72.
258 On the extent and impact of literacy instruction in colonial American schools, see
LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 1607-1783
(1970); KENNETH LOCKRIDGE, LITERACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 57-69 (1974).
259 See, e.g., Cornel West, West of Righteous: Anders Stephanson Talks with Cornel West,
ARTFORUM, Feb. 1994, at 66, 104.
260 On the significance of aurality and oral communication in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century (white) America, see BROWN, supra note 232; WARNER, supra note 176, at
21-29; Harry S. Stout, Religion, Communications, and the Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 34 WM. & MARY Q. 519 (1977).
ETHICS
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continued to produce, trust, and even revere great speakers.261
From the mid- to late nineteenth century, however, as white Americans approached "universal" literacy under the impetus of new developments in printing technology, 262 many seemed less confident
in what they said or heard. Within the white community, public
speech became more dependent on visual, written scripts;263 old264
fashioned oratory was increasingly dismissed as "mere rhetoric.
Storytelling survived, but it was largely, if not altogether accurately, associated with children, members of. less literate lower
classes, and inhabitants of backward rural areas. Most white
American authors jettisoned the more obvious aural mannerisms
and formats that had characterized so much American literature in
the antebellum era.265 At the same time, white Americans gradually embraced silence as both a social norm and a primary means of
social discipline. Increasingly used to sitting quietly in front of
texts, white American theater- and concert-goers who had formerly
been inclined to spontaneously talk to each other and interact with
stage performers 266 became more willing to sit in silent (or at least
suspended) judgment on the musicians and actors who appeared

261 On eighteenth- and nineteenth-century (white) American oratory, see BARNET BASKERVILLE, THE PEOPLE'S VOICE: THE ORATOR IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1979).
HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADDRESS (William N. Brigance
262 See GRAFF, supra note 117, at 340-72.

See also A
ed., 1943).

263 In 1875, E.L. Godkin, the editor of the influential periodical Nation, observed that
"[e]veryone ... knows what the 'great speech' of the average Congressman has become. It
is usually a diffuse written essay, full of quotations, often far-fetched and sometimes absurd, which he expects few people to listen to, and only lets off that he may get it printed."
Quoted in BASKERVILLE, supra note 261, at 90.
264 Barnet Baskerville, 19th Century Burlesque of Oratory, 20 AM. Q. 726, 726 (1968);
Barnet Baskerville, Principal Themes of Nineteenth-Century Critics of Oratory, 19 SPEECH
MONOGRAPHS 11 (1952).
265 On the "declamatory" nature and style of much antebellum American literature, see
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, A Declamatory Literature,in THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL ExPERIENCE 307 (1965). For a discussion of how oral practices and conventions shaped one
famous antebellum literary work, see John G. Bayer, Narrative Techniques and the Oral
Tradition in The Scarlet Letter, 52 AM. LITERATURE 250 (1980). It should not be assumed,
however, that white American authors completely disregarded or denigrated aurality in the

years after the Civil War. See, e.g., BARRY SANDERS, A Is FOR OX: VIOLENCE, ELEC-

209-24 (1994) (discussing
Mark Twain's sympathetic if caricatured and occasionally condescending treatment of orality in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn); Thomas D. Ziatic, The "Seeing Eye" and the
"Creating Mouth": Literacy and Orality in Mark Twain's Joan of Arc, 21 CLIO 285 (1992);
TRONIC MEDIA, AND THE SILENCING OF THE WRITTEN WORD

Larry D. Griffin, Orality in the Poetry of Walt Whitman (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma) (on file with author):.
266 JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS AND CIVILITY: MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
URBAN AMERICA

219 (1990).
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before them. 67 In the schoolroom where white American teachers
had once taught their students to read by recitation, the most important meta-lesson became, as it today remains, how to sit, write,
and read in contented quiet.2 68
The black Africans who were transported to America from the
1620s onward hailed from cultures that had only limited experience
with writing. Mostly living as slaves on the other side of the Middle Passage, blacks were given neither the literate instruction nor
the exposure to the written word that many American whites took
for granted. Southern "slave codes" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in fact prohibited anyone from teaching blacks to
read and write, for fear that they might become vulnerable to abolitionist tracts or use their skills to communicate with each other
and foment rebellion.269 These prohibitions were lifted after the
Civil War, but African Americans in the South and the North alike
continued to face discrimination and prejudice which formally and
informally prevented them from gaining equal access either to the
schools where basic literacy was taught, or to the universities where
students mastered entire fields of written learning. 270 The impossibility in these circumstances of black Americans (as a group) becoming highly dependent upon, and therefore partial toward, the
written word has largely precluded vision and visual forms from
achieving the same prominence in the African American community as they have attained in white America. 271 Notwithstanding
267 "The ritualistically silent audience of the nineteenth century was an audience of
'readers' observing a print convention." RICHARD LANHAM, THE ELECTRONIC WORD:
DEMOCRACY, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ARTS 76 (1993); see also KASSON, supra note 266, at
239-40; LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, HIGHBROw/LOWBROW: THE EMERGENCE OF CULTURAL
HIERARCHY IN AMERICA 177-200 (1988).
268 For a brief introduction to the late-nineteenth-century "silent reading" movement,
see DANIEL CALHOUN, THE INTELLIGENCE OF A PEOPLE 82-85 (1973).
269 The antiliteracy laws were not completely effective, however. In some cases, white
slaveowners taught their slaves to read so that the latter could assist in keeping their masters' accounts or running their businesses. White children are also known to have instructed their black playmates and servants. THOMAS L. WEBBER, DEEP LIKE THE
RIVERS: EDUCATION IN THE SLAVE QUARTER COMMUNITY 131-38 (1978). For a recent
study of the extent and nature of African American literacy in the pre-Civil War South, see
JANET D. CORNELIUS, "WHEN I CAN READ MY TITLE CLEAR": LITERACY, SLAVERY AND
RELIGION IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1991).

270 For a classic study of the various obstacles postbellum African Americans faced on
the road to literate education, see HORACE M. BOND, EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE
AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER (1966). See also MEYER WEINBERG, A CHANCE TO LEARN:
THE HISTORY OF RACE AND EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1973).
271 Writing's limited role in African American society-especially in the antebellum period-was long complemented and its negative impact on African American visuality was
even reinforced by the limited presence of paintings and other pictures in African American homes. As Frederick Douglass noted in 1870:
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black achievements in the literary and visual arts, contemporary
African American cultural critic Michele Wallace actually claims
that there exists a "visual void in black discourse '272 attributable to
"intra-racial pain and outside intervention. ' 273 Exclusively visual
expression and experience-including reading and writing-have
even been denigrated by some members of the African American
community as being either secondary repositories of the African
American heritage 274 or, more provocatively,
undesirable marks of
275
oppression.
and
assimilation
racial
Heretofore, colored Americans have thought little of adorning their parlors
with pictures .... Pictures come not with slavery and oppression and destitution, but with liberty, fair play and refinement. These conditions are now possible to colored American citizens, and I think the walls of their houses will soon
begin to bear evidence of their altered relation to the people about them.
Quoted in KATHERINE M. MCCLINTON, THE CHROMOLITHOGRAPHS OF LOUIS PRANG 37
(1973).
272 Michele Wallace, Afterword: "Why Are There No GreatBlack Artists?": The Problem
of Visuality in African American Culture, in BLACK POPULAR CULTURE 333, 334 (Gina
Dent ed., 1992).
273 Michele Wallace, Modernism, Postmodernismand the Problem of the Visual in AfroAmerican Culture, in OUT THERE: MARGINALIZATION AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 39,
40 (Russell Ferguson et al. eds., 1990); see also West, supra note 259, at 71 ("I do not
believe we have produced an African-American painter comparable to a John Coltrane or
a Duke Ellington. In fact I don't even think we've produced a writer comparable to them.
But you have this long history in which literacy was denied, in which pictorial art was
downplayed ....
").
274 The African cultures from which black Americans came have historically declined to
accord superior status to the visual. Thus, "African aesthetics beautifully blends the
human senses of sight, touch, sound, and the physical feel of movement.. . [while] Western
literacy has led to a rearrangement of the senses, with emphasis on the visual, on looking."
SIMON OTTENBERG, ANTHROPOLOGY AND AFRICAN AESTHETICS 9 (1971); see also Ian
Ritchie, Fusion of the Faculties: A Study of the Language of the Senses in Hausaland, in
VARIETIES, supra note 48, at 192.
275 GENEVA

SMITHERMAN,

TALKIN

AND TESTAFYIN:

THE LANGUAGE

OF BLACK

AMERICA 76-77 (1977); see also Ashraf H.A. Rushdy, Reading Mammy: The Subject of
Relation in Sherley Anne Williams' Dessa Rose, 27 AFRICAN AM. REV. 365, 366 (1993)
("[Tihe written word represents the processes used by racist white American institutions to
proscribe and prescribe African American subjectivity."). On the correlation between being seen to excel at or to enjoy a variety of textual and observational skills and "acting
white," see Signithia Fordham & John Ogbu, Black Students' School Success: Coping with
the Burden of "Acting White," 18 URB. REV. 176, 181 (1986).
While obviously excelling at a visual craft, a number of African American novelists
have expressed or demonstrated discomfort with visuality, especially as they have associated that with white American culture. The most obvious case in point is Ralph Ellison,
author of the Invisible Man (1952). Toni Morrison's first novel, The Bluest Eye (1970),
featured a young female character, Pecola Breedlove, suffering under the racist, judgmental gaze of her white teachers and the other white people in her community. Morrison's
narrator, Claudia MacNeer, "vents her rage against this eye-dominated culture by poking
out the 'glassy blue eyeballs' of a baby doll." Anthony J. Berret, Toni Morrison's Literary
Jazz, 32 CLA J. 267, 269 (1989); see also Malin L. Walther, Out of Sight: Toni Morrison's
Revision of Beauty, 24 BLACK AM. LITERATURE F. 775, 786 (1990) (discussing how Morrison's writing consistently "removes black beauty from the [white] specular system").
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Both by force and by choice, African American culture has
retained an appreciation and respect for its own oral tradition that
white American culture has largely lost. That tradition began with
the bits and pieces of ancient African lore-songs and stories,
proverbs and parables-that individual Africans held in their
heads when they were taken as slaves from their homelands.276
Later generations of black Americans developed and elaborated
upon it according to their own unique needs and conditions.277 Today it lives most vibrantly in storytelling,278 preaching,279
288c121
2 jazz, 2822and rap."' It is a defining, even
"toasts, 28 ° "signifying,"
privileged, element in African American culture:2 84 as Cornel West
has recently noted, the "organic intellectual traditions in AfricanAmerican life ...are oral, improvisational, and histrionic .
"...
,8
White Americans have tended to interpret this aurality as a mark
of ongoing African American disempowerment, but for many Afri-

276

On the oral traditions of various African cultures, see generally JOHN M.

CHERNOFF,

AFRICAN RHYTHM AND AFRICAN SENSIBILITY (1979); OKPEWHO, supra note 70. On the
general significance of sound in African societies, see PAUL STOLLER, THE TASTE OF ETHNOGRAPHIC THINGS: THE SENSES IN ANTHROPOLOGY 101-22 (1989) (discussing sound in

African Songhay culture); Philip M. Peek, The Sounds of Silence: Cross-World Communication and the Auditory Arts in African Societies, 21 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 474 (1994).
277 See generally BEN SIDRAN, BLACK TALK (1971); SMITHERMAN, supra note 275. On
the important cultural and communicative role of the aural arts in African American plantation society in particular, see ROGER D. ABRAHAMS, SINGING THE MASTER: THE EMERGENCE OF AFRICAN AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH

(1992);

LAWRENCE

W. LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRO-AMERICAN FOLK
THOUGHT FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (1977).
278 See generally TALK THAT TALK: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN STORYTELLING (Linda Gross & Marian E. Barnes eds., 1989).
279 See generally GERALD L. DAVIS, I GOT THE WORD IN ME AND I CAN SING IT, YOU

KNOW: A STUDY OF THE PERFORMED AFRICAN-AMERICAN SERMON (1985).
280 See SMITHERMAN, supra note 275, at 157-61.
281 See generally Henry L. Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey and the Language of Signifyin(g): Rhetorical Differences and the Orders of Meaning, in THE SIGNIFYING MONKEY: A
THEORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM 44 (1988); Patricia Sullivan, Signification and African-American Rhetoric: A Case Study of Jesse Jackson's "Common Ground
and Common Sense" Speech, 41 COMM. Q. 1 (1993).
282 See generally SIDRAN, supra note 277.
283 On rap's roots in African American oral tradition, see Jimmie L. Briggs, Jr., Where
They're Calling From: Cultural Roots of Rap, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 151, 155-56
(1993); Tricia Rose, Orality and Technology: Rap Music and Afro-American Cultural
Resistance, POPULAR MUSIC & SOC'Y, Winter 1989, at 35.
284 Phillip B. Harper, Synesthesia, "Crossover," and Blacks in Popular Music, 23 Soc.
TEXT 102, 103 (1989) ("[T]he privileging of aural ...

expression over the visual is a vital

element in the larger Afro-American cultural tradition.").
285 Cornel West, The Dilemma of the Black Intellectual, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Winter 1993-94, at 59, 61.
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can Americans it is equally a mark of survival and resistance.28 6
Such an historical and political commitment to speech and sound
has understandably induced in the African American community a
certain suspicion of silence, which by definition would suppress
oral interaction and hence compromise cultural continuity.287
Oral traditions and forms have notably resonated in the
corpus of African American literature which has come into existence since the American Revolution. 28 8 In the mid-nineteenth century, Frederick Douglass's writings rang with the rhythmic
cadences of speech.28 9 In 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois set The Souls of
Black Folk in an additive, metered, and somewhat repetitive prose
style that almost literally echoed the most effective forms of oral
presentation; 290 he introduced his chapters with musical epigraphs
(bars from African American "sorrow songs") that overtly testified
to the cultural power of aurality.291 In the 1930s and 1940s, Langston Hughes's poetry consciously captured the syncopated nuances
of jazz and "be-bop. '' 292 More recently, Maya Angelou has de-

clared of her own work:
I write for the Black voice and any ear which can hear it. As a
composer writes for musical instruments and a choreographer
creates for the body, I search for sound, tempos, and rhythms to
ride through the vocal cord over the. tongue, and out of the lips

286 See Harryette Mullen, Runaway Tongue: Resistant Orality in Uncle Tom's Cabin,
Our Nig, Incidents in Life as a Slave Girl, and Beloved, in THE CULTURE OF SENTIMENT:
RACE, GENDER AND SENTIMENTALITY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 244 (Shirley

Samuels ed., 1992); Rose, supra note 283, at 37 ("Rap constitutes a form of resistance and
self-identification for young working-class black[s] ... who are completely marginalized.").
287 THOMAS KOCHMAN, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES IN CONFLICT 22-23 (1981).
288 See JOHN F. CALLAHAN, IN THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN GRAIN: THE PURSUIT OF
VOICE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY BLACK FICTION (1988); GAYL JONES, LIBERATING
VOICES: ORAL TRADITION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN LITERATURE

(1991); Lawrence B.

James, The Influence of Black Orality on Contemporary Black Poetry and Its Implications
for Performance, 45 S. SPEECH COMM. J. 249 (1980); Mullen, supra note 286; Mary L.E.
Martin, Orality and Black Nonfiction Prose Style in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University) (on file with
author).
289 For an extended discussion of Douglass's "oral style," see Martin, supra note 288, at
88-128.
290 For an extended discussion of Du Bois's "oral style," see id. at 168-82.
291 On the significance, of these songs in Du Bois's writing and thought, see ERIC J.
SUNDQUIST, To WAKE THE NATIONS: RACE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN LITERATURE
457-539 (1993).
292 See generally L.L. Dickson, "Keep It in the Head": Jazz Elements in Modern Black
American Poetry, 10 MELUS 29 (1983).
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of Black people.... I accept the glory of stridencies and purand somber sonorities. 293

rings, trumpetings
Music and oral storytelling have additionally provided the narrative frameworks or have been particularly prominent themes in the
writings of a variety of African American novelists.294
293 Maya Angelou, Shades and Slashes of Light, in BLACK WOMEN WRITERS 1950-1980,
at 3, 3-4 (Mari Evans ed., 1984). Compare the comments of African American novelist
Gayl Jones:
I still feel that the best of my writing comes from having heard rather than

read.... Hearing has to be essential ....

You have to be able to hear other

people's voices and you have to be able to hear your own voice.... I have to
bring the written things into the oral mode before I can deal with them.
Melvin Dixon, Singing a Deep Song: Language as Evidence in the Novels of Gayl Jones, in
BLACK WOMEN WRITERS 1950-1980, supra, at 236, 238-39.
In light of my earlier comments suggesting that American men in general may have a
relatively visual bias and American women in general may have a relatively aural bias, it is
very interesting to note one critic's suggestion that for all they may have in common as the
products of an African American culture which respects the aural more than does its white
American counterpart, "[tlhe texts of black women are different from literature by black
men.... [T]he area of their distinctiveness lies between the spoken text and the expressive
text-between voice and vision .... [T]exts by black males often isolate the word, circumscribe its territory and subordinate its voice to expressive behaviors." KARLA F.C. HOLLOWAY, MOORINGS AND METAPHORS: FIGURES OF CULTURE AND GENDER IN BLACK
WOMEN'S LITERATURE 6-7 (1992). Another commentator has suggested that African

American male writers such as Langston Hughes, Richard Wright, and Ralph Ellison have
been more concerned with texts and the acts of reading and writing, while African American female writers such as Zora Neale Hurston and Toni Morrison have been more concerned with voice and orality. Deborah Clarke, "What There Was Before Language":
Preliteracy in Toni Morrison's Song of Solomon, in ANXIOUS POWER: READING, WRITING
AND AMBIVALENCE IN NARRATIVE BY WOMEN 265, 266-67 (Carol J. Singley & Susan E.
Sweeney eds., 1993); see also Pearlie M. Peters, "Ah Got the Law in My Mouth": Black
Women and Assertive Voice in Hurston's Fiction and Folklore, 37 CLA J. 293 (1994).
294 On the role of music as theme and touchstone in African American literature, see
Berret, supra note 275; Eleanor W. Traylor, Music as Theme: The Blues Mode in the Works
of Margaret Walker, in BLACK WOMEN WRITERS 1950-1980, supra note 293, at 511; Eleanor W. Traylor, Music as Theme: The Jazz Mode in the Works of Toni Cade Bambara, in
BLACK WOMEN WRITERS 1950-1980, supra note 293, at 58; Alfonso W. Hawkins, Jr., The
Musical Tradition as an Affirmation of Cultural Identity in African American Autobiography (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with author).
On the role of oral storytelling in contemporary African American fiction, see generally Jay Clayton, The Narrative Turn in Recent Minority Fiction, 2 AM. LITERARY HIST. 375
(1990). The climax of David Bradley's The Chaneysville Incident (1981) notably features
the night-long retelling of a historical tale about escaped slaves. Alex Haley's Roots (1976)
is the story of a personal quest made possible by a history of family storytelling, a quest
which culminates in Haley hearing a West African griot recount how one of Haley's own
ancestors was abducted by slavers. Toni Morrison's Song of Solomon (1977) features three
characters-Macon Dead, First Corinthians, and Milkman-who through personal experiences rediscover the power of stories told and heard. (On the specific connection between
Morrison's storytelling and African American oral tradition, see Clarke, supra note 293;
Joyce I. Middleton, Orality, Literacy, and Memory in Toni Morrison's Song of Solomon, 55
C. ENG. 64 (1993)). John Wideman's Reuben (1987) is about an unlicensed lawyer who
helps clients by simply listening to them tell their own stories. Compare the prominence of
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On the levels of language and ethnicity as distinguished from
"race," Americans from the loosely defined "Anglo" community
may also be said to have had, as a group, a relatively closer association with the written word than have Americans from "Hispanic"
backgrounds. Members of the former group have had considerable
facility with the English language. In some instances, their ancestral or psychological attachment to an English culture which traditionally has placed greater emphasis on reading and writing than
have some other European societies 295 has given them a unique
advantage in an English-based, writing-oriented American educational structure. Both in and out of school, many Anglo-Americans additionally have had physical and economic recourse to a
good deal of written English language material. Finally, Anglos
have traditionally controlled the major American print media and
have been in a unique position to set the aesthetic standards for the
American visual arts. All these factors have encouraged AngloAmericans, as a group, to take a greater interest in, and become
more dependent upon, visual expression and experience.
Americans from Hispanic backgrounds have traditionally
been burdened by discriminatory Anglo attitudes and policies that
have directly and indirectly kept them at the margins of American
written culture.296 Hispanic Americans have faced enormous linguistic barriers: in a culture which has informally (and in some
American jurisdictions, formally). adopted English as its official
language, English language literacy has been made a prerequisite
for access to "mainstream" American culture. The difficulty of
learning to read English in English language classrooms at a stage
of life when Spanish speaking children have not yet mastered
Spanish has been a leading cause of the high dropout rates traditionally encountered among Hispanic American school students.297
At the same time, the successful cultivation of Spanish language
literacy has been rendered problematic because of the intolerance
or lack of facilities for Spanish language instruction in most American schools and universities.298 With much written material in both
English and Spanish having thus been rendered largely meaningstorytelling in these and other works with the prominence of storytelling in the Canterbury
Tales and the Decameron. See supra p. 253.
295 See generally GRAFF, supra note 117.
296 John H. Burma, Introduction to MEXICAN-AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES: A
READER at xvii (John H. Burma ed., 1970) [hereinafter MEXICAN-AMERICAN READER].
297 See generally A.R. Ramirez, Adult Illiteracy, in MEXICAN-AMERICAN READER,
supra note 296, at 100; NEA-Tscon Survey, The Invisible Minority, in MEXICAN-AMERICAN READER, supra note 296, at 103, 107-08.
298 NEA-Tuscon Survey, supra note 297, at 110-11.
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less or inaccessible, American Hispanic culture has not been pulled
towards visuality in the same manner as has its Anglo counterpart.299 Instead, many Hispanics have repeatedly found themselves
drawn and sometimes forced back into the soundscapes of their
own ethnic communities. Here, aurality born of discrimination and
necessity has been positively reinforced by strong Spanish and Native American oral traditions,3 °° with the result that aural expression has been the primary conduit of Hispanic language and
culture.30 1 Today the power and attraction of aurality in Hispanic
American life is manifested in the strength of contemporary Hispanic storytelling, in the ongoing popularity of dialogic "competitive" and "collective" recollections offered by Hispanic elders,30 2
and in the cultural prominence of traditional Hispanic ballads (corridos). °3 Somewhat less directly, the same aurality is reflected in
Hispanic American novels that draw on cuentos (traditional oral
tales), 30 4 in Hispanic American poetry inspired by corridos30 5 or
written with the specific intention of being read aloud,3° and in the
variety of oral histories that have begun to document different aspects of the Hispanic American experience.30 7
299 "Were the Hispanic community in the United States to possess the means of production, promotion, and distribution of its literature in printed form, were it to control its
history and image in print, [Hispanic writers'] works might be more print-bound [i.e., more
visually oriented] .... " Nicolas Kanellos, Orality and Hispanic Literature in the United
States, in REDEFINING AMERICAN LITERARY HISTORY, supra note 213, at 117, 122.
300 Arnulfo D. Trejo, Of Books and Libraries, in THE CHICANOS: As WE SEE OURSELVES 167, 172-74 (Arnulfo D. Trejo ed., 1979). It is noteworthy that the rate of illiteracy
among Spanish adults as late as the 1850s was roughly 75%, as compared to 30% to 33%
among English adults. CARLO M. CIPOLLA, LITERACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST
115 (1969).
301 "For the Mexican American, the spoken language has been the primary means of
transmitting from one generation to another information that is considered significant and/
or unusual." Trejo, supra note 300, at 172.
302 See generally CHARLES L. BRIGGS, COMPETENCE IN PERFORMANCE: THE CREATIVITY OF TRADITION IN MEXICANO VERBAL ART 59-99 (1988).
303 See generally Reynaldo Ruiz, The Corrido as a Medium for CulturalIdentification, in
IMAGINATION, EMBLEMS AND EXPRESSIONS: ESSAYS ON LATIN AMERICAN, CARIBBEAN,
AND CONTINENTAL CULTURE AND IDENTITY 53 (Helen Ryan-Ranson ed., 1993). See also

Trejo, supra note 300, at 172.
304 See, for example, the works of Rudolfo Anaya, discussed in Reed W. Dasenbrock,
Forms of Biculturalism in Southwestern Literature:The Work of Rudolfo Anaya and Leslie
Marmon Silko, 21 GENRE 307 (1988).
305 See generally Jos6 E. Limon, Oral Tradition and Poetic Influence: Two Poets from
GreaterMexico, in REDEFINING AMERICAN LITERARY HISTORY, supra note 213, at 124.
306 See generally Kanellos, supra note 299.
307 See, e.g., MARILYN P. DAVIS, MEXICAN VOICES/AMERICAN DREAMS: AN ORAL HISTORY OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES (1990); MARTIN, supra note 234;
BEATRICE R. OWSLEY, THE HISPANIC-AMERICAN ENTREPRENEUR: AN ORAL HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN DREAM (1992).
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With respect to religion, the American Protestant community's special affection for the written word is born of the traditional Protestant conviction that only the written Bible contains the
pure and true word of God (sola scriptura). In this context, reading has been considered as more than just a skill; it has been regarded as a sure route to salvation. The initial Protestant (largely
Lutheran) enthusiasm for the spoken word during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries 308 may be construed as a temporary response to the realities of then limited European literacy; in the
short term, what was written might at least be heard by all if it
could not yet be read by all.30 9 As their religious beliefs encouraged Protestants to become more literate, however, the textualist theologies of John Calvin and Huldrych Zwingli gained
ground 310 and Protestantism as a whole became more visualist.
The American Puritans notably thought of God less as a speaker
than as a spectator. The pulpits of many New England meetinghouses bore but a single graphic device: "an enormous, carefully
painted, staring eye, a terrible and suggestive illustration to youthful wrong-doers of the great all-seeing eye of God."'311 Men could
help God by watching each other. In the Puritan meetinghouse,
the elders sat underneath the pulpit so that they could see the congregation; 312 outside the meetinghouse, "holy-watching" over one's
neighbors was part of a man's civic and religious duty.3 13 American
Quakers sought a metaphorically visual "Inner Light" and adopted
as their primary form of collective worship the so-called "silent
meeting" in which they "waited upon the Spirit" with only occasional spoken interjections. 314 American Shakerism also had a
308

See

WILLIAM

A.

GRAHAM,

Hearing and Seeing: The Rhetoric of Martin Luther, in

BEYOND THE WRITTEN WORD: ORAL ASPECTS* OF SCRIPTURE IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION 141 (1987); see also Woolf, supra note 132, at 174-75.
309 See generally Robert Scribner, Oral Culture and the Diffusion of Reformation Ideas,

5

HisT. EUR. IDEAS 237 (1984).
31o See generally James A. Freeman,

Orality Versus Textuality in the Reformation: The
Origin and Influence of Textuality on Theological Perspectives in the Sixteenth Century
(1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University) (on file with author). For a specific discussion of Zwingli's scripturally inspired attack on music in worship, see CHARLES
GARSIDE, JR., ZWINGLI AND THE ARTS 43-47 (1966).
311 ALICE M. EARLE, THE SABBATH IN PURITAN NEW ENGLAND 16 (photo. reprint
1974) (1891).
312 DAVID H. FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 118
(1989).
313 ROGER THOMPSON, SEX IN MIDDLESEX: POPULAR MORES IN A MASSACHUSE TTS

COUNTY, 1649-1699, at 32, 169-89 (1986).
314 See generally Richard Bauman, Speaking in the Light. The Role of the QuakerMinister, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SPEAKING 144 (Richard Bauman & Joel
Sherzer eds., 2d ed. 1989).
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strong visionary component: according to Shaker theology, "righteousness involved seeing rightly. ' 315 Contemporary American
Protestantism certainly has neither abandoned nor rejected aurality out of hand (witness the speech practices associated with American Fundamentalism), 316 but it is noteworthy that even the most
voluble Protestant preachers not only insist upon citing chapter
and verse from a Biblical text, but frequently carry that text about
with them as a visible totem of their authority.
The practices and doctrines of both the Catholic and Jewish
faiths have arguably disinclined their American adherents (as
groups) from embracing the written word as unreservedly as have
American Protestants. Catholicism has always had considerable
respect for a clerical interpretation of Scripture dependant upon
the aural and sometimes actually catechistic relationship between
priest and parishioner. The Catholic Church still subscribes to a
resolution of the 1546 Council of Trent that declared oral dogma to
be equivalent in stature to the Scriptures themselves: it had been
"received by the apostles from the lips of Christ himself, or by the
same apostles at the dictation of the Holy Spirit. ' 317 The Catholic
emphasis on oral revelation has not dissuaded many American
Catholics from developing a high degree of reliance on the written
word, but it has made such a reliance less necessary to their spiritual well-being. As a result, American (and for that matter, North
American) Catholic culture has been relatively less committed to a
strictly visualist interpretation of existence, to the extent that two
of the foremost investigators and exponents of aurality since the
1960s have been a Catholic convert (Marshall McLuhan) 318 and a
Jesuit priest (Walter Ong).
The various strands of American Jewish culture have likewise
shared a broader sensory base. Jews have frequently been called
"People of the Book," but this reference to the importance of writ315 SALLY

M.

PROMEY, SPIRITUAL SPECTACLES: VISION AND IMAGE IN MID-NINE-

19 (1993). The "first Shaker," Ann Lee, is supposed to
have said, "I look into the windows of heaven, and see what there is in the invisible world."
Quoted in id. at 17.
316 See, e.g., Daniel N. Maltz, Joyful Noise and Reverent Silence: The Significance of
Noise in Pentecostal Worship, in PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE 113 (Deborah Tannen & Muriel Saville-Troike eds., 1985).
317 3 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BIBLE 193 (S.L. Greenslade ed., 1963). For an extended discussion of orality's influence on early Christian life, thought, and writing, see
Paul J. Actemeier, Omne Verbum Sonat: The New Testament and the Oral Environment of
Late Western Antiquity, 109 J. BIBLICAL LITERATURE 3 (1990).
318 At least one student of McLuhan's thought has explicitly concluded that his "communication theory was a direct outgrowth of his Catholicism." ARTHUR KROCKER, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CANADIAN MIND: INNIS/McLUHAN/GRANT 78 (1984).
TEENTH CENTURY SHAKERISM
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ten scripture in Judaism should not be permitted to mask a significant aurality rooted in the Jewish experience of God.3 19 In marked
contrast to the visibility of Christ in the New Testament,320 Yahweh
in the Hebrew Bible preferred not to show Himself or permit Himself to be shown (thus the Second Commandment: "You shall not
make yourself a graven image .... 1).321 Instead, Yahweh spoke to
Israel either directly or through his prophets (hence the classic
formula "Hear, 0 Israel"). 32 2 The relationship between God and
323
his people became implicitly and sometimes explicitly dialogic.
Several commentators have suggested that this pattern of aural interaction had profound epistemological consequences within the
Jewish community. The Jewish theologian and philosopher Martin
Buber, noting early in this century that "the most vivid descriptions
in ancient Jewish writing are acoustic in nature," ventured that
3 24
"[t]he Jew of antiquity was more of an aural than a visual man."
More recently, rabbinic scholar Jos6 Faur has posited that "[f]or
the Hebrews, the highest form of truth is perceived at the auditory
level.... The highest expression of reality is found in communica319 One commentator has suggested that the label "is a strange one for a people who...
made prodigious efforts to prevent just the fate of being smothered by texts." DANIEL J.
SILVER, STORY OF SCRIPTURE: FROM ORAL TRADITION TO THE WRITTEN WORD 276
(1990).
320 "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us... ;we have beheld his glory."
John 1:14.
321 Exodus 20:4.
322 E.g. Deuteronomy 6:4. See SUSAN A. HANDELMAN, THE SLAYERS OF MOSES: THE
EMERGENCE OF RABBINIC INTERPRETATION IN MODERN LITERARY THEORY 17 (1982);
Raymond A. Bowman, Yahweh as Speaker, 3 J. NEAR E. STUD. 1 (1944); Don Ihde, Studies
in the Phenomenology of Sound: III. God and Sound, 10 INT'L PHIL. Q. 247 (1979); Adin
Steinsaltz, The Command Is to Hear: An Interview with Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, 19 PARABOLA 27 (1994). The notion of God as speaker is magnificently captured in the rabbinic
legend that holds that if all things in the world were to fall silent, humankind would hear
the voice of God from Sinai, incessantly pronouncing the words of the Ten Commandments. DAVID J. WOLPE, IN SPEECH AND IN SILENCE: THE JEWISH QUEST FOR GOD 45
(1992). But see also Daniel Boyarin, The Eye in the Torah: Ocular Desire in Midrashic
Hermeneutic, 16 CRITICAL INOUIRY 532 (1990) (arguing that the importance of visual revelation in Judaism has traditionally been underestimated).
323 It has been said that the Hebrew Bible is "full of a dialogue between heaven and
earth. It tells us how again and again God addresses man and is addressed by him....
[S]ometimes these records actually assume a dialogic form." MARTIN BUBER, ON JUDAISM
214 (1967). See generally WALTER L. REED, DIALOGUES OF THE WORD: THE BIBLE AS
LITERATURE ACCORDING TO BAKHTIN (1993).
324 Quoted in Herbert Howarth, Jewish Art and the Fearof the Image: The Escape from
an Age-Old Inhibition, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1950, at 142, 143. See also Shemaryahu
Talmon, Oral Traditionand Written Transmission, or the Heard and the Seen Word in Judaism of the Second Temple Period, in JESUS AND THE ORAL GOSPEL TRADITION 121, 156
(Henry Wansbrough ed., 1991) ("In the biblical milieu, aurality, viz. the heard word, fulfils
the function which visibility, viz. written transmission and/or pictorial narration, fulfils in
cultures that are more manuscript-conscious.").
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tive speech. The outer aspect of things is unimportant. Neither
Scripture 5nor the rabbis gave visual descriptions of things or
32
people."
Aurality still animates many aspects of Jewish life and belief.
Reflecting a long tradition of oral recitation, the books of the Hebrew Bible are known to Jews by a form of incipit, in this instance
the first significant word in the book's text. 26 Part 6f the Torah
remains expressly "Oral" (Torah shebe'al-peh, literally "the Torah
that is memorized"). 2 7 Although actually written down since the
third century C.E., it must not be publicly taught from a docu325 Josi FAUR, GOLDEN DOVES WITH SILVER DOTS: SEMIOTICS AND TEXTUALITY IN

RABBINIC TRADITION 29-30 (1986). Compare the comment of Jewish historian Hans
Kohn:
[T]o this folk [i.e., the Jews] did God become a voice. Again and again sounds
the command "Hear!" When Elijah becomes aware of God he hears only a still
small voice. Therefore the Jew never made himself an image of God. It is the
word, the logos, which to the Jews is the mediator between the infinite and the
individual, and the word carries more of infinity within it than the sharp form
of the frozen image.
Quoted in Howarth, supra note 324, at 144; see also BOMAN, supra note 85; HANDELMAN,
supra note 322 (discussing aurality's impact on various dimensions of Jewish religious tradition); Philip S. Alexander, Orality in Pharisaic-RabbinicJudaism at the Turn of the Eras,
in JESUS AND THE ORAL GOSPEL TRADITION, supra note 324, at 159.
In light of such comments, it is interesting to note that ancient Judaism took a limited
turn towards the visual when it encountered Hellenistic Greek culture (on the visuality of
which see supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text). In the first century A.D., for instance, the Jewish commentator, Philo of Alexandria, repeatedly "transform[ed] ... biblical expressions involving hearing into ones involving sight." HANS BLUMENBERG, THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE 286 (Robert M. Wallace trans., MIT Press 1983).
326 Thus, Genesis begins with the words "In the beginning," and in Hebrew is called
Bereshit; Exodus begins with the word "Names," and is called Sh'mot; Leviticus begins
with the words "In the wilderness," and is called Bamidbar;and Deuteronomy begins with
the word "Propositions," and is called D'varim. Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules:
Writing Law According to Moses, with Reference to Other Jurisprudences,11 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1079, 1079 n.1 (1990). Compare the medieval method of labelling statutes, supra
note 140 and accompanying text.
327 On Oral Torah, see generally BIRGER GERHARDSSON, MEMORY AND MANUSCRIPT:
ORAL TRADITION AND WRITTEN TRANSMISSION IN RABBINIC JUDAISM AND EARLY CHRIS-

TIANITY (1961); JACOB NEUSNER, ORAL TRADITION INJUDAISM: THE CASE OF THE MISH-

NAH (1987). The Judaic insistence on Oral Torah as a necessary complement to Written
Torah has led at least one commentator to suggest, not altogether tongue in cheek, that
"[wihat the Catholic Encyclopaedia writes [about oral revelation] could just as well have
been written by a rabbi." Marcel Simon, The Ancient Church and Rabbinic Tradition, in
HOLY BOOK AND HOLY TRADITION 94, 94 (F.F. Bruce & E.G. Rupp eds., 1968). The
religious and cultural importance of Oral Torah is emphasized by this excerpt from the
Midrash:
After he had taught Moses the oral Torah, the Holy One - blessed be He - said
unto him: teach it to Israel. Moses answered: Lord of the Universe, I shall write
it down for them. But God replied, saying: I do not want you to write it down,
for I know that the nations of the world will rule over Israel and attempt to
take it from them. I give Israel mikra [reading] in written form, but I give them
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ment.328 The Talmud pointedly preserves the sayings of the rabbis
(thus the standard Talmudic formula, "Rabbi X said . . ."). Since
the early sixteenth century the Talmud has been printed in a way
which literally surrounds the principal text with later commentaries, thereby perpetuating an implicitly dialogic relationship between the text and the commentary on the same page, or better
yet, between the original "speaker" and the commentators.329
When studying aloud that portion of the Talmud called the Gemara
"students expressing the argument-on the page [of the text] tend to
speak for and with the sages in their confrontations, as if the sages
were talking to each other today. '330 Even the "silent meditation"
of the Amidah, the Jewish prayer service, is a faintly audible pro33
cess: to quote the Talmud, "words in the heart are not words." 1
Finally, no consideration of the aural aspects of contemporary Judaism would be complete without mention of Yiddish, the usually
spoken but (at least until recently) rarely written folk language that
of ... social and political cohesion"
has long served as "the vehicle
332
in the Jewish community.
Taking advantage of the social power that their relatively
greater access, exposure, and commitment to writing has helped to
give them, American men, whites, Anglos, and Protestants have
filled the ranks of the American legal profession from its very beginnings. Inevitably, they have brought their own sensory preferences into American legal life. It is they who have been principally
responsible for designing courts and legal rules that have directly
Mishna, Talmud and Agada orally, and thus will Israel be distinguished from all
other nations.
MIDRASH RABBA, Exodus 47, quoted in Simon, supra, at 110.
328 FAUR, supra note 325, at 100-02.
329 Joseph Lukinsky, Law in Education: A Reminiscence with Some Footnotes to Robert
Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 96 YALE L.J. 1836, 1840, 1841 (1987); see also WOLPE, supra
note 322, at 116-17.
330 Lukinsky, supra note 329, at 1840; see also Jonathan Boyarin, Voices Around the
Text. The Ethnography of Reading at Mesivta Tifereth Jerusalem, in THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF
READING, supra note 248, at 212 (discussing the relationship of text and speech in Jewish
study).
331 Quoted in WOLPE, supra note 322, at 123. The importance of spoken prayer in Jewish tradition is intimately connected with God's status not only as a speaker, but as a listener. Id. at 125-27.
332 BENJAMIN YARSHAV, THE MEANING OF YIDDISH 79 (1990). As this Article was going to print, I chanced upon a recent comment by Rabbi Harold S. Kushner that generally
reinforces the points made in this paragraph about the place of aurality in modem Judaism:
"We sanctify our power of speech.... While some would claim that 'talk is cheap,' in
Judaism words are real .... Jews take words seriously ... because, since the Temple was
destroyed nineteen hundred years ago and we no longer bring animal offerings, words are
the currency of our transactions with God." HAROLD S. KUSHNER, To LIFE!: A CELEBRATION OF JEWISH BEING AND THINKING 69 (1993).
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and indirectly favored visual experience.333 It is they who have established and perpetuated norms of legal interpretation and legal
scholarship that, at least until recently, have largely marginalized
and delegitimized aurality, aural styles, and aurally based written
forms.334 It is they who (as we shall see) have pushed legal philosophy towards values that have traditionally been associated with
vision.
When they have spoken the actual language of the law, individuals from the more visualist American groups have analogously
been drawn to metaphors and figures of speech appealing to their
visualist predelictions. In the sundry expressions we encountered
in the Introduction to this Article, they have presented law not so
much as a speaking or as any other kind of aural enterprise, but as
a looking, something to see and be seen. This language has inevitably empowered them by making the law more recognizable and
accessible. At the same time, visualist legal metaphors have, perhaps not entirely by accident, disempowered and alienated members of American gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups which
have not been so visually oriented. Law expressed in visual terms
has literally not resonated with their particular experiences.
The visuality of American law in general and American legal
metaphors in particular has been made all the more compelling
and oppressive because individuals from the dominant visualist
groups have in the past used their power to exclude from both the
legal profession and the legal professoriate members of other gender, racial, ethnic, or religious groups who, left to their own devices, might have preferred different legal procedures, legal
standards, and ultimately, different legal language. It is well known
that in the face of these efforts, the first American woman lawyer
was not admitted to practice until 1869;335 the first woman hired
full-time by an American law faculty took up her position in
1927.336 In 1950, only five of 1239 law faculty members were female.337 The first African American to practice law professionally
was not admitted to the bar until 1844,338 and only in 1925 was a
333

See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.

334 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
335 KAREN B. MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA: 1638
TO THE PRESENT 11 (1986) (referring to Belle Mansfield, admitted in Iowa).
336 Herma H. Kay, The Future of Women Law Professors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 5, 6 (1991)
(referring to Harriet Spiller Daggett, Louisiana State University).
337 Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of a Perpetual
First Wave or the Case of the DisappearingWomen, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799, 801 (1988).
338 Kenneth S. Tollett, Black Lawyers, Their Education, and the Black Community, 17
How. L.J. 326, 329 (1972) (referring to Macon B. Allen, admitted in Maine).
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black law professor hired to teach at a "white" law school.33 9 Protestants dominated the American bench3 40 and bar as a whole
through the early twentieth century, and in the face of unwelcome
"intrusions" by immigrant-class Catholics and Jews, reserved for
themselves the "high-ground" of corporate law until very recently. 341 Exact figures are hard to come by, but it would be accurate to say that the presence of Catholic and Jewish lawyers on
American law faculties was similarly restricted well into this century. Hispanic Americans, 'the overwhelming majority of whom
are Catholic, are only just beginning to break into mainstream legal
practice342 and still have only a toehold in the professoriate.343 In
this context, relatively few American lawyers or law professors
have come from backgrounds that might have inclined them to
push American legal metaphors in a nonvisualist sensory direction.
Even those American lawyers who have come from less visualist backgrounds have for the most part adopted the visualist idiom.
This outcome has been more or less assured by the hurdles to law
school and bar admission that were raised from the late nineteenth
century by a pedagogically ambitious, but also increasingly nervous
male, white, Anglo, and Protestant dominated legal establishment.
It will be recalled from the previous section of this Article that,
until the late nineteenth century, American legal training had
taken the form of either apprenticeship, which despite its textual
orientation was still at least residually aural, or lecture and recitation-based classroom instruction for which there were few written
or writing-related prerequisites. In the decades after 1870, however, individuals aspiring to the bar were compelled to complete
high school (and later two years of college); they then had to attend textbook-based law schools where they learned how to dissect
massive quantities of black letter law. They had to pass written
339. J. CLAY SMITH, EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944,
at 41 (1993) (referring to Clarence Mahoney, Buffalo Law School).
340 On the historically marginal role of Catholic justices on the United States Supreme
Court in particular, see Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil
Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1056-58 (1990).
341 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MOD-

50, 62 (1976). On discrimination against Jewish lawyers and law students,
see Note, The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs: DiscriminatoryEffects in Law Firm
Hiring Practices, 73 YALE L.J. 625 (1964).
342 Richard Brunelli, Hispanic Lawyers Gaining Respect but Struggle Continues, CHI.
DAILY L.BULL., Nov. 7, 1986, at 1; James Evans, HispanicAttorneys Are 'Inching' Forward
in the Profession, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 6, 1992, at 1.
343 Rex Bossert, The Hiringof Hispanic Faculty Is Up 25 Percent,L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 10,
1992, at 1.
ERN AMERICA
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examinations before graduating 3" or being admitted to the bar in
most states. 34 5 Since the 1950s, would-be attorneys have also been
346
subjected to the written Law School Admission Test ("LSAT").
Surviving such a process, which has obviously put a premium on
the development of excellence in visual tasks while rendering aural
traditions and talents irrelevant, can only have distanced successful
female, African American, Hispanic, and even some Catholic and
Jewish lawyers from their relatively more aural roots and any inclination they might have had to evoke those roots in aural legal
metaphors.
Even presuming that a modicum of cultural aurality might
have survived the visually skewed professional initiation process, a
variety of professional and social circumstances have traditionally
conspired to dissuade many female, African American, Hispanic,
Catholic, and Jewish jurists from drawing from their own experiences in ways that might have made aurality more prominent in
their legal writing.347 Because the number of these individuals
within American law firms, law courts, and law faculties has, until
recently, been small, these legal scholars have historically lacked
the peer support and encouragement which is so important to the
success of any serious intellectual, methodological, or terminological departure. The realities of tenure and promotion within American law schools still dominated by males, whites, Anglos, and
Protestants, have moreover discouraged many nontraditional
scholars from trying anything too novel, lest they be indirectly pun344

See supra note 209 and accompanying text.

345 On the written bar examination as an ongoing obstacle for minority law students, see

Dannye Holley & Thomas Kleven, The-Bar Examination and Other Barriersto African and
Hispanic American Fair Representation Among American Lawyers: A 1990 Update-Perspectives-and Recommendations, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV.477 (1991); Dannye Holley &
Thomas Kleven, Minorities and the Legal Profession: CurrentPlatitudes, Current Barriers,
12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (1987). On the bar examination as an obstacle for women,
see Arthur E. Ryman, Jr., Women and the Bar Exam: Thinking Like a Woman Lawyer, 37
DRAKE L. REV. 79 (1987-1988) (noting that in 1987 the pass rate in Iowa for men was 77%,
but for women only 66%).
346 On the LSAT's negative impact on minority law school applicants, see Eulius Simien,
The Law School Admission Test as a Barrierto Almost Twenty Years of Affirmative Action,
12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 359 (1987).
347 For example,

for Jews ind Catholics alike ... it seems plausible to argue that there is a price
attached to entry into leadership positions within [the bench and bar]. This
price has been the modulation, if not outright suppression of much awareness

.of anything within their respective religious traditions that might be significantly different from-let alone pose a challenge to-the wider American (and
Protestant?) culture.
Levinson, supra note 340, at 1058.
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ished for doing SO. 3 48 Finally, the perspectives represented by these
legal scholars have traditionally lacked a critical measure of recognition and legitimacy in American culture at large, leading to preemptive concerns that any scholarship or thought based on these
perspectives might well be rejected out of hand.3 49 In this context,
most female, African American, Hispanic, Catholic, and Jewish
lawyers-despite their undoubted success in achieving greater social justice for members of their own and other "out groups"have until recently been disinclined to challenge the fundamental
visuality of American law and legal metaphor.
C. Law and the Phenomenology of Sight
In addition to being both a consequence of culture and a product of power, the historical popularity of visual metaphors in
American legal discourse has been a function of the considerable
overlap between the traditional American understanding of law
and the predominant American understanding of vision. In this
society, law and vision have been deemed to share certain characteristics and to favor similar values. American lawyers and legal
scholars casting about for accessible, "sensible" ways in which to
describe or explain difficult or theoretical legal concepts have
therefore been particularly drawn to visual figures of speech.
Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, most American lawyers and jurists, if not all American law professors, 35 0 have understood law as being ideally abstract, disengaging, objective,
determinate, timeless, systematic, and differentiatory. 351 Law has
been regarded as abstract to the extent that its rules, principles,
348 In the words of one woman looking back on the early history of women in American
law teaching:
The trick was to be able to be just like the men-whether that meant in our
behaviors, demeanors, emotions, values, assumptions, styles of thinking or
styles of relating. If our femaleness showed through, or if we relied on our
socialized natures for guidance about how to behave, react, interact or reason,
we were presumed less competent, disqualified, and necessarily less lawyerly.
Leslie Bender, For Mary Joe Frug: Empowering Women Law Professors, 6 WIs. WOMEN'S
L.J. 1, 12-13 (1991).
349 "Marginalized groups may lack the inclination to engage in certain ways of thinking
and writing because we learn early that such work may not be recognized or valued."
BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS 129 (1990).
350 Recall, for example, the Realists of the 1930s and 1940s, the adherents of Critical
Legal Studies in the 1970s and 1980s, not to mention today's feminist and critical race
scholars.
351 On the rapid development of this understanding of law in the late nineteenth century, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at
9-20 (1992).
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and such legal constructs as "the reasonable man" are generalizations independent of particular concrete circumstances. 352 Law has
been understood as disengaging to the extent that it allows and
even encourages parties to pursue their own autonomous self-interests free from the involvement or interference of others-hence,
the concept of "rights. ' 353 It has been considered objective in that
it exists apart from, and is supposedly applied regardless of, the
feelings or whims of individual judges or lawyers or their personal
attitudes towards the disputing parties. 354 It has been held to be
determinate insofar as it has been assumed that proper legal analysis leads to "one right answer. '355 Traditional American jurisprudence has conceived of law as timeless insofar as its core
principles-if not always its specific rules-remain constant. 6
Law has been viewed as systematic in that its rules and principles
are presumed to be related to each other in a coherent deductive
pattern.35 ' Finally, traditional lawyers and legal scholars have
thought of law as differentiatory in that they have attributed much
of its success to depend on its ability to make and maintain sharp
distinctions between various situations, categories, and rules.358
352 See, e.g., Christopher T. Wonnell, The Abstract Characterof Contract Law, 22 CONN.
L. REV. 437 (1990). On the "reasonable man," see, for example, Harry S. Gerla, The "Reasonableness" Standard in the Law of Negligence: Can Abstract Values Receive Their Due?,
15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 19 (1990).
353 For a recent discussion of this aspect of traditional legal thought that rejects the
notion that "autonomy" necessarily leads to "atomism," see Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic
Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1171 (1992).
354 See generally Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 445 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739
(1982); Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity: How People Are Treated, 8 CRIM. Jus. ETHics 31 (1989).
355 On the nineteenth-century roots of this idea, see Grey, supra note 163, at 7.
Although it is currently out of favor in many quarters of the academic community, this
notion has been stoutly defended, and to some extent reanimated, by Ronald Dworkin.
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Ronald Dworkin, No Right
Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1978).
356 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
357 For many jurists ... the central task of jurisprudence appears as the analysis
and systematic exposition of legal rules and precepts, and the deduction of the
general principles and concepts that underlie them, and the way in which these
may be built up into a logical and coherent scheme or system.
A.L. Epstein, The Case Method in the Field of Law, in THE CRAFT OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 205, 208-09 (A.L. Epstein ed., 1967). On the systematizing, ordering predelictions
of "classical" American legal thought, see Grey, supra note 163, at 8-10; Duncan Kennedy,
Toward an Historical Understandingof Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal
Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. Soc. 3, 8-9 (1980).
358 See HORwrrz, supra note 351, at 10-19; Kennedy, supra note 357, at 4-5.
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Each of these qualities of law has been closely matched by a
characteristic of vision, at least as American and other Western
philosophers have encouraged us to understand visual "phenomenology." To begin, we have traditionally considered vision to be
the ultimate abstract sense. Sight depends not on contact or proximity with concrete reality, but rather on withdrawal: "The best
view is by no means the closest view; to get the proper view we
take the proper distance, which may vary for different objects and
different purposes, but which is always realized as a positive and
not a defective feature in the phenomenal presence of the object.

' 359

To this extent, sight literally abstracts one from the

world-certainly not completely, but more than the other
senses. 360 Perhaps this is why "it is easier to be a visual spiritualist
than a tactile one.

'361

Regarded in a positive sense, visually in-

duced abstraction facilitates generalization; indeed, our word for
the ultimate generalization, a "theory," is derived from the Greek
theoria, meaning "a seeing." In a negative sense, however, visual
abstraction inhibits the appreciation of lifelike particularity. 362 After World War II, deafened veterans reported that their loss of
hearing at first made the noisy world a peaceful place. In time, as
they were forced to mediate more and more of their experience
through vision, they found it to be lifeless and unreal.363 Their
original abstraction had become outright alienation.
Insofar as vision abstracts individuals from other individuals,
we have generally regarded it as facilitating mutual disengagement.
Well before one reaches the outer limits of visual (as opposed to
aural or tactile) perception, the urge, the need, and sometimes
even the ability to actively interact with one's potential interlocutor
is reduced. Unlike the "feeler" and the "hearer," the seer is moreover not physically affected by the individual perceived. In this
context, seers readily assume an uninvolved, uncommitted, indifferent, literally voyeuristic stance towards one another.3 64 Passive,
observing individuals become more aware of themselves as autono359 JONAS, supra note 108,
360 "Vision is that sense

at 149-50.
which places the world at greatest remove." Keller &
Grontworski, supra note 87, at 213.
361 BERLEANT, supra note 51, at 39.
362 From a Platonic perspective, it might be said that "[v]ision connects us to truth as it
distances us from the corporeal." Keller & Grontworski, supra note 87, at 209.
363 TUAN, supra note 49, at 118; see also Clemens E. Benda, Language, Consciousness
and Problems of Existential Analysis, 14 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 259, 262 (1960) (positing
that "when sound is eliminated from our experience, it becomes clear how inadequate and
ambiguous is the [purely] visual experience").
364 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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mous "selves," while regarding their observed counterparts as dis'
tinct "others."365
The capacity of vision to separate (even create)
"self" and "other" was most effectively dramatized in fifteenthand sixteenth-century Europe, when artists routinely set transparent grids between themselves and their subjects so that the latter
could be drawn according to the purely visual dictates of linear perspective. In this context, "the self becomes a spectator ensconced
behind his or her window on the world,... the body, now divorced
from this self, becomes a specimen, and. . . the world. . becomes
a spectacle. ' 366' More recently, French psychologist Jacques Lacan
has identified the onset of the self-concept in young children with
the "mirror-stage": the developmental point at which the child recognizes itself-as separated Other-in the mirror.367
We have similarly associated vision with objectivity. The visually distanced and disengaged seer is able to contemplate other
things or persons without being burdened by the emotions or attitudes that might be encouraged by physical proximity. 368 Things
can supposedly be seen for themselves, not as the seer subjectively
reacts to them or to their personal context.369 In the case of persons, what they are may be separated from who they are or what
they think (or what is thought of them). Thus, the American artist
Maurice Grosser has pointed out the physical and psychological
difficulty of painting someone's portrait from within "touching
distance."
[Alt touching distance, the sitter's personality is too strong. The
influence of the model on the painter is too powerful, too disturbing to the artist's necessary detachment, touching distance
being not the position of visual rendition, but of motor reaction
or some physical expression of sentiment, like fisticuffs, or the
various acts of love.3 7 °
365 "Critics of the Cartesian skeptical tradition have long questioned vision as the Cartesian paradigm of perception, asking if sight, by its very nature, does not presume a detachment from the Other that is then solidified into separateness from the Other." O'Fallon &

Ryan, supra note 22, at 897.
366 ROBERT D. ROMANYSHYN, TECHNOLOGY AS SYMPTOM AND DREAM 31 (1989).
367 JACQUES LACAN, The MirrorStage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed
in PsychoanalyticExperience, in ICRITS: A SELECTION 1 (Alan Sheridan trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1977) (1966). As a matter of history, it is interesting that the popularization of

the mirror in the twelfth century coincided not only with the rise of self-portraiture, but
with the rise of autobiography as a developed literary form. See Martin Stevens, The Performing Self in Twelfth-Century Culture, 9 VIATOR 193 (1978).
368 "[T]he visual system allows for a more or less detached contemplation .
DAVID
CHIDESTER, WORD AND LIGHT: SEEING, HEARING, AND RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 11 (1992).
369 JONAS, supra note 108, at 147-48.
370 Quoted in EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 72 (1966).
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It is this "objective" quality of sight that has made it the ultimate
scientific and "intellectual" sense.37 ' The same quality, however,
has occasionally rendered sight problematic in social situations
where subjectivity and even empathy are valued. Unadulterated,
unmitigated looking-precisely because it "objectifies"-is generally considered antisocial. Children are taught, "Don't stare." As
Walter Ong has noted, "[l]ooking fixedly at another person has
normally the effect of reducing him to a surface, a non-interior, and
thus to the status of a thing.

37 2

The determinacy of sight has been expressed in two ways. In
the first place, sight has been said to be "single-perspectival." Vision takes in one visual perspective or vista at a time, which it instantly resolves to. a single, unique point-the "point of view" (a
point which, by being duplicated in a painting or text, may moreover be imposed bn another observer). 373 Presuming that one is
looking straight ahead, other potential perspectives-alternative
vistas behind, beside, above, or below-are invisible, discoverable
only with the subsequent intervention and assistance of other faculties (particularly movement, which would allow one to appreciate
different perspectives by circumnavigating an object). To this extent, the purely visual world is always a single truth before our
eyes. Like the photograph, it is tyrannically definitive, implicitly
rejecting all other views as wrong or illegitimate. The phrase "that
is exactly the way it looks to me" rapidly becomes "this is the place
to see it from.

' 37 4

Vision has also been considered determinate in

light of the manner in which colors-primary constituents of the
visual world-routinely interact; when combined in the same
space, they lose their original hues and become one entirely new
entity.375 By virtue of both these phenomena, the visual sense has
been deemed relatively incapable of supporting existential
diversity.
Sight has been thought timeless because it is not dependent
upon the dynamic unfolding of events. Unlike hearing, which depends on the next sound or phoneme to form a coherent noise or
word, or touch, which depends on the next feeling to discern a
supra note 80, at 7.
supra note 75, at 166.
373 "The involuntary and subliminal character of [the] ... 'fixed point of view' depends
on the isolation of the visual factor in experience." McLUHAN, supra note 44, at 127.
374 Jacqueline 'Iyrwhitt, The Moving Eye, in EXPLORATIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS, supra
note 45, at 90, 91-92.
375 ACKERMAN, supra note 166, at 219.
371 LOWE,

372 ONG,
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shape, sight need not wait upon the next image to bring meaning.
As Hans Jonas has explained:
All other senses construct their perceptual "unities of a manifold" out of a temporal sequence of sensations which are in
themselves time-bound and nonspatial. Their synthesis therefore, ever unfinished and depending on memory, must move
along with the actual progress of the sensations, each of which
fills the now of 37
the6 sense from moment to moment with its own
quality.
fugitive
Vision can extract a tremendous amount of information from a
static, literally timeless scene. Indeed, rapid change in the environment may make the visual extraction of information more difficult.3 77 Vision may therefore be said to demand a certain degree of
constancy or "being"; in this sense, it378peculiarly "lends itself to a
static conception of 'eternal truths."'
Largely because we have regarded sight as timeless, we have
regarded it as the principal systematizing sense. It is supposed to
be the sense most capable of appreciating or identifying the constant relations between different elements that make up the idea of
"system" (as opposed to, say, the more dynamic idea of "process").
The visual bias of our idea of system was implicitly understood as
early as the eighteenth century, when Scottish philosopher David
Hume commented that "to deliver a system in conversation
scarcely appears natura. ' 379 One modern student of sight has observed, somewhat more directly, that "[a] view comprehends many
things juxtaposed."38 A second has noted that "objects are visible
at the same time, and they are stable long enough for us to apprehend their relationship to each other. '3'8 1 A third scholar has concluded that "[v]ision involves the discernment of patterns,
configurations, spatial relationships-in other words, the recogni382
tion of order.
Finally, we have held sight to be highly differentiatory. All the
senses can make distinctions between the presence and absence of
supra note 108, at 136.
377 "To view something closely by sight, we wish to stop it for inspection, and we do so
when we can, studying even motion itself, or so we pretend, in a series of still shots." ONG,
supra note 75, at 41.
378 Keller & Grontworski, supra note 87, at 213; see also JONAS, supra note 108, at i45
("Only sight ... provides the sensual basis on which the mind may conceive the idea of the
eternal, that which never changes and is always present.").
379 Quoted in Cox, supra note 191, at 102.
380 JONAS, supra note 108, at 136.
381 TUAN, supra note 49, at 118.
382 CHIDESTER, supra note 368, at 11.
376 JONAS,
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stimuli or between different types of stimuli. Vision, however, excels at identifying very fine, very precise distinctions. Visible
shapes enable us to distinguish one object from another; visible colors may likewise help us to distinguish objects, or the various parts
of objects; visible lines allow us to discern distinct zones and territories. The distinguishing aspect of vision was already evident to
Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.: "We prefer seeing to everything else [because] . . . , most of all senses, sight makes us know
and brings to light the many differences between things. '383 More
recently, French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty has asserted that vision is a "dissecting" sense, while Walter Ong has described distinctness and "taking apart" (which he notably
-associates with the thinking of Descartes) as aspects of a "visual
38 4
ideal."
The similarity between the values of traditional American
legal theory and the values we have traditionally associated with
sight is not coincidental. In the first place, traditional American
legal theory was developed and has prospered in a society which
has itself been highly visualist. 8 5 This broad cultural orientation
has made American law susceptible not only to the techniques and
the language of sight, but also to its phenomenological biases. In
other words, with American culture dominated by a sense that is
understood as fostering (if not necessarily creating) abstraction,
disengagement, objectivity, timelessness, system, and differentiation, American legal theory-necessarily operating within that culture-has been drawn to many of the same values.
In the second place, traditional American legal theory has
been largely articulated and elaborated by individuals from American gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups whose relative visuality 38 6 has arguably biased them towards the values that visuality
has been held to favor. The historically greater visuality of American men's culture may thus have prompted American men (as a
group) to claim a special attraction for, and/or be particularly associated
by others with abstraction, disengagement, and objectivity, 387 even if American men's visuality has neither afforded them a
383 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics 980a (W.D. Ross trans.), in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE,
supra note 116, at 243, 277.
384 ONG, supra note 75, at 129.

385 See supra part II.A (Seeing Culture).
386 See supra part II.B (Visuality and Power).
387 On the general association of these values with men or men's culture (at least within
the modern Western or American tradition), see GILLIGAN, supra note 255; Susan Bordo,
The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought, 11 SIGNS 439 (1986); Evelyn F. Keller, Gender
and Science, in FEMINIST RESEARCH METHODS: EXEMPLARY READINGS IN THE SOCIAL
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monopoly over the invocation or application of those values 388 nor
prevented many men from adopting different perspectives. 3 9 The
historically greater visuality of white American culture may have
encouraged white Americans (as a group) to ascribe to themselves,
and/or be largely identified by others with the same norms,390
although white Americans' relative visuality has certainly not made
those norms either their exclusive property3 91 or their universal
preference.392 The relative visuality of Protestant culture may
equally have biased American Protestants (as a group) towards disengagement, objectivity, and system, both in their own eyes and in
the eyes of their religious and social critics. 393 The long-standing
numerical and political domination of both the American legal
supra note 246, at 41. For examples of feminist legal writing implicitly or explicitly alleging the same association-in most instances, preliminary to a critique of "men's"
values and the articulation of "feminist" alternatives-see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The
Rhetoric of the Anti-ProgressiveIncome Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 465 (1987); MacKinnon, supra note 244; Matsuda, supra note 244; Carrie MenkelMeadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 63 (1993).
388 As Joan Williams has pointed out, "feminists of difference submerge the fact that the
[female] thinkers who have developed the new epistemology [that has challenged these
values] have, by and large, been cerebral and detached in the extreme." Joan C. Williams,
DeconstructingGender, 87 MICH. L. REV.797, 805 (1989); see also Frances Olsen, Feminist
Theory in GrandStyle, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1168-74 (1989) (reviewing CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)) (discussing the book as an instance of abstract, disengaged, and objective "grand theory").
389 Williams, supra note 388, at 806. This would seem to undermine the contention that
any particular values are "male" per se.
390 See generally KOCHMAN, supra note 287, at 18-34, 106-29. For examples of African
American legal writing that implicitly or explicitly associate all or some of these norms
with white American culture (for the most part, as a preliminary step towards challenging
those norms from a black cultural perspective), see John 0. Calmore, CriticalRace Theory,
Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural
World, 65 S.CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992); Jerome M. Cuip, Jr., Autobiography and Legal
Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539
(1991); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as
Struggle, 65 S.CAL. -L. REV. 2231 (1992).
391 Witness the large body of African American legal scholarship framed in "traditional"
style that reflects and inde6d indulges the norms of abstraction, disengagement, and
detachment.
392 See, for example, the "critical" works of the white American legal theorists discussed
in part III, infra ("Fair Hearings").
393 See, e.g., ONG, supra note 75, at 283-86. Following American sociologist Robert
Merton, a number of scholars have suggested that the Protestant bias towards these values
created a North European, and eventually an American, intellectual climate in which science and scientism naturally flourished. For a recent review and critique of the "Merton
thesis," see JOHN H. BROOKE, SCIENCE AND RELIGION: SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
109-16 (1991).
SCIENCES,
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community and the American legal professoriate by members of
these visualist groups has in turn helped make "visualist" virtues
central to traditional American legal theory.
Third, traditional American legal thought has been primarily
set down and spread in a visual medium-writing-the use of
which may be said to have phenomenologically encouraged law's
conformity to visual values. As we have recently been reminded,
"Law is bound by its form. In important ways, [it] is the product of
its methods of creation, transmission, and execution."394 American
legal thinkers who have historically depended on writing for so
much of their professional inspiration, information, and communication may have been incidentally led by writing to endorse abstraction, disengagement, and other such visual norms.395
The mutual affinity between vision and traditional American
legal theory that these three circumstances have helped create has
been reflected most generally in the tendency of traditional legal
scholars to embrace forms of legal scholarship that are "visualist,"
or are, at most, minimally reminiscent of aural styles and formats.
Law's abstraction and objectivity, for instance, are more readily indulged in analysis than in story or poem; law's disengagement and
system are more effectively communicated in an essay than in a
dialogue. In turn, the jurisprudential use of visualist analysis and
essay-by precluding or preempting more aurally oriented styles of
presentation 396 which might allow concrete, subjective, relational,
or process-based values to come to the fore-indirectly supports,
and even promotes, the notion that law is abstract, objective, disengaged, and systematic.
By the same token, vision has been a natural referent for legal
figures of speech used by adherents of traditional legal theory.
What better sense metaphorically to communicate (and reinforce)
the systematic nature of traditional law than the sense by which
systems are said to be most readily perceived? In this context, visual legal metaphors like "seamless web" or "body of law" seem
truly tailor-made. Likewise, what better way to communicate law's
objective nature than by metaphorically evoking a form of sensory
394 Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts,44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 509 (1992).
395 On the written word's phenomenological contribution to the development of abstraction, disengagement, and system as primary characteristics of Western law and legal
thought, see M. ETHAN KATSH; THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LAW (1989) (especially ch. 6). See also JACK GOODY, THE LOGIC OF WRITING AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY 165-67 (1986).
396 E.g., story, poetry. See discussion infra part III.C (Law and the Phenomenology of
Sound).
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experience that we consider biased towards objectivity?397 In this
light, referring to adjudication visually as "judicial review" seems
highly appropriate. Trying to communicate the same legal qualities
by reference to, say, aural or tactile experience might be phenomenologically awkward and less effective, if not actually self-defeating. At the same time, the most casual use of visual legal
metaphors can incidentally reinforce the phenomenologically compatible values of orthodox jurisprudence: saying that a constitutional principle is a "fixed star" or that an area of concurrent
jurisdiction is a "zone of twilight" indirectly supports and even encourages the belief that law is abstract, static, and disengaged from
concrete human experience.398 To this point, American lawyers
may rarely have reflected on these phenomenological associations
between law and vision, but the traditional American preference
for visual legal language suggests that, at some level, the associations have nonetheless been understood.
III.

"FAIR HEARINGS": AURALITY AND THE
NEW LEGAL LANGUAGE

A turn to the auditory dimension is . . . more than a simple
changing of variables. It begins as a deliberate decentering of a
dominant traditionin order to discover what may be missing as a
result of the traditional double reduction of vision as the main
3 99
variable and metaphor.

397 Note, for example, the striking correlation between the idea of legal objectivity/impartiality and the use of visually evocative language on the one hand, and the idea of
partiality/subjectivity and the use of aurally evocative language on the other in this excerpt
from a well-known law review article:
The idea of impartiality implies human access to a view beyond human experience, a "God's eye" point of view. Not only do humans lack this inhuman
perspective, but humans who claim it are untruthful, trying to exercise power to
cut off conversation and debate .... [A] single absolute truth would mean the
end of human discourse, but ... we are happily saved from that end because
any truth, once uttered, becomes immediately one truth among many, subject
to more discourse and dispute.
Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 75 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Carol Gilligan and her colleagues might
have been referring to precisely this statement when they observed that "the talk of separation with its imagery of seeing ... suddenly yields to a different language for describing
connection and closeness with others, a language of talking, of listening .... ." Gilligan et
al., supra note 255, at 316.
398 Martha Minow came to the edge of this point in 1988 when, in a footnote, she suggested that in legal discourse, even her casual use of "visual metaphors, like 'glimpse,' 'see,'
and 'reveal,' despite my intentions, may invoke positivist conceptions of objectivity and
unmediated reality, graspable through perception." Minow, supra note 397, at 68 n.270.
399 IHDE, supra note 81, at 14.
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The growing popularity of aural metaphors in contemporary
American legal discourse has already drawn some comment from
observers, but so far it has attracted only the most superficial of
explanations. 4°° In this section of the Article I will try to make
amends for this unsatisfactory state of affairs by arguing that the
recent increase in aural figures of legal speech may be attributed to
three fundamental factors that complement those underlying the
traditional popularity of visual metaphors in American legal language. First, just as our visual legal metaphors have been a product
of our culture's traditional bias towards vision and visual experience, our increased inclination towards aural legal metaphors is a
function of the increasing attraction of sound and aural experience
in a society that is becoming more dependent on aural technologies. Second, just as visual legal metaphors have traditionally been
preferred in an American legal community dominated by members
of gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups which have been
more writing-based and hence relatively more respectful of visuality, aural legal metaphors are coming into greater favor as a growing number of American law professors from gender, racial, ethnic,
and religious groups which are less writing-oriented and hence relatively more respectful of aurality draw on their own group experiences and values for scholarly inspiration. Third, just as the use of
visual legal metaphors has been encouraged by the perceived fit
between traditional legal philosophy and our phenomenological
understanding of sight, the use of aural legal metaphors is being
encouraged by the perceived fit between what might loosely be
termed a "critical" legal philosophy and our phenomenological understanding of hearing. In the next three subsections of this Article, I will explore each of these factors in detail.
A.

Hearing Culture

In the midst of a culture saturated with printed and electronic
texts and bombarded by images from television and movies, it cannot be denied that seeing remains at the center of American sensory experience. There is nonetheless evidence to suggest that in
the late twentieth century we 4 ' are increasingly fascinated with400 E.g., Massuro, supra note 25, at 2100 n.11 (suggesting that the popularity of "voice"
in legal writing "likely stems from Carol Gilligan's rather astonishingly popular work, In A
Different Voice."). Certainly Gilligan's work is not irrelevant, to this trend, but I believe
that it is more a symptom of change than a cause.
401 In this section of the paper, "we" generally refers to Americans as a whole, not
Americans as members of any particular gender, racial, ethnic, or religious group. See
supra note 46.
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and in a few instances, are even becoming biased towards-aural
expression and experience.4"2 This development has arguably encouraged a significant number of American legal scholars to use
aural figures of speech to define and describe a variety of legal
ideas and procedures.
Some manifestations of the new American aurality are obvious; others are not. A growing number of Americans prefer to experience language aurally rather than visually.'0 3 A significant
number of us do not read the news in the daily press anymore;
instead, we listen to (and on TV, even watch) it being read aloud to
us. 40 4 Long the mainstay of American visual culture, books are still
very popular,40 5 but the market for so-called "talking books" (or
"audiobooks") read by noted entertainers or personages is growing
at a phenomenal rate.4°6 Popular magazines such as Newsweek and
People are appearing in separate "audio" versions.40 7 We share an
unprecedented passion for music of all sorts.40 8 We are taking renewed interest in poetry readings and oral storytelling.4°9 We send
greeting cards which play melodies for their recipients; we buy toys
402 See ONG, supra note 174, at 136-38 (suggesting an aural renewal Which he terms
"secondary orality"); CYNTHIA OZICK, The Question of Our Speech: The Return to Aural
Culture, in METAPHOR AND MEMORY 146 ,(1991); STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS: THE
HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY

186-88 (1990).

403 Robin T. Lakoff, Some of My Favorite Writers Are Literate: The Mingling of Oral and
Literate Strategies in Written Communication, in SPOKEN AND WRITTEN LANGUAGE: ExPLORING ORALITY AND LITERACY 239, 242 (Deborah Tannen ed., 1982).
404 In this sense we are becoming not so much "illiterate" but "aliterate"; an "aliterate"
being "a person who knows how to read but who doesn't choose to read." Bernice E.
Cullinan, Inviting Readers to Literature, in CHILDREN'S LITERATURE IN THE READING
PROGRAM 2, 11 (Bernice E. Cullinan ed., 1987).
405 Roger Cohen, If the Written Word Is Really Dying, Who Is Patronizingthe 'Superstores'?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at E6. At the same time, it has been asserted that
"[e]ighty percent of the books in this country are read by about 10% of the people." JANE
M. HEALY, ENDANGERED MINDS: WHY OUR CHILDREN DON'T THINK 23 (1990).
406 Preston Hoffman, A Change of Voice. The Art of the Spoken Word, LIBR. J., Nov. 15,
1991, at 39, 39-43; Richard Zoglin, A Real Tape Turner, TIME, Aug. 29, 1994, at 73 (noting
that "[rietail sales for audio books ... reached $1.2 billion in 1993, up 40% from the year
before"); see also SVEN BIRKERTS, Close Listening, in THE GUTENBERG ELEGIES: THE
FATE OF READING IN AN ELECrRONIC AGE 141 (1994) (considering the implications of
listening to literature, instead of reading it).
407 Liz Horton, Magazines Bid for Ears as Well as Eyes of Readers, FOLIO, Feb. 1992, at
43.
408 "This is the age of music .... Music was not ... that important for the generation of
students preceding the current one." ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN
MIND 68-70 (1987).
409 Evy H. Anderson, The Spell of the Storyteller, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Feb. 15, 1993, at
28; Glenn Collins, When the Writers Read, the Readers Listen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1989, at
C15; Diana J. Schemo, After the Beats: A New Generation Raises Its Voice in Poetry, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1994, at B1.
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which talk and even "read" to our children. An increasing number
of young Americans of both sexes are highlighting their ears with
studs or earrings.4 10 Even contemporary eroticism is no longer a
function of sight simpliciter: Americans have made 1-900 "aural
sex" telephone services into a billion-dollar industry.1 1
With sound thus in the ascendant, the silence that has historically been a concomitant of American visuality seems to be in cultural retreat. More and more of us find that we want (or need)
aural distraction when we are reading, exercising, relaxing, or even
trying to go to sleep. 12 Muzak accompanies us while we make our
rounds at the supermarket; many of us publicly despise it, but
many of us also miss it when it isn't there. The traditional sanctuaries of silence-libraries, museums, and art galleries-are
slowly being invaded by cassette tapes,413 listening equipment,
voice-based exhibits, and artworks which literally speak for themselves.41 4 At the movie theater, more and more of us accustomed
to the constant electronic buzz of modern life are unwilling, or unable, to be quiet.41 5 We cannot even take psychic refuge in the
"silent" reaches of Newtonian space: thanks to modern radio astronomy, we are newly conscious of the fact that far from being
still, the universe sputters with the static of the stars.
Our social identities are increasingly founded upon aural affinities and differences. As we come into more frequent aural contact
with one another via telephone, radio, and television, we are more
aware of accents. In a high-visualist culture, accents tend to be but
a secondary basis of differentiation, and hence only a secondary
basis for discrimination. Today, however, as understanding an410 Corey Seymour, Now Ear This, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 5, 1993, at 59. In a fascinating
article on the Suya Indians of central Brazil, anthropologist Anthony Seeger has suggested
a connection between a society's habits of bodily ornamentation on the one hand and its
sensory bias on the other. Anthony Seeger, The Meaning of Body Ornaments: A Suya
Example, 14 ETHNOLOGY 211 (1975). The Suyas decorate the mouth and ears, which Seeger interprets as evidence of their aurality. Id. at 212. If he is right, then the American
practice referred to in the text may well be something more than a passing cosmetic trend.
411 See generally Thomas J. Lo, The Supreme Court'sRecent Stand on Dial-a-PornRegulations: "Honey, I Shrunk the First Amendment," 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 431 (1992). In
1988, phone sex services grossed $2.4 billion. Id. at 433 n.13.
412 TONY SCHWARTZ, THE RESPONSIVE CHORD 51 (1973).
413 For a discussion of the potential impact of "talking books" on the pplicy and mission

of traditional libraries, see Virgil L.P. Blake, Something New Has Been Added: Aural Liter,
acy and Libraries, in INFORMATION LITERACIES FOR THE TWEiNTY-FIRST CENTURY 203
(Virgil L.P. Blake & Renee Tjoumas eds., 1990).
414 Judy K. C. Van Wagner, Sound Art, ARTS MAG., Sept. 1984, at 19.
415 Thomas J. Meyer, Go to the Movies. And Shut Up!, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at
A27; Richard Sandomir, A Tragedy of Manners at the Movies, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at
C1.
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other person's speech becomes more and more important to effective interpersonal communication, accent-based differentiation and
discrimination appear to be on the rise.416 At the same time, we
are becoming more interested in and more sensitive towards the
plight of the deaf.417 In a more aurally oriented society, we may
slowly be realizing that not being able to hear can be a problem of
the same fundamentality as is not being able to see in a visualist
culture. To the extent that our changing circumstances prompt us
to improve the social and legal situation of deaf people,418 the new
aurality may have positive as well as negative social consequences.
Our everyday language is picking up a growing number of aural or aurally related terms. The process of auralization accelerated noticeably in the 1960s, when American youth began to "tune
in" and "turn on."'419 Today, when we make a proposal to someone, we first "sound them out." An appealing idea or proposal
"sounds good" even if it is written down. Jargon of all sorts is
routinely labelled as a form of "speaking," along lines first suggested by George Orwell ("doublespeak," "Newspeak") in his 1949
novel Nineteen Eighty-Four: thus, "businesspeak," "computerspeak," and "sciencespeak. '' 420 Psychological or technical language
is notably "psychobabble" or "technobabble." 421 A popular term
is a "buzzword," evoking the noise of everyone speaking it at the
same time.422 In conversation, acknowledgement (if not necessarily agreement) seems increasingly to be communicated by the
phrase "I hear you" as opposed to "I see." Ignorance is increasingly portrayed in aural as well as visual terms. Where we were
once overwhelmingly inclined to "turn a blind eye" to something,
416 Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1324, 1333-48 (1991). See, e.g., Fragrante
v. Honolulu, 699 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (1987) (where a person with what was described as a
"heavy Filipino accent" was denied employment on the grounds that he "[w]ould be difficult to understand over the telephone").
417 See, e.g., HARLAN LANE, WHEN THE MIND HEARS: A HISTORY OF THE DEAF (1984);
OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE DEAF (1989); Michele-Lee Berko, Comment, Preservingthe Sixth Amendment Rights of the Deaf Criminal
Defendant, 97 DICK. L. REV. 101 (1992).
418 See, e.g., Randy Lee, Equal Protectionand a Deaf Person's Right to Serve as a Juror,
17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 81 (1989-1990) (discussing Pennsylvania's success at
incorporating deaf individuals in juries).
419 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 412, at 9.
420 Mary G. Porter & I. Willis Russell, Among the New Words, 59 AM. SPEECH 159, 16364 (1984).
421 SARA TULLOCH, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NEW WORDS 22 (1991); Fred Shapiro, Coinage of Psychobabble, 59 AM. SPEECH 373 (1984).
422 TULLOCH, supra note 421, at 124.
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we now also "turn a deaf ear. '4 3 When two individuals or groups
refuse to pay attention to one other, they are analogously engaged
in a "dialogue of the deaf."
Not even writing has been immune from the new aurality. The
style of written language in newspapers, magazines, and even
scholarly books is increasingly dependent on aural conventions.424
Contemporary authors frequently refer to themselves in the first
person as if they were speaking to their readers face-to-face.425
The written use of contractions ("can't," "don't," etc.), once stylistically limited to conversation, seems to be on the rise. The written
depiction of conversation itself is becoming noticeably more "true
to life" with the inscription of pauses, false starts, mistakes, and so
on.42 6 Novelists seem increasingly drawn to aural storytelling as a
central literary theme or event.4 27 Many expository writings are
being marketed as opportunities for "listening," presentations of
''voice," or exercises in "conversation" that promise more intimate
contact with a subject.4 28 Nonfiction works are again appearing in
423 Perhaps not surprisingly, the latter phrase is actually the older of the two, having
been recorded as early as the fifteenth century. CHRISTINE AMMER, HAVE A NICE DAYNo PROBLEM!: A DICTIONARY OF CLICH-S 384 (1992).
424 Lakoff, supra note 403, at 245; see also DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, The Decline of Grammar: The Colloquial Conquers the Classroom, in THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC ExPERIENCE 451 (1973).

425 Ruth Behar, Dare We Say '1'? Bringing the Personalinto Scholarship, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., June .29, 1994, at B1.
426 Lakoff, supra note 403, at 254-55.

427 Clayton, supra note 294, at 376 (citing as examples Paul Auster, Moon Palace (1989);
John Irving, The World According to Garp (1978); Cynthia Ozick, The Messiah of Stockholm (1987); Philip Roth, The Counterlife (1986) and other works).
428 For recent instances of writing presented as an opportunity for "listening," see
G.R.F. FERRARI, LISTENING TO THE CICADAS: A STUDY IN PLATO'S PHAEDRuS (1987);
PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC (1992); DAVID LAMB, A SENSE OF PLACE:
LISTENING TO AMERICANS (1993); THOMAS NEWKIRK, LISTENING IN: CHILDREN TALK
ABOUT BOOKS (AND OTHER THINGS) (1992); MICKEY PEARLMAN, LISTEN TO THEIR
VOICES: TWENTY INTERVIEWS WITH WOMEN WHO WRITE (1993); BRIAN STOCK, LISTENING FOR THE TEXT: ON THE USES OF THE PAST (1990); WILLIAM L. SULLIVAN, LISTENING
FOR COYOTE: A WALK ACROSS OREGON'S WILDERNESS (1988).

For recent instances of writing presented as "voice," see DANIEL L. ALKON, MEMORY'S VOICE: DECIPHERING THE MIND-BRAIN CODE (1992); ROBERT A. BEAUREGARD,
VOICES OF DECLINE: THE POSTWAR FATE OF US CITIES (1993); CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993); IMMI.

GRANT VOICES: NEW LIVES IN AMERICA, 1773-1986 (Thomas Dublin ed., 1993); SAUL D.
SLAPIKOFF, CONSIDER AND HEAR ME: VOICES FROM PALESTINE AND ISRAEL (1993);
VOICES FROM THE BATTLEFRONT: ACHIEVING CULTURAL EQUITY (Marta M. Vega &

Cheryll Y. Greene eds., 1993);

VOICING OUR VISIONS: WRITINGS BY WOMEN ARTISTS

(Mara R. Witzling ed., 1991).
For recent instances of writing presented as "conversation," see ANTHONY AVENI,
CONVERSING WITH THE PLANETS: How SCIENCE AND MYTH INVENTED THE COSMOS
(1992); WILLIAM H. CALVIN & GEORGE A. OJEMANN, CONVERSATIONS WITH NEIL'S

306

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:229

dialogue form, probably in the hope of giving their contents something of the immediacy and interactivity generally associated with
the spoken word.4 29 A variety of commentators and critics have
even begun to argue that writing (and reading) are themselves metaphorically dialogic (if not yet actually aural) processes, and that
the written "text" is not so much a thing as an ongoing negotiation
of meaning between writer and reader, much As a conversation is
between speaker and listener.
Contemporary American law reflects the new aurality in a variety of ways. Of course, aurality is no more dominant in American law than it is in American life: visual habits and metaphors
continue to permeate both the legal profession and the legal professoriate. What we are talking about here is an emergent trend
towards taking sound (and aural experience) more seriously. It
must also be emphasized that not all of law's current aurality is the
product of recent change. Despite the visuality that has traditionally dominated the surrounding culture, American lawyers and jurists have never altogether abandoned faith in nor lost all
familiarity with speech 430 and aural styles. 4 31 American law is
nonetheless in the midst of an aural revival. Appellate judges are
BRAIN: THE NEURAL NATURE OF THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1994); CONVERSATIONS ON
COMMUNICATION ETHICS (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 1991); JAY L. ROBINSON,'CONVERSATIONS ON THE WRITTEN WORD: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE AND LITERACY (1990); EDWARD
TELLER ET AL., CONVERSATIONS ON THE DARK SIDE OF PHYSICS (1991).

429 For recent examples of constructed nonfiction dialogues, see WALTER ADAMS &

A DIALOGUE ON RADICAL REFORM
DIALOGUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (James N. Roseman
SYSTEMS OF SURVIVAL: A DIALOGUE ON THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF CULTURE AND POLITICS (1992); MICHAEL J. KATZ, SOCRATES IN OCTOBER: DIALOGUES ON INCONDENSABLE COMPLEXITY (1987); DAVID B. MYERS, MARX AND
NIETZSCHE: THE REMINISCENCES AND TRANSCRIPTS OF A NINETEENTH CENTURY JOURNALIST (1986); DAVID WEINBERGER, NUCLEAR DIALOGUES (1987); Alastair Fowler, Writing Criticism and Making Poems, 21 NEW LITERARY HIST. 1 (1989); Jerome McGann,
Revision, Rewriting, Rereading; or "An Error[Not] in The Ambassadors," 64 AM. LITERATURE 95 (1992). Other recent nonfiction dialogues are transcripts of actual interviews.
See, e.g., BACKTALK: WOMEN WRITERS SPEAK OUT/INTERVIEWS WITH DONNA PERRY
(Donna Perry ed., 1993); DAVID BRESKIN, INNER VIEWS: FILMMAKERS IN CONVERSATION
(1992); NOAM CHOMSKY, CHRONICLES OF DISSENT: INTERVIEWS WITH DAVID BARSAMIAN
(1992); BILL MOYERS, A WORLD OF IDEAS (Andie TIcher ed., 1989); ALEXANDER NEUBAUER, CONVERSATIONS ON WRITING FICTION: INTERVIEWS WITH THIRTEEN DISTINGUISHED TEACHERS OF FICTION WRITING IN AMERICA (1994). A similar growth in the
JAMES W. BROCK, ADAM SMITH GOES TO MOSCOW:

(1993); GLOBAL VOICES:
ed., 1993); JANE JACOBS,

number of published dialogues and transcripts has been noted in contemporary Japan. See
Masao Miyoshi, Thinking Aloud in Japan, RARITAN, Fall 1989, at 29.
430 Recall the central role of speech in discovery, cross-examination, and trial advocacy
in general.
431 Thus, "t]here is nothing novel or mysterious about stories in law [as a whole]. Lawyers are storytellers ....
" Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1855, 1859 (1990).
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considering greater roles for oral argument and oral decision.432
Trial judges are more willing to accept parol evidence as a supplement to written contracts.433 Judges at both levels have loosened
-the hearsay rules to give more scope to witnesses who want to report what they have heard from others, as opposed to what they
have seen. 434 They are taking face-to-face oral defamation more
seriously, 435 and if they have not necessarily rehabilitated slander
as a primary civil wrong, they have extended the working definition
of libel to include defamatory aural declarations made over radio
or television.436 They are more willing to indulge challenges to the
apparent "plain meaning" of wills based on extrinsic evidence of
what testators said.43 7 By permitting televising of trials, they have
even restored law to its historical place as a speaking presence in
438
the community at large.

In law schools, the value of aural teaching is being reasserted
as an antidote to the intellectual privilege traditionally accorded
written scholarship.439 Oral examination has reemerged as a topic
worthy of serious consideration. 440 More and more scholarly work
is being done or disseminated at professional conferences and colloquia featuring speakers and organized discussions. 41 Inside and
outside the conference hall, American legal academics are becoming noticeably more absorbed by the process and rhetoric of oral
432 Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals
Might Do to Help Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1321, 1337 (1994); Daniel J. Meador,
Toward Orality and Visibility *inthe Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 732, 738-47 (1983).
433 See, e.g., George I. Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Contracts-Impact
of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 Mo. L. REV. 651 (1979).
434 Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1992).
435 See generally Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527 (1993).
436 LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 82-86 (1978).

437 Grey, supra note 63, at 224.

438 It has been noted that with the advent of Court TV, "law comes to life; it becomes a
living, breathing matter of debate and arguments." Joshua Lazerson, Court TV: Can It
Increase the Understandingof Law and the Legal Process?, 76 JUDICATURE 57 (1992).
Thanks to Simon & Schuster, members of the public can now buy audiotapes of their favorite broadcast cases. See, e.g., THE MENENDEZ MURDER TRIAL (1 Courtroom Cassettes

1994).
439 See, e.g., John S. Elson, The CaseAgainst Legal Scholarshipor, If the ProfessorMust
Publish,Must the Profession Perish?,39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343 (1989); Odeana R. Neal, The
Making of a Law Teacher, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 128, 132 (1990-91).
440 Steven I. Friedland, Towards the Legitimacy of Oral Examinations in American Legal
Education, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 627 (1988).

441 For a light-hearted discussion of this phenomenon, see Rodolfo Sacco, Organizing a
Scholarly Congress, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 279 (Arthur Rossett & Renata Paolini trans.,

1990).
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argument," 2 and concomitantly less obsessed by written appellate
decisions.443 We are taking more interest in studying and reproducing the actual talk (what Julius Getman calls the "real voice")
of lawyers, litigants, and others participating or caught up in legal
disputes. 4 We are more concerned with employment discrimination based on accent."4 We are paying more attention to "alternative" types of dispute resolution (such as arbitration) which are
oriented towards talking and listening more than writing and reading.446 We are significantly more troubled by the social and emotional impact of oral insults and epithets. 447 We seem more willing8
to acknowledge "unwritten" sources of constitutional authority"
and consider them as legitimate supplements to the written text.
442 See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, The Use of Appellate Case Report Analysis in Modern
Legal Education:How Much Is Too Much?, 10 NOVA L.J. 495 (1986) (suggesting, inter alia,
that law schools pay more pedagogical attention to the skill of listening); McKenzie, supra
note 25.
443 See, e.g., Meador, supra note 432; Stephen M. Simon & Bertrand Poritsky, Judicial
Trial Skills Training, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 428 (1987).
444 For example:
This Article draws on over two years of interviews and discussions with people
in the paper industry. It includes many quotations from employees to describe
the dynamics, both internal and institutional, that make a cooperative, high
performance strategy effective. Hearing the voices and listening to the experiences of those whose interests labor law and policy are intended to promote
gives a unique and valuable perspective on labor law and labor relations.
Getman & Marshall, supra note 22, at 1806; see also JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM
O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE

(1990); Julius G. Getman, A Story of Voice, 55 U. PIrr. L. REV. 973 (1994); Ann M. Gill,
The Oral Tradition of Gerry Spence in Pring v. Penthouse, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 693 (1988);
Sally E. Merry, The Discourses of Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1 (1990); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyers' Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989); and the more
than 400 other articles and books collected under the heading "Spoken Language in Legal
Settings," in Judith N. Levi, Language and Law: A Bibliographic Guide to Social Science
Research in the USA, in 4 TEACHING RESOURCE BULL. 1 (1994).
445 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 416; Carolyn R. Matthews, Comment, Accent: Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason or Permission to Discriminate, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 231
(1991); Mary E. Mullin, Comment, Title VII: Help or Hindrance to the Accent Plaintiff?, 19
W. ST. U. L. REV. 561 (1992).
446 See, e.g., Symposium, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1
(1989-1990).
447 See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and
Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990).
448 See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1974-75); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Grey, supra note 63;
Wayne D. Moore, Written and Unwritten ConstitutionalLaw in the Founding Period: The
Early New Jersey Cases, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 341 (1990); Sherry, supra note 206.

1994]

MAKING SENSE OF METAPHORS

309

A significant number of today's law teachers are analogously fascinated by law's relationship with such traditionally or actually aural forms of expression as story, 449
rhetoric, 50 parable,45 ' poetry, 5 2 speech (as dialogue, conversation,
456
or simply talk), 453 and music. 454 Actual parables 455 and poems
are being quoted or reproduced in legal articles. Some adventurous law professors have taken to writing their own original sto-

449 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv, 971 (1991);
Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation,and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630 (1992); Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983); Delgado, supra note 25; James R. Elkins, The Stories We Tell Ourselves in
Law, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1990); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The
CriticalPracticeand Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
861 (1992); David R. Papke, Discharge as Denouement. Appreciating the Storytelling of
Appellate Opinions, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145 (1990); Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectivesfrom Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 37 (1990); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989);
Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: JudicialInterpretationof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103

HARV.

L.

REV.

1749 (1990).

See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Constitutive Rhetoric: Law as Literary Activity, 14 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 305 (1991); White, supra note 23.
451 See, e.g., John J. Bonsignore, In Parables: Teaching Through Parables, 12 LEGAL
STUD. FORUM 191 (1988); Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the
Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984).
452 See, e.g., Lawrence Joseph, Theories of Poetry, Theories of Law, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1227 (1993); James B. White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of
Life, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1669 (1984).
453 See, e.g., Mary L. Ciampe, The I and Thou: A New Dialoguefor the Law, 58 U. CIN.
L. REV. 881 (1990); Amy H. Kastely, Cicero's De Legibus: Law and Talking Justly Toward
a Just Community, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1991); Robert J. Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies,
and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatismand the Art of Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 69 (1991).
454 See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Studying Music, Learning Law: A Musical Perspective
on Clinical Legal Education, 13 CORNELL L. FORUM 8 (1987); Jennifer Jaff, Law and Lawyer in Pop Music: A Reason for Self-Reflection, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 659 (1986); Johnson
& Scales, supra note 20; Gary Minda, Phenomenology, Tina Turner and the Law, 16 N.M.
L. REV. 479 (1986); Peter R. Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue:An Essay on Reading Fuller,
70 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (1986); and other articles cited infra notes 567-77.
455 See, e.g., Martha G. Duncan, In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in Criminal Justice, 68 TUL. L. REV. 725, 753-54 (1991); Martha Minow, Questioning Our Policies:
Judge David L. Bazelon's Legacy for Mental Health Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 7, 11 (1993); Daniel
J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: Investments, Memberships, the Tree of
Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEX. L. REV. 559, 612 (1994) (reviewing RONALD
450

DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANSIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993)); and other examples cited infra note 607.
456 See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 27, at 662 n.8; Ball, supra note 29, at 2295; David R.
Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 62 (1990); Ronald R. Garet, Meaning and Ending, 96 YALE L.J. 1801, 1811 (1987);
and other examples cited infra note 606.
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ries,457 parables, 458 and works of poetry.4 9 An increasing number
of law review pieces carry titles that evoke the titles or words of
popular songs.4 6 Some legal academics are even quoting and/or
analyzing lyrics in the course of making their academic arguments.461 Footnotes are citing conversations,462 and, in at least one
instance, the hitherto ubiquitous "See also" has (in the context of a
reference to music) given way to "Hear also. '463 An increasing
amount of legal scholarship is being framed in aurally evocative
457 See Derrick Bell et al., Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation,
37 UCLA L. REV. 1037 (1990); Andrew W. McThenia, Jr., Telling a Story About Storytelling, 40 J. LEGAL Euc. 67 (1990); and the many other examples cited infra note 610.
458 See, e.g., Emily F. Hartigan, The Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as Invitation, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 76-77 (1991); and other examples cited infra note 613.
459 See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Vietnam Haiku, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1228 (1989); and
the other examples cited infra note 614. The new poetry has had a mixed reception. One
scholar has graphically commented that "if Archibald MacLeish ever got a look at some of
the political 'poetry' appearing in publications like the Cornell Law Journal[sic] he would
puke." Arthur Austin, Commentary on Jensen's Commentary on Commentary, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 175, 181 (1991).
460 See, e.g., Americo R. Cinquegrana, Dancing in the Dark: Accepting the Invitation to
Struggle in the Context of "Covert Action" the Iran-ContraAffair and the Intelligence Oversight Process, 11 Hous. J. ITr'L L. 177 (1988); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in
All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings,15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1523 (1994); David Fraser, What's Love Got to Do With It? Critical Legal Studies,
Feminist Discourse,and the Ethic of Solidarity, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 53 (1988); Peter
Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Steven H.
Hobbs, We Are Family: Changing Times, Changing Ideologies and Changing Law, 14 CAP.
U. L. REV. 511 (1985); Lisa Perrochet & Ugo Colella, What a Difference a Day Makes: Age
Presumptions, Child Psychology, and the Standardof Care Required of Children, 24 PAC.
L.J. 1323 (1993); W. Wylie Spicer, Ch-Ch-Changes:Stumbling Toward the Reasonable Expectations of the Assured in Marine Insurance, 66 TUL. L. REV. 457 (1991); Erik S. Jaffe,
Note, "She's Got Betty Davis['s] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver
Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clause, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528 (1990). For a
list of similar articles that have recently appeared in Canadian law journals, see Vaughan
Black & David Fraser, Cites for Sore Ears (A Paper Moon), 16 DALHOUSIE L.J. 217, 218
n.7 (1993).
461 See, e.g., Ronald R. Garet, Dancing to Music: An Interpretationof Mutuality, 80 Ky.
L.J. 893, 925, 928 (1991-92); Philip N. Meyer, "Fingers Pointingat the Moon": New Perspectives on Teaching Legal Writing and Analysis, 25 CONN. L: REV. 777, 785, 788 (1993);
Minda, supra note 454, at 489, 493; Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of
Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1695-99 (1990); and
the other examples cited infra note 608. The most recent edition of the Harvard Bluebook
notably contains guidelines (under the new heading "Sound Recordings") on how to reference popular songs, and provides sample cites to the works of David Bowie, the Beatles,
and Kate Bush. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 124-25 (15th ed.
1991).
462 See, e.g., Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Theory: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1,
9 n.26 (1992); Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 n.3
(1989).
463 James D. Gordon, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 987, 993 n.48 (1990). For an analogous instance of "Hear e.g.," see C. Garrison Lepow, DeconstructingLos Angeles or a Secret Fax from MagritteRegarding PostliterateLegal
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styles: first person "conversational" pronouns are becoming far
more common, as are contractions.464 For the first time in over two
hundred years, legal dialogues are reappearing in strength as serious scholarly endeavors.465 The student editors of a variety of law
reviews are simultaneously showing an increased willingness to
publish the oral transcripts of legal conferences and seminars as
academically respectable articles. 466 They are also producing more
symposium issues467 and printing more exchanges of correspondence 468 in what may be seen as attempts to create at least a semblance of conversation and dialogue." 9
In light of all these developments, is it any wonder that American legal language-especially as articulated in the legal academy-has itself acquired a new aurality? If language and law are
increasingly experienced or presented as things spoken or heard, it
is surely sensible and even helpful to describe law as "voice,"
"rhetoric," or "discourse," and to perceive injustice as "silencing."
If legal ideas and insights tend increasingly to emerge from face-toface encounters, written dialogues, or transcripts, it is convenient
and to some extent even literally accurate to approach law as a
"conversation," "dialogue," or "talk" of one sort or another. If law
Reasoning: A Critique of Legal Education, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69, 122 n.222 (1992)
(citing a radio program).
464 For instance, a search in the LEXIS/NEXIS database yielded 23 articles using the
contraction "couldn't" that appeared in the Stanford Law Review between 1988 and 1992,
as compared with only 8 articles using the same contraction between 1983 and 1987. Similar searches over the same periods for the HarvardLaw Review, the Yale Law Journal, the
Michigan Law Review, and the Virginia Law Review yielded figures of 9 versus 5, 22 versus
16, 24 versus 13, and 10 versus 2, respectively. Search of LEXIS, Lawrev library, Allrev file
(Jan. 15, 1994).
465 See, e.g., Peter Lushing, Capital Punishment: A Disputation, 42 ARK. L. REV. 105
(1989); Scott Burris, Note, Death and a Rational Justice: A Conversation on the Jurisprudence of John Paul Stevens, 96 YALE L.J. 521 (1987); and the many other examples cited
infra notes 556, 557, 611.
466 See,' e.g., Appendix-Transcript of Proceedings, 15 NOVA L. REV. 795 (1991);
Church/State Symposium-Questions and Answers, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 663 (1991-92); Discussion, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1993); Stanley Ingber, The Demise of Dialogue: Commentary on Perry and Nagel, 55 ALB. L. REV. 583 (1992); Seminar, Leveraged Buyouts and
Lenders' Risks, 21 SETON HALL L.REV. 918 (1991); Symposium, Defining the Corporate
Constituency: Panel Discussion, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 467 (1990). The presence of such features in a variety of reputable law reviews counters the notion that they might be the last
refuge for editors of marginal law reviews lacking quality "orthodox" submissions.
467 E.g., Jean Stefanic, The Law Review Symposium Issue: Community of Meaning or
Re-inscription of Hierarchy?,63 U. COLO. L. REV. 651 (1992)..
468 E.g;, Erik M. Jensen, Law Review Correspondence: Better Read than Dead?, 24
CONN. L. REV. 159 (1991).
469 For instance, the literal meaning of "symposium" is "a convivial! meeting for drinking, conversation, and intellectual entertainment." 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DicrIONARY 464
(2d ed. 1989).
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operates within a music-saturated society, it can certainly have
"resonance" and aspire to "polyphony." Insofar as American culture as a whole is becoming more aurally oriented, such metaphoric expressions and turns of phrase have an appeal born of the
new familiarity and immediacy of aural experience. At the moment, this appeal may be felt more strongly in the legal professoriate than in the more culturally conservative confines of the legal
profession or the judiciary, but there is reason to believe that as
aurality becomes increasingly prominent and powerful, aural metaphors will eventually be welcomed in those quarters as well.
But what is propelling the new aurality which is already reconfiguring the established pattern of American legal discourse? The
history of Western culture over the past 125 years suggests that the
recent turn towards the aural is largely a product of new aural technologies. In essence, cultural aurality has tended to become more
4 70
pronounced as aural technologies have multiplied and spread.
At every stage in this process, the existence of these technologies
has radically extended the power and range of aurally communicated information. As technologically transmitted and amplified
sound has become able to assume more of the cultural burden, culture itself has turned towards sound for inspiration. Being integral
aspects of culture, law in general and legal metaphors in particular
have begun to change accordingly.47 '
The "first generation" of genuinely aural technologies 472-the
telephone and the phonograph-appeared and spread between
roughly 1875 and 1920. Thanks to Alexander Graham Bell's invention, Europe and America became literally "wired for sound"; at
the same time, Thomas Edison's brainchild (invented in 1877, but
not made commercially viable until the 1890s) brought a recognizable facsimile of music 473 into thousands of homes. Both devices
helped to focus and humanize the noise that was already being gen-

470 "As a wider range of new material reached the public through telephone, radio, film,
records, and television, we developed a stronger orientation toward the auditory mode of
receiving and processing information." SCHWARTZ, supra note 412, at 13.
471 "As the predominant form of communication shifts.., legal metaphors.., change to
reflect the changes in communication." Katsh, supra note 182, at 406 n.14.
472 Some scholars have characterized the mid-nineteenth-century telegraph as an aural
technology, but that mechanism was at best only incidentally aural. Not only were its audible clicks incomprehensible to anyone untrained in code, but it was used to send messages
that generally started out and ended up in writing.
473 DON GIFFORD, THE FARTHER SHORE: A NATURAL HISTORY OF PERCEPTION, 17981984, at 52 (1990).
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erated incidentally by modern machinery and other technological
novelties.474
Slowly, sound began to have a discernable impact on a variety
of different disciplines and undertakings. In linguistics, Frederic de
Saussure departed from then-conventional academic wisdom to argue that true language was speech, as opposed to some combination of speech and writing. 475 His essays were particularly
remarkable for discussing communication as a circuit, a model
which indirectly evoked telephonic communication. 476 A variety of
European and American poets abandoned the visualist analogy between poetry and painting (ut picturapoesis) that had held intellectual sway since the eighteenth century and instead began to
explore the inherently aural relationship between poetry and music. 477 In Ireland, W.B. Yeats called for a return to "the living
voice" in literature. 478 Influenced perhaps by the various anti-ocular, aurally indulgent musings of the nineteenth-century philosophic iconoclasts Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, 479
Henri Bergson and Edward Husserl turned to dynamic aural phenomena such as tone and melody for metaphoric antidotes to the
prevailing spatialized and visualized-and hence strangely staticidea of time.48 Sound even had an impact on the visual arts. In
The Scream (1893), the French artist Edward Munsch made a revolutionary attempt to incorporate at least the depiction of sound
into the silent visuality of the classical canvas.4 8 Other artists like
474 R. MURRAY SCHAFER, The IndustrialRevolution, in THE TUNING OF THE WORLD 71
(1977).
.475 "The object of study in linguistics is not a combination of the written word
and the

spoken word. The spoken word alone constitutes the object." Quoted in ROBERT HOPPER, TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 37 (1992).
476 In one drawing, Saussure depicted the spoken voice travelling from the mouth of one
party to the ear of another along what looked very much like telephone wires. Id. at 36.
477 Kenneth Douglas, Masterpieces of the Modern World, in 2 THE CONTINENTAL EDITION OF WORLD MASTERPIECES 993, 994 (Maynard Mack et al. eds., 3d ed. 1974); Roy
Park, "Ut Pictura Poesis": The Nineteenth-Century Aftermath, 28 J. AESTHETICS & ART
CRITICISM 155 (1961).
478 W.B. YEATS, Literature and the Living Voice [1906], in EXPLORATIONS 202 (1962).
479 On antiocularism and aurality in Kierkegaard's writings, see ELLUL, supra note 119,
at 37-39. On antiocularism in Nietzsche, see SARAH KOEMAN, NIETZSCHE AND METAPHOR
105 (1993). Jacques Derrida has actually suggested that "[aill of Nietzsche's investigations
...are coiled in the labyrinth of an ear." JACOUES DERRIDA, SPURS: NIETZSCHE'S STYLES

43 (Barbara Harlow trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1978).
480 VICTOR ZUCKERKANDL, SOUND AND SYMBOL: MUSIC AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD

254 (1956). For a brief discussion of "auditory material" in Husserl's Phenomenology of
Internal Time Consciousness, see IHDE, supra note 81, at 57.
481 "If one thinks about the history of visual art, one realizes that there are almost no
representations of sound or music in painting or sculpture. This lack of images of course
makes sense because the forms involve mutually exclusive sensory systems: one cannot see
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the young Pablo Picasso and George Braque gave their works a
modicum of "voice" by incorporating letters, words, and even musical notation into their pictures. 2 On the eve of World War I,
Italian Futurist painters used several techniques to evoke aural experience in their work. 8 Marcel Duchamp resolved to "[m]ake a
painting of frequency. 484 The young Wassily Kandinsky openly
likened the process of painting to musical composition (he would
ultimately call some of his efforts "improvisations"). 485 A few artists even ventured into the relatively untested waters of "performance" where sound could be directly manipulated in the context of
,other media.486
For all of this frenetic activity, however, aurality remained
very much avant-garde. Perhaps as a result, it failed at this stage to
command much attention in American law. American courts grappled with a few obvious issues stirred up by the new aural technologies (e.g., the admissibility of phonographic evidence) 48 7 but the
leading American legal minds of the period were much more visualist than auralist in orientation. Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose
pronounced visuality was discussed earlier in this Article, was notably inclined to actually and metaphorically "stop" legal conversation rather than start or attempt to sustain it.488 In 1910, a young
Roscoe Pound critiqued the "law in books" that historically had
hearing, or hear seeing." Craig Adcock, Marcel Duchamp's Gap Music: Operations in the
Space Between Art and Noise, in WIRELESS IMAGINATION: SOUND, RADIO, AND THE
AVANT-GARDE 105, 128 (Douglas Kahn & Gregory Whitehead eds., 1992) [hereinafter
WIRELESS IMAGINATION].

482 See generally JESSICA PRINZ, The Text in the Eye, in ART DISCOURSEDIsCOURSE IN
ART 1 (1992); E.H. Gombrich, Image and Word in Twentieth Century Art, 1 WORD & IMAGE 213 (1985).
483 On the aurality of Futurist painting (from a Futurist perspective), see generally Carlo
Carri, The Painting of Sounds, Noises and Smells [1913], in FUTURIST MANIFESTOS 111
(Umbro Apollonio ed., 1973). For a more recent academic discussion of the same subject,
see Jane Sharp, Sounds, Noises, and Smells: Sensory Experience in FuturistArt, in THE
FUTURIST IMAGINATION 16 (Anne C. Hanson ed., 1983).
484 MARCEL DUCHAMp, The 1914 Box, in SALT SELLER: THE WRITINGS OF MARCEL
DUCHAMP (MARCHAND DU SEL) 22, 25 (Michel Sanouillet & Elmer Peterson eds., 1973).
485 See generally Jerome Ashmore, Sound in Kandinsky's Painting,35 J. AESTHETICS &
ART CRITICISM 329 (1977); H.L.C. Jaffe, Syntactic Structure in the Visual Arts, in STRUCTURE IN ART AND IN SCIENCE 137 (Gyorgy Kepes ed., 1965).
486 Rosalee Goldberg, Performance:A Hidden History, in THE ART OF PERFORMANCE:
A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 24, 27-29 (Gregory Battcock & Robert Nickas eds., 1984).
487 See 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 795, at 103 n.5 (2d ed. 1923)
(discussing 1905 and 1906 cases in which phonographic evidence was introduced to establish the nature of noises made by trains going past plaintiffs' properties).
488 In this respect, Holmes differed from his literary father, who had always sought to
encourage and continue dialogue. It might be argued that while the elder Holmes's style
reflected a lingering affection for aural experience and exchange which in the early to midnineteenth century had not yet passed altogether out of fashion, the younger Holmes's
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both reflected and propelled American legal visuality, but his call
to consider the inevitably-more-oral "law in action" was at best
only indirectly shaped by new aural habits and values.489
The years between 1920 and 1950 witnessed the development
of a second generation of aural technologies. Radio was born in
the early 1920s; by the mid-1930s radios were playing continuously
in hundreds of thousands of living rooms, businesses, and barber
shops across Europe and America. Music suddenly became omnipresent;490 not only did radio make music more available, but people who liked what they heard on the air seemed to develop more
of an interest in making music themselves. 9 ' In the late 1920s, recorded speech and music were introduced to the. motion picture
theater, where the "talkies". gave birth to a whole new cinematic
492
industry.
In this context, sound assumed' a higher cultural profile,4 9 3
picking up slack from a visuality that had lost at least some of its
luster in the trenches of the First World War.494. In literature,
approach was the by-product of a more visualist late-nineteenth-century culture that was
notably more impatient with aural transactions and habits. See Gibian, supra note 183.
489 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910).
490 Frank Biocca, The Pursuitof Sound: Radio, Perceptionand Utopia in the Early Twentieth Century, 10 MEDIA, CULTURE & Soc'Y 61, 62 (1988) [hereinafter Biocca, Pursuitof
Sound]. In 1928, one commentator observed that
[flormerly the only music a man heard, week-in-week-out, was the church organ on Sunday, or his daughter's practice hour when he got home too early,
with maybe a couple of phonograph records thrown in on a Saturday night.
Now he hears several hours of assorted music a week.
Frank Biocca, Media and PerceptualShifts: Early Radio and the Clash of Musical Cultures,
24 J. POPULAR CULTURE 1, 8 (1990).
491 By 1925, just a few years after the beginning of the American "radio craze," the New
York Times was reporting a surge in musical instrument sales. Trade publications carried
headlines like "America Musically Now Comes of Age"; "This is the Golden Age of Music
in the United States"; and "Radio is Doing a Good Job in Music." In 1928, The Musician
observed that "the nation.., is becoming more and more tone minded." Quoted in Biocca, Pursuit of Sound, supra note 490, at 66.
492 See generally ALEXANDER WALKER, THE SHATTERED SILENTS: How ThE TALKIES
CAME TO STAY (1986). The introduction of the sound track "changed the structure of
movies.... Narrative became even more important, and character development, difficult in
the silent movie, became central." STEVEN LUBAR, INFOCULTURE 205 (1993).
493 See generally Biocca, Pursuit of Sound, supra note 490.
494 On the battlefields of France,
[t]he invisibility of the enemy, and the necessity of hiding in the earth, the
layered intricacy of the defense system, the earshattering roar of the barrage,
and the fatigue caused by the day and night shifts, combined to shatter those
stable structures that can customarily be used to sequentialize experience.
Hearing became much more important than vision as an index of what was real
and threatening.
ERIC J. LEED, No MAN'S LAND: COMBAT & IDENTITY IN

WORLD WAR

I, at 124 (1979).

On the postwar European critique of visuality, see generally Martin Jay, The Disenchant-

316

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:229

James Joyce enthusiastically embraced puns4 95 and onomatopoeia
in his novels Ulysses (1922) and Finnegans Wake (1939),496 while
William Faulkner made aural expression and experience a central
theme of The Sound and the Fury (1929). 497 Poets such as T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound evoked musical formats 498 and used language
499
to achieve striking aural, even lyrical effects in their own works.
Dylan Thomas and Robert Frost made reputations for themselves
as reciters50° In the movies, on stage, and perforce on radio, actors
and comedians relied less on visual slapstick and more on voice
inflection,5 0 ' dialect,50 2 and witty repartee. 50 3 The new Gestalt psy-

chology adopted "melody" as a primary instance of the fundamental indissolubility of experience." In Being and Time (1927), the
young German philosopher Martin Heidegger found himself drawn
to aural metaphors of knowing and belonging. 0 5 In I and Thou
(1933), the Jewish theologian Martin Buber stressed the imporment of the Eye: Surrealism and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism, 7 VISUAL ANTHROPOLOGY
REV. 15 (1991).
495 On the "fundamentally oral" nature of puns, see JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING CULTURE 112 (1989).
496 For example: "In the beginning is the woid, in the muddle is the sound-dance and
thereinafter you're in the unbewised again .. " JAMES JOYCE, FINNEGANS WAKE 378.29
(1939).
497 See generally Karl F. Zender, Faulkner and the Power of Sound, 99 PUB. MOD. LANGUAGE ASS'N 89 (1984).
498 Thus, Eliot's Four Quartets and Pound's Cantos. See generally GEORGE STEINER,
LANGUAGE AND SILENCE 29 (1967).
499 On the oral dimension of Pound's writing and work, see generally MAX NANNY,
EZRA POUND: POETICS FOR AN ELECTRIC AGE (1973).
500 Donald Hall, The Poetry Reading: Public Performance/PrivateArt, 54 AM. SCHOLAR
63, 64 (1984-85). Frost's own words help to explain his enthusiasm for recitation: "The ear
is the only true writer and the only true reader ....
[Slentence sounds are very definite
entities. They're apprehended by the ear. They're gathered by the ear from the vernacular. The most original writer only catches them fresh from talk where they grow spontaneously." Quoted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 412, at 120.
501 E.g., W.C. Fields and Mae West.
502 E.g., Jack Pearl ("Baron Munchausen"), Bert Gordon (the "Mad Russian"), Harry
Einstein ("Parkyakarkus"), not to mention the comedic denizens of Fred Allen's Allen's
Alley radio program.
503 E.g., Clark Gable, Katharine Hepburn, and Cary Grant. See generally ALAN HAVIG,
FRED ALLEN'S RADIO COMEDY 5 (1990); WALKER, supra note 492, at 198.
504 On "melody" in the early history of Gestalt, see GEORGE W. HARTMANN, GESTALT
PSYCHOLOGY: A SURVEY OF FACTS AND PRINCIPLES 9-12 (1935).
505 John D. Caputo, The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case
of Heidegger and Rorty, in HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS 248, 255 (Robert Hollinger ed.,
1985). In this early work, however, Heidegger was not consistent in his use of aural metaphors, and indeed abandoned them at a critical moment in his analysis.
Heidegger initiates his departure from tradition by grounding knowledge in the
world via attunement, yet at the point where the primordial access to the world
which attunement bestows becomes fully fledged, reflexive, and representable
knowledge, he shifts his metaphoric base to that of sight. This allows Heideg-
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tance of a life based on intersubjective "dialogue" in which "truth"
existed not as an absolute command or position but rather as a
relation between "speaking" and "listening" partners.506 The concept of "dialogue" also animated the writing of Russian literary
critic Mikhail Bakhtin, 0 7 who joined it with the notion of "polyphony," a condition in which the voices of author and character
freely overlap and speak together without dominating one another.50 In art, "sound became the primary focus of the Surrealist
movement. ' 50 9 The Swiss painter Paul Klee-although not a Surrealist himself-created compositions such as The Twittering
Machine (1922) and Polyphonic White (1929) that were directly inspired by aural phenomena.5 1 0 As if to take revenge on the visualist prejudices and practices of the past, painted, sculpted, and even

ger to "keep the connection going" with the tradition of philosophy and to
enjoy the rights of representation which this tradition bestows.
Frances Dyson, The Silencing of Sound: Metaphysics, Technology, Media 38 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Technology, Sydney) (on file with author); see
also David M. Levin, Decline and Fall: Ocularcentrisim in Heidegger's Recording of the
History of Metaphysics,in MODERNITY, supra note 75, at 186, 194 (asserting that in spite of

his implicit and explicit criticisms of Western vision-based thinking, Heidegger ultimately is
"not at all antiocular.").
In 1929, two years after the publication of Being and Time, the American philosopher
John Dewey launched a more forthright attack on what he called "the spectator theory of
knowledge." JOHN DEWEY, The Quest for Certainty:A Study of the Relation of Knowledge
and Action, in 4 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 1, 19 (Jo Ann Boydston
ed., 1984).
506 On Buber and dialogue generally, see RONALD C. ARNETT, COMMUNICATION AND
COMMUNITY: IMPLICATIONS OF MARTIN BUBER'S DIALOGUE (1986); MAURICE S. FRIEDMAN, MARTIN BUBER: THE LIFE OF DIALOGUE (1955). On actual speech as the key to
Buber's ideal of dialogic relation, see STEVEN KEPNES, THE TEXT As THOU: MARTIN
BUBER'S DIALOGICAL HERMENEUTICS AND NARRATIVE THEOLOGY 65-67 (1992).
507 In his classic work, Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics, Bakhtin wrote: "To be...
means to communicate dialogically. When dialogue ends, everything ends." Quoted in
ROBERT STAM, SUBVERSIVE PLEASURES: BAKHTIN, CULTURAL CRITICISM, AND FILM 187
(1989). On Bakhtin and the concept of dialogue in general, see MICHAEL HOLQUIST, DIALOGISM: BAKHTIN AND HIS WORLD (1990).
508 On the initial revival of the idea of "polyphony" in pre-World War I poetics, reflecting yet again the modern alliance between poetry and music, see STEPHEN KERN, THE
CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE: 1880-1918, at 72 (1983). On the use of "polyphony" by one
of Bakhtin's contemporaries, Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden, see CURTIS, supra note
78, at vii.
509 Christopher Schiff, Banging on the Windowpane: Sound in Early Surrealism, in
WIRELESS IMAGINATION,

supra note 481, at 139.

510 Klee once remarked that the task of painting was "not to render the visible, but to
make visible" a personal philosophy which directly empowered and legitimized this type of
work. Quoted in Jaffe, supra note 485, at 143.
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filmed depictions of isolated, blind, missing, or mutilated eyes increased in number.51 '
While all this was happening, American law slowly became literally and conceptually more attuned to sound and aurality. Radio
forced lawyers to reevaluate the legal significance of speech-"radio defamation" became an important issue in the 1930s.512 A few
lawyers like Karl Llewellyn and Gleason Archer used radio to
make their political points or to educate the public in law and legal
terminology. 513 For a brief period, radio even restored public
"voice" to the courts: portions of the Scopes Trial of 1925 were
broadcast nationwide, 514 while a variety of tribunals permitted reg515
ular local transmission of their judicial proceedings.
The new importance of sound and speech was most prominently echoed in the legal writings of Judge Jerome Frank. Beginning in the early 1930s, Frank vilified the printed, narrowly visualist
legacy of Langdell, labelled absurd the notion that law was best
learned from texts in a library, and called for a revised form of
legal education which would give law students ample opportunity
to hear and see the law as it was actually argued.516 He repeatedly
suggested that trial case records should take the form of "talking
movies" instead of typed or printed documents so that trial (and,
See Gerald Eager, The Missing and Mutilated Eye in Contemporary Art, 20 J. AES& ART CRITICISM 49 (1961); Jeanne Siegel, The Image of the Eye in Surrealist Art
and Its Psychoanalytic Sources, Part One: The Mythic Eye, ARTS MAO., Feb. 1982, at 102.
512 See, e.g., Donald R. Graham, Defamation and Radio, 12 WASH. L. REV. 282 (1937);
Lawrence Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio, 19 MINN. L. REV. 611
(1935).
513 In 1927, Karl Llewellyn used radio to plead publicly for a commutation of the death
sentences of Sacco and Venzetti. WILLIAM TWINNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 345 (1973). Gleason Archer, the founding Dean of the "evening" Suffolk
Law School in Boston, appears to have been the first person regularly to use radio as a tool
of public legal education: in 1930 and 1931, he delivered a series of thirty-six talks on law
over a network of stations associated with NBC. The talks are collected in GLEASON
ARCHER, LAWS THAT SAFEGUARD SOCIETY (1931). Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound, John Wigmore, and Learned Hand later spoke on various subjects in the series The Lawyer and the
Public, sponsored by the American Bar Association and broadcast on the Columbia network in 1933 and 1934. A.B.A. Broadcasts, 9 CAL. ST. B.J. 265 (1934); The American Bar
Association Goes on the Air, 8 CAL. ST. B.J. 52 (1933).
514 See generally James W. Wesolowski, Before Canon 35: WGN Broadcasts the Monkey
Trial, 2 JOURNALISM HIST. 76 (1975).
515 See Mitchell Dawson, Broadcast Trials?-Yes, THE ROTARIAN, Oct. 1937, at 14; Radio Out of Police Court,.VARIETY, Dec. 9, 1936, at 38; Judge William H. Schaeffer, Broadcasting Traffic Trials, AM. CITY, July 1935, at 77.
516 See Jerome Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J. 723
(1933); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933);
see also Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947) [hereinafter
Frank, A Plea].
511
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ultimately, appellate) judges interested in reviewing evidence could
hear and see witnesses instead of having to depend merely on the
transcript of their words. 517 in 1943, Frank wrote an anonymous
article in the Virginia Law Review in which-consistent with all of
this-he asserted the primacy of spoken over written language in a
distinctly Saussurian manner: "language, at its core, is a tongue.
And the tongue ...is used .. for speaking. A written language
should, therefore, be directly related to the tongue-to speech....
It would seem clear that good writing is speech heightened in tone
and polished in form. 518 Frank praised jurists such as Hugo Black,
William Douglas, and Robert Jackson who he claimed "write much
[O]ne feels, in the
as they talk, as their fellow Americans talk. . ...
as a presence
the
writer
of
writings of each of them, the personality
"519 Benjamin Cardozo, on the other hand, attracted Frank's
....
criticism for having made his writing "unspeakable"-excessively
literary, overly refined, and artificial. 2°
As might have been expected, music too found a niche in legal
discourse at this time. In his 1934 decision in Helvering v. Gregory,
517 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 118-19 n.9 (Anchor Books 1963)
(1930). In a 1949 essay, Frank raised the option of ',talking movies" again after quoting
one judge as saying that a
stenographic transcript .. fails to reproduce tones of voice and hesitations of
speech that often make a sentence mean the reverse of what the mere words
signify. The best and most accurate record [of oral testimony] is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the peach before it
was dried.
JEROME FRANK, Facts Are Guesses, in COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 14, 23 (1949) [hereinafter COURTS ON TRIAL]; see also United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 921 n.5 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., dissenting); JEROME FRANK, The
Upper-CourtMyth, in COURTS ON TRIAL, supra, at 222,224. In the late 1980s, almost sixty
years after Frank first made his proposal, a number of Kentucky courts began treating
videotapes as the sole and official form of trial record. Collins & Skover, supra note 394, at
538-39.
518 Anon Y. Mous, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, in A MAN'S REACH:
THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE JEROME FRANK 35, 36-37 (Barbara F. Kristein ed., Greenwood Press 1977) (1965) (article originally published at 20 VA. L. REV. 625 (1943)). In
1947, this oralist philosophy probably played a role in leading Frank to give up the thenstandard practice of referring to himself in the third person in his own writings, and to
adopt instead the conversational first-person pronoun "I." This, he commented, "abandons the impersonal disguise and frankly reveals the personal character of the statements."
Frank, A Plea, supra note 516, at 1303 n.2.
519 Anon Y. Mous, supra note 518, at 46-47.
520 Id. at 42. In another article, Frank declared that "Cardozo's style is unpleasantly
ornate, baroque, needlessly intricate, a barrier at times to understanding his meaning."
Jerome N. Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 672
(1957). In this latter piece, Frank praised Learned Hand for the same reasons he had
-singled out Black, Douglas, and Jackson. He noted that another judge had said of Hand
that "he never knew a man whose writings so conveyed the life of his talk." Id. at 674.
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Judge Learned Hand departed from traditional legal language in
suggesting that the meaning of a sentence in a statute was more
than just the meaning of its separate words, just "as a melody is
more than the notes."' s2 ' Frank later suggested that Hand had been
influenced by the musical metaphors of Gestalt. 22 In 1941, when
Karl Llewellyn attacked "paper rules," he wrote, in a turn of
phrase that now sounds remarkably contemporary, that the "rightist and most beautiful type of legal rule, [is] the singing rule with
purpose and with reason clear. '5 2 3 Llewellyn at least entertained a
broader analogy between law and music, even if he ultimately rejected that for a more classically visualist analogy between law and
architecture. 24 A few years later, Frank wrote two articles in the
Columbia and Harvard law reviews forcefully espousing the analogy that Llewellyn had cast aside. In Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, Frank compared judicial
interpretation of a statute to a performer's interpretation of a musical composition. 25 Just as a "wise composer" expects a performer to interpret his score with an insight transcending its literal
meaning, Frank argued that a wise legislature (and a wise public)
should allow a judge to interpret a statute otherwise than according
to the technical meaning of its words.52 6 In Say it with Music, he
took the musical analogy even further, suggesting that the comparison of law with music captured the emotional, nonrational aspect
of legal decision making (Judge Hutcheson's famous "hunch") that
could not be verbally expressed. 27
Still, aural styles and analogues did not exactly take the American legal community by storm. The Realist predilections of Llewellyn and Frank may ironically have done as much to burden the
new ideas as benefit them. When in 1939 British legal theorist
Carleton Allen applied the label "jazz jurisprudence" to some of
the new legal ideas coming out of the United States it was a mark
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1267 (1947). See supra note 504 and accompanying text.
523 K.N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224,
250 (1941-1942); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 183, 24647 (1960).
524 Llewellyn, supra note 523, at 230. In this context it may not be irrelevant that Llewellyn frequently regaled gatherings of law teachers with songs on legal subjects, the most
famous of which was his ballad The Common Law Tradition. This "hobby" suggests that,
although Llewellyn was at some level capable of seeing a connection between law and
music, he did not believe the two could be seriously compared or combined.
525 Frank, supra note 522.
526 Id. at 1262-64.
527 Jerome Frank, Say It with Music, 61 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1948).
521
522
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of disdain, not admiration.528 The force of tradition was strong: in
a society that was still overwhelmingly visual (even if, in an age of
cinema and experimental television, it was no longer exclusively
textual) law remained very much a visual, writing-based enterprise.
In 1937, the American Bar Association even succeeded in turning
the clock back by stilling the just-liberated judicial voice, the
broadcast example of which might eventually have done much to
encourage and sustain the'nascent jurisprudential turn towards
aurality.529
Since 1950, we have seen the spread of a third and perhaps
even the birth of a fourth generation of aural technologies. The
development of magnetic tape at the end of the Second World War
made sound recording-and hence the study and cultural recognition of sound-much easier than it had been before; 530 Phillips
Corporation's invention of the audio cassette in 1963 put tape recording and playback capacity in the hands of millions. In the
1950s, television rapidly joined radio in the home-TV was obviously a visual medium (we "watch" TV), but it also had (and has) a
significant aural dimension. 3 ' The 1950s and early 1960s similarly
witnessed the development of hi-fi and stereo systems that made
domestic sound reproduction notably more realistic and helped to
popularize music to an unprecedented extent. Since 1980, audio
technology has been radically miniaturized in Walkmans and digitized by computers in ways that have made music and the spoken
word the companions of our every waking moment. There are numerous signs that this technology will soon become even more socially significant.532
528 CARLETON K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 45 (3d ed. 1939).

529 The ABA's instrument for silencing the courts was Canon 35 of the Code of Professional Ethics, which read in part: "Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting
dignity and decorum. The... broadcasting of court proceedings degrade[s] the court and
create[s] misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be
permitted." Quoted in Oscar Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials,
24 MINN. L. REV. 453, 465 (1940). For a reprint of the ABA report which led to the adop-

tion of Canon 35, see id. at 477-508.
530 "Before [the recording improvements of the 1940s] there was considerable practical
difficulty in studying spoken language .... There was therefore an understandable bias
towards studying written language .... " MICHAEL STUBBS, LANGUAGE AND LITERACY:
THE SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF READING AND WRITING 23 (1980).
531 ROGER SILVERSTONE, THE MESSAGE OF TELEVISION: MYTH AND NARRATIVE IN

CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 34-48 (1981). In this connection it is noteworthy that "talk
shows" (Oprah, Donahue, etc.) draw some of the largest TV audiences. See also Susan
Stamberg, Visual Era or No, Voices Are Back in the Picture, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, at
H25 (discussing the importance of voices in TV and movie animation).
532 As this Article is being written, television advertisements are trumpeting the advantages of electronic voice-recognition technology for computer and telephone users. On
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In such circumstances, sound's literary, artistic, and philosophical stock has gone up yet again. The new audio technology has
directly and indirectly supported the growing public interest in poetry and storytelling. In the artistic community, sound has actually
been made a part of numerous multimedia works 533 and has be'534
come especially prominent in contemporary "performance art.
Filmmakers and cinema theorists have finally been prompted to
take a serious interest in the sound track.535 Among the growing
ranks of Continental and American philosophers who have lately
rejected visual metaphors for thinking and knowing,536 a notable
variety have reasserted the value of aurality and aural practices.537
In What is Called Thinking? (1954) the mature Martin Heidegger
called hearing "our need and necessity"; 538 in Truth and Method
(1975) Hans-Georg Gadamer declared that "the primacy of hearing is the basis of the hermeneutical phenomenon, '539 meaning that
our growing interest in engaged interpretation rather than analytic

computer voice-recognition and voice-generation, see S. Joy Mountford & William W.
Gaver, Talking and Listening to Computers, in THE ART OF HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERFACE DESIGN 319 (Brenda Laurel ed., 1990); Nicholas Negroponte, Talking to Computers:
Time for a New Perspective, WIRED, Feb. 1994, at 134 ("[F]ifteen years from now, the bulk
of our interaction with computers will be through the spoken word.").
533 See, e.g., Lin Emery & Robert Moriss, Kinesone I: A Kinetic Sound Sculpture, 19
LEONARDO 207 (1986); Bill Fontana, The Relocation of Ambient Sound: Urban Sound
Sculpture, 20 LEONARDO 143 (1987).
534 Goldberg, supra note 486, at 26.
535 See, e.g., MICHEL CHION, AUDIO-VIsION: SOUND ON SCREEN (Claudia Gorbman ed.
& trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1994) (1990); SOUND THEORY/SOUND PRACTICE (Rick Altman ed., 1992).
536 See generally JAY, supra note 85; Caputo, supra note 505, at 254-55. Richard Rorty
has argued that "[wie must get the visual, and in particular the mirroring, metaphors out of
our speech altogether." RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 371
(1979).
537 French political economist Jacques Attali has penned what might be described as a
provocative "manifesto" for this diverse group: "For twenty-five centuries, Western knowledge has tried to look upon the world. It has failed to understand that the world is not for
beholding. It is for hearing. It is not legible, but audible." JACQUES ATrALI, NOISE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF Music 3 (Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1985)
(1977).
538 Quoted in DAVID M. LEVIN, THE LISTENING SELF: PERSONAL GROWTH, SOCIAL
CHANGE AND THE CLOSURE OF METAPHYSICS 17 (1989). On Heidegger's use of aural
metaphors in his later work, see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND: THINK.
ING 122 (1978).
539 HANS-GEORO GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 420 (Garett Barden & John Cumming eds., Crossroad Publishing 1975) (1960); see also GEORGE H. TAYLOR, TEXTUALISM
AT WORK (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 215, on file with author) ("[I1t remains one of
hermeneutics' major contributions-one all the more powerful in today's world-that it
adopts as a fundamental posture that of hearkening, hearing, listening.").
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explanation represents the triumph of ear over eye."4 The idea (or
perhaps more accurately, the ideal) of life and thought as "dialogue," "discourse," or "conversation" has simultaneously gained
momentum thanks in part to the writings, of Gadamer,54 ' JUrgen
Habermas, 4 2 Michael Oakeshott,5 43 Richard Rorty, 544 and Richard
Bernstein. 45 Aurality has even been heralded as a guiding principle of the new postmodernism.546
Sound has similarly affected other aspects of contemporary intellectual life and language. In a variety of academic disciplines,
growing cultural aurality has had a diffuse, if definite, impact; in
several disciplines, professional familiarity with or reliance on particular aural technologies has directly magnified aurality's impact
on thought and terminology. For example, rhetoric has been reborn in circumstances where radio and television together have
radically increased the social power of aural argument. 47 Within a
few short years in the early 1960s, Marshall McLuhan, Walter Ong,
and Eric Havelock-all of whom had been influenced by their experiences with radio 54 8-introduced
the professoriate to the
precepts and practices of preliterate or marginally literate "oral
cultures." In a technological environment where a researcher can
540 Following the French philosopher Paul Ricouer, George Taylor has lately suggested
that "the hermeneutic posture is to be contrasted with more prevalent models that examine a text on the basis of an analytic grid brought to and imposed upon a text-a differentiation that may crudely be termed one between understanding and explanation."
TAYLOR, supra note 539 (manuscript at 215 n.335).
541 See, e.g., GADAMER, supra note 539, passim. On Gadamer and conversation/dialogue, see Francis J. Ambrosio, Gadamer, Plato, and the Discipline of Dialogue, 27 INT'L
PHIL. Q. 17 (1987).
542 See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE AcTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry W. Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 1990) (1983).
543 See, e.g., MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, The Voice of Poetry in the Conversationof Mankind,
in RATIONALISM AND POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 197 (1962).
544 See, e.g., RORTY, supra note 536.
545 See, e.g., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983).
546 See THOMAS DOCHERTY, AFTER THEORY: POSTMODERNISM]POSTMARXISM 16 (1990)

("[PJostmodernismprioritizes the aural; it... works against the specular and even against

theory or speculation in order to re-install the lost sense of hearing; it shapes itself around
the model of the labyrinthine ear."). Martin Jay has recently suggested a fascinating link
between the antispecular (and, in Docherty's terms, pro-aural) aspect of postmodernism
and "the intense fascination with Judaism that gripped many French intellectuals in the
1970s and 1980s." JAY, supra note 85, at 546.
547 See generally LANHAM, supra note 267, at 55-96.
548 "We had all been listening to the radio, a voice of incessant utterance, orally communicating fact and intention and persuasion, borne on the airwaves to our ears. Here was a
new type of demand on our attention, even a new force exercised over our minds." ERIC
HAVELOCK, THE MUSE LEARNS TO WRITE: REFLECTIONS ON ORALITY AND LITERACY
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 30 (1986).
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capture speech and song with the flick of a switch, the historical
and literary study of "oral traditions" has since become an academic growth industry. As technical advances have made field recordings much easier to make, anthropologists have
"coincidentally" begun to reconceptualize their discipline in oral
terms. In 1964, Claude L6vi-Strauss chose music as the conceptual
theme of his classic work The Raw and the Cooked;5 49 in the 1980s,
"postmodern anthropology" was characterized as a form of dialogic listening rather than observation.
Psychologists like Carol
Gilligan, Mary Field Belenky, and Lyn Mikel Brown who in the last
decade or so have depended on tapings for the preservation and
study of subject interviews have proved particularly willing to embrace "voice" and "listening" as figurative expressions of psychological identity and relation.5 5 1 Historians have meanwhile started
to take oral history seriously. From the most meager and technologically awkward of beginnings in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
that enterprise rapidly gained critical respect as recording methods
improved and aurality gained cultural and academic stature
through the 1970s and 1980s. 52
It is over this same period that aurality has begun to blossom
in American law. In the 1950s and 1960s, a few dialogues began to
show up in American law reviews. 53 The dialogues certainly had
549 CLAUDE LIvI-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED: INTRODUCTION TO A SCIENCE
OF MYTHOLOGY I (1969).

550 Post-modern anthropology is the study of man "talking." ... Post-modern an-

thropology replaces the visual metaphor of the world as what we see with a
verbal metaphor in which world and word are mutually implicated ....

Post-

modern anthropology is thus the end of an illusion. It ends the separation of
word and world created by writing ....
Stephen A. Tyler, Post-Modern Anthropology, in DISCOURSE AND THE SOCIAL LIFE OF
MEANING 23 (Phyllis P. Chock & June R. Wyman eds., 1986); see also DENNIS TEDLOCK,
The Analogical Tradition and the Emergence of a DialogicalAnthropology, in THE SPOKEN
WORD AND THE WORK OF INTERPRETATION 321 (1983); James Clifford, Introduction:Partial Truths, in WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY 1, 9
(James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986); Steven Webster, Dialogueand Fiction in
Ethnography, 7 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 91 (1982).
551 See, e.g., BROWN & GILLIGAN, supra note 251, at 26 (emphasizing how "[wiorking
with audio-tapes.., enables us to sound and re-sound, trace and retrace voice(s) through
the interview process").
552 Louis Staff, Oral History, in ORAL HISTORY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY
3-21 (David K. Dunaway & Willa K. Baum eds., 1984). In the late 1980s, oral history
became the subject of an annual survey in the prestigious Journal of American History.
553 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357
(1954); Glenn W. Ferguson, Vocabulary, Veil, and Vested Interest: A Dialogue, 10 J. LEGAL

EDUC. 87 (1957); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
FederalCourts:An Exercise in Dialectic,66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Yale Kamisar, The
Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on the "The Most Pervasive
Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962).

19941

MAKING SENSE OF METAPHORS

325

deep legal roots in the long-standing courtroom practice of crossexamination and in the "Socratic dialogue" of the classroom. Still,
they appeared in print (quite unself-consciously) only after technological advances had helped aurality and aural conventions gain
greater credence in American culture as a whole. Most of the aural, aurally empowering, aurally evocative, and aurally sensitive
features of contemporary American legal life and scholarship that I
mentioned at the beginning of this section are nonetheless the
products of the last ten to fifteen years. During this time, the lawyers and jurists who grew up in the sound-saturated 1960s and
1970s have come of professional age; not surprisingly, they have
brought to their work and their writing the comfortable relationship with aurality that they developed in their youth. Their aural
inclinations have only been validated and encouraged by the habits
and expectations of newly admitted lawyers and legal scholars of
the "Walkman generation."
One statistically convenient measure of the momentum of the
most recent shift towards aurality in contemporary American law is
the late increase in the number of dialogues published in American
law reviews.
Here, the story is not that dialogues are becoming
commonplace (far from it), but that their numbers are rising so
quickly. A comprehensive manual search of university law reviews
published between 1983 and 1992 indicates (taking three-year intervals as benchmarks) that three fictionalized dialogues were published in 1983, five were published in 1986, five appeared in 1989,
and seven appeared in 1992. 555 Over the same period, dialogues
have moreover changed from being an experimental, even exotic
form primarily associated with audacious, albeit less prominent,
law reviews 556 into an at least marginally mainstream genre that
is
57
journals.
legal
"elite"
of
editors
the
to
acceptable
increasingly
554 Law reviews are not, of course, the only forums in which law professors publish
dialogues. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
555 The presence of almost all of these dialogues in older primary (as opposed to newer
secondary or "spin-off") university law reviews suggests that this phenomenon is not simply the result of the late proliferation of law reviews in general.
556 See, e.g., Stanley A. Freedman & Ward Smith, Non-Price Competition by the Monopolist Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: A Dialogue, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 469 (1983);
Friedland, supra note 440; Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law and
the Supreme Court.A Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 841 (1981); Norman Redlich, Hugo Black Enters His Hundredth Year: Some
Heavenly Reflections on the Constitution, 38 ALA. L. REV. 357 (1987); John W. Van Doren
& Patrick T. Bergin, CriticalLegal Studies: A Dialogue, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 291 (198586).
557 See, e.g., Burris, supra note 465; Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings,1991 DUKE L.J. 39; Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell
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The presence of new aurally oriented legal forms is more than
matched by the recent growth of aural metaphors in American law
and legal scholarship. Leading terms like "dialogue," "voice," and
"conversation" seem to have entered American legal discourse in
force during the early to mid-1980s 58 thanks largely to the efforts
of Bruce Ackerman,5 59 Robert Cover 5 60 Robert Burt, 561 James
Boyd White, 562 Stephen Burton,5 63 Carrie Menkel-Meadow 5 64and
Frank Michelman 5 65 It is very difficult to determine just how fast
these specific aural figures of speech (which have since been joined
by others) are gaining ground in the American legal community at
large, but it may be significant that the metaphoric use of "dialogue" and "voice" in the titles of articles appearing in American
university law reviews has increased markedly in the past decade.
A keyword search in the INFOTRAC/LEGALTRAC database
yields one such article including the metaphoric term "dialogue" in
1983, three in 1986, three in 1989, and seven in 1992. The metaphoric term "voice" was similarly included in the titles of one law
review article published in 1983, three articles published in 1986,
six in 1989, and eleven in 1992. The metaphoric term "conversation," although. introduced with the others, has only recently come
into its own in article titles, with five titles carrying that figure of
speech in their titles since 1990.566
Another relevant if somewhat more impressionistic measure
of the shift towards metaphoric aurality is the late increase of interest in the analogy between law and music. The analogy appears to
have re-emerged in 1982 with the publication of a book by Daniel
Kurtzer called The Music of the Laws. In 1985, a student-written
and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988)
(reviewing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL

JUSTnCE (1987)).
558 Prior uses of these and other aural metaphorical terms in modern American legal
literature are scattered and tend to stand out by virtue of their isolation. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 111 (1975) (discussing the "endlessly renewed educational conversation" between the public and the Supreme Court on the terms
of public obedience to judicial rulings); JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION:
STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 215-18 (1973) (describing
as "conversation" the ongoing process of statutory interpretation and application).
559 See, e.g.,
ACKERMAN,supra note 554.
560 See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 27.
561 See, e.g., Burt, supra note 451.
562 See, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LoSE THEIR MEANING (1984).
563 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BURTON, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
(1985).
564 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 387.
565 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 27.
566 Searches of INFOTRAC/LEGALTRAC, February 1994.
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Note in the Southern California Law Review explicitly revived
Frank's musical musings of the 1940s.567 Since that time, a variety
of articles have appeared addressing different aspects of the analogy. Some scholars have merely toyed with the metaphor in much
the same way as Kurtzer had done, hoping perhaps to humanize
law in the process.568 Others have offered more thoughtful explorations of the similarities between the genres. For instance, Peter
Teachout and Robert Abrams have likened legal and musical composition,569 while John Hart Ely and John Calmore have contemplated the metaphorical links between jazz and constitutional law
and critical race theory respectively. 570 Sanford Levinson and J. M.
Balkin have explored the connection between the "authentic performance" theory of early music and certain styles of legal interpretation (in particular, constitutional originalism). 7 1 Jerry
Phillips has lately suggested that we approach law as metaphoric
"ornamentation," i.e., the spontaneous embellishment of a set musical score.572 While all this has been happening, metaphoric references to "harmony" and "dissonance" in the titles of university law
review articles have increased significantly. An INFOTRAC/
LEGALTRAC search reveals six uses of the word "harmony" in
university law review titles between 1980 and 1986, and twelve uses
between 1987 and 1992. 573 "Dissonance" appeared in the title of
one article before 1986, and has been used in three since then.574
Going even further, the title of one law review article published in
1987 seems figuratively to have recalled the Muse whom Blackstone had dismissed from Anglo-American jurisprudence almost
two and a half centuries before.575 In 1990, a second published pa-

567 Mark Fleischer, Note, The Interpretive Process and People v. Marotta. A Search for
Safety in the Shadow Between Concept and Reality, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1051 (1985).
568 See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, Content Neutrality: Some Thoughts on Words and Music, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1987); Dean Robert L. Misner, Songlines for the Lawyer, 29
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (1993).
569 Abrams, supra note 20, at 2; Teachout, supra note 454.
570 Calmore, supra note 390; John H. Ely, Another Such Victory: ConstitutionalTheory
and Practicein a World Where Courts Are No Differentfrom Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV.
833, 837 n.10 (1991) ("On the Constitution as a Lead Sheet").
571 Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and OtherPerforming Arts, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 1597 (1991).
572 Jerry J. Phillips, Law as Ornamentation,10 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 499 (1993).
573 Search of INFOTRAC/LEGALTRAC, February 1994.
574 For a recent titular use of the related term "resonance," see Durham, supra note 23.
575 Abrams, supra note 20 (article entitled Sing Muse: Legal Scholarship for New Law
Teachers).
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per metaphorically revived the "music of the spheres, '576 while the
title of a third employed the word "polyphony" for the first time. 577
In the wake of all this "sound" scholarship, it would seem that law
has, in a sense, become tuneful nomos once again. 578
B.

Aurality and Diversity

In addition to being a product of changing cultural conditions,
the rising popularity of aural metaphors in American legal literature is also attributable to the new willingness and political ability
of a growing number of female, African American, Hispanic, and
Jewish legal scholars from historically marginalized and relatively
more aural backgrounds to bring those backgrounds more directly
to bear on their legal writing and discourse.579 Much of the work
produced by these scholars is overtly based on an aurally indulgent
methodology that attempts "to know history from the bottom" by
drawing from "sources often ignored," in particular "poems, oral
histories, and stories from.., experiences of life in a hierarchically
58 0
arranged world.
This novel and self-assured "turn toward experience" may be
regarded as the product of four factors operating both inside and
outside contemporary American law schools. First, the feminist
movement, the civil rights movement, the Chicano Revival, and the
general "diversity" movement have lately helped to legitimate the
subject of lives led outside the dubious shelter of the dominant
gender, racial, ethnic, and religious umbrellas. 581 As a result, fe576 Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
89 (1990).
577 Weisbrod, supra note 29 (article entitled PracticalPolyphony: Theories of the State
and Feminist Jurisprudence).
578 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
579 Again, reference to legal scholars from these particular groups is not meant to be
definitive. The same point could be made about a growing number of (as yet comparatively few) Native American and Asian American legal writers. The reader who is interested in manifestations of aurality in Asian American legal scholarship should see Robert
S. Chang, Toward an Asian-American Legal Scholarship:CriticalRace Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1993); Carolyn Jin-Myung Oh, Questioning the Cultural and Gender-Based Assumptions of the Adversary System: Voices of
Asian American Law Students, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 125 (1992). Chang's article
(notably the first to call for an "Asian American Legal Scholarship") is remarkable not just
for its repeated use of aural metaphors, but for its metaphorically musical structure, featuring both a "Prelude" and a "Coda."
580 Mari J. Matsuda, PublicResponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2324 (1989).
581 As a general matter, one wonders to what extent the causes of traditionally marginalized, relatively more aural American groups have been assisted by the development of the
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male, African American, Hispanic, and Jewish legal scholars have
become more willing to think, teach, and especially write on their
own terms,582 while white, male, Anglo, and Protestant Americans
have become more willing to hear their stories. Second, the
number of female, African American, and Hispanic scholars in the
American legal academy-within which most legal scholarship is
done-has risen dramatically in recent years, thanks to largely lessrestrictive law school admission and hiring policies. For instance,
in 1970 sixty-six tenure-track women constituted 2.2% of the
American legal professoriate; 58 3 by 1990, women made up 24% of
the full-time faculty at AALS-accredited law schools.5 8 4 The gains
for African Americans and Hispanics have not been as great, but
have still been striking.8 In a less thoroughly alien professional
environment, female, African American, and Hispanic law professors have inevitably felt more secure in plumbing the depths and
affirming the power of their own traditions and practices. 86 Third,
African American, Hispanic, and Jewish legal scholars have lately
found themselves working in law schools where once-predominant
faiths in the individual, in objectivity, and in traditional forms of
dispute resolution are being doubted and challenged by growing
numbers of "majority" scholars. Insofar as the historical values
and experiences of out-groups seem to provide, almost by defini-

new cultural aurality and the new aural technologies discussed in the preceding section of
this Article. For instance, to what extent have the new technologies encouraged feminism
and civil rights by making it literally easier for American women and African Americans to
make their voices heard (here consider the fundamental effect of broadcast speeches and
demonstrations on the fortunes of both movements)? Analogously, to what extent has the
new cultural aurality encouraged American men and whites to take those voices more
seriously than they took them before?
582 For the powerful and moving story of how considerations of diversity and community
have lately prompted one Jewish American legal scholar to bring more of his faith to his
teaching, see Bruce Levine, An Issue of ProfessionalIdentity, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 35 (1992).
583 Angel, supra note 337, at 802. Compare this to the 1950 figures discussed supra in
the text accompanying note 337.
584 CYNT IA F. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 434 (2d ed. 1993).
585 In 1980 to 1981, there were 123 African American law professors in "majority-operated" law schools; by 1986, there were 187 (constituting 3.7% of the total). Allen J. Webster, Jr., The Need for More African American Law Professors, NAT'L B.A. MAO., JulyAug. 1993, at 1. Over the same period, the number of Hispanic law faculty members increased from 24 to 33. Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and
Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 537, 556 (1988). By 1991 to
1992, the sum of Hispanic law faculty members had risen to 81. Rex Bossert, The Hiringof
Hispanic Faculty Is Up 25 Percent, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 10, 1992, at 1.
586 See Mary I. Coombs, OutsiderScholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L.
REv. 683, 691 (1992).
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tion, obvious alternatives to beleaguered dominant models,587
scholars from these backgrounds are increasingly inclined-and in
fact are being implicitly and sometimes explicitly encouraged by
their majority colleagues-to bring those values and experiences
into their legal writing.588 Fourth and finally, American legal academics of all stripes have been taking more interest in the relationship between law and religion. In this context, Jewish legal
scholars have had an additional reason to write from their unique
perspective, 89 while it has become easier for Hispanic scholars to
draw directly and 90indirectly on the Catholic aspects of their own
5
cultural tradition.
As more female, African American, Hispanic, and Jewish
American law professors have taken up the challenge of bringing
more of themselves to their legal scholarship, a good number have
drawn on-and have directly or indirectly encouraged others to
draw on-the aurality which has traditionally animated and structured so many of their group experiences. Thus, Regina Austin
writes of the task before the minority female legal scholar: "The
voice . . . reflected in her work should contain something of the
essence of the culture that she has lived and learned; imagine, if
you will, writing a law review article embodying the spontaneity of
jazz, the earthiness
of blues, or the vibrancy of salsa." 591 So-called
"outsider ' '592 scholars have actually been able to follow this sort of
advice despite having themselves become thoroughly grounded in
visualist, writing-based legal discourse. Many have drawn on a personal "double consciousness" 593 that has allowed them to strive
587 Thus, Jewish law has been described as a "contrast case": antihierarchical, egalitarian, communitarian, based on mutual obligations instead of rights, etc. See Suzanne L.
Stone, In Pursuitof the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary
American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 818-19 (1993); see also Steven F. Friedell,
The "Different Voice" in Jewish Law: Some Parallelsto a Feminist Jurisprudence,67 IND.
L.J. 915 (1992).
588 On the relationship of this majoritarian "loss of confidence" to the new wave of
Jewish legal writing in particular, see Stone, supra note 587, at 818.
589 Id.
590 See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather'sStories, and Immigration Law: The. Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (1990).
591 Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539, 543.
592 Keeping in mind this term's general application to individuals from variois "outgroups . . . who have suffered historical under-representation and silencing in the law
schools" (Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1988)), I pointedly extend it in this
Article to include Jewish American legal scholars as well as the female, African American,
and Hispanic legal scholars to whom it is typically applied.
593 This term was coined by W.E.B. Du Bois who, ironically perhaps, expressed it via
visual metaphors:
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and succeed within the more visualist environment of the dominant
culture while maintaining connection with their relatively more aural traditions and values.594 African American legal scholar Odeana Neal, for instance, has declared that for all her achievements
and obvious ability as a highly visualist, highly literate "double
Harvard" (Harvard College and Harvard Law) she still "cannot believe in the privilege of the written word ... for what would that
say about the relative importance of things that I hold dearest in
my heart, things that were taught to me by unlettered men and
women, or whispered by a lover, or giggled about on the phone
with a friend? '595 Another African American law professor, Angela Harris, has chosen to manage her own cultural duality by approaching the written word as, at least metaphorically, a creature
of speech and sound. She has pointedly called writing
the game of inventing selves, speaking in tongues. ... Like a
ventriloquist, I can write like a woman, like a man, like an intellectual, like a lawyer, like an illiterate. I try on voices as I try on
selves .... It's like talking on the radio, whispering words into a
microphone in a booth to be listened to in a hundred different
private rooms. Read my words and try to guess the timbre of
my voice .... 596
Legal scholars sharing such ambivalence about writing and (by
implication) visuality have used several strategies to reintroduce a
measure of aurality to American legal thought. A relatively high
number Of female, African American, and Hispanic law professors
have become very concerned with actual speech. They have raised

the Negro is a sort of a seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with secondsight in this American world,-a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It
is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking
at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels hii,
twoness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; 'two warring ideals in one dark- body, whose dogged strength alone
keeps it from being torn asunder.
W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk [1903], in WRITINGs 357, 364-65 (Nathan Huggins ed., 1986).
594 Some scholars have notably described this "double consciousness", as being, in a metaphorical sense, "bilingual." For a brief discussion, of this overall phenomenon, see
Bender, supra note 348, at 18.
595 Neal, supra note 439, at 133. Compare supria note 284 (on the privileging of aural
over visual experience in African American culture).
596 Angela Harris, Women of Color in Legal Education: Representing La Mestiza, 6
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 110-11 (1990-91).

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:229

issues related to hurtful speech events, 597 opportunities for speech
in the classroom 598 and in and out of court, 599 the status of speech
as both a subject of legal scrutiny6°° and a medium for the intellectual evaluation of law students"° and professors, 6 2 and the legal
ramifications of the very sound of speech.60 3 These interests are
eminently sensible for scholars who are not only rightly concerned
about participation and prejudice, but who come from traditions in
which individuals have been markedly empowered by speech and
disempowered by silence, and in which the spoken word itself has
carried greater weight (both for good and ill) than has usually been
attributed to it in the more visualist environment of American culture considered as a whole. 6°4 A disproportionate number of fe597 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 447; Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Matsuda, supra note 580.
598 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Differences and Exploring Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 165 (1988); Carrie MendelMeadow, Women as Law Teachers: Towards the "Feminization"of Legal Education, in HuMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW: MONOGRAPH III 16, 21-22 (1981); Tidwell & Linzer, supra
note 22, at 813-14 (1991); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Classroom Climate: Encouraging
Student Involvement, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 326 (1989-90); Stephanie M. Wildman,
The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation,38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
147 (1988).
599 See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordination of
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 337 (1990);
Merry, supra note 444; Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and
Problems, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 21 (1984); White, supra note 230.
600 Where our tradition is oral, anticipating that the story will change with every
new teller and listener, the law gives primacy to the words within the four corners of the contract or evidentiary record, making time stand still and silencing
the storyteller who comes with news of events or understandings that preceded
or followed the written word.
Lawrence, supra note 390, at 2279.
601 See, e.g., Alice K. Dueker, Diversity and Learning:Imagining a Pedagogy of Difference, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 101, 110 (1991-1992) ("Although the success of
many practicing lawyers will be based more on oral than written presentations.... little or
no credit is given for such skills.").
602 One of the most difficult presumptions I must strive to overcome... isone of
the primary presumptions of legal academia: that writing is the most significant
act that someone in the profession can undertake, that those who write, and are
published, are somehow smarter than those who primarily want to engage in
the verbal exchange of ideas, or teaching.
Neal, supra note 439, at 132.
603 See e.g., Matsuda, supra note 416; Matthews, supra note 445; Mullin, supra note 445;
Beatrice B. Nguyen, Accent Discriminationand the Test of Spoken English: A Call for an
Objective Assessment of the Comprehensibility of Non-native Speakers, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1325 (1993); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of
Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993).
604 The authority and danger attributed to the spoken word tends to be greatest in completely oral cultures, and least in highly visualist communities: "in an oral culture, which
knows words only in their natural habitat, that is, the world of sound, words necessarily
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male, African American, Hispanic, and Jewish law professors have

analogously shown an interest in styles of legal scholarship that directly or indirectly evoke aural experience. Many have opted for a
more informal, conversational delivery featuring the use of first
person pronouns. °5 A wide variety have quoted others' poems,6 °6
parables, 60 7 and even songs60 8 in legal text or footnotes. In a few
instances, outsider scholars have chosen to be still more ambitious,
carry with them a special sense of power. For sound [unlike sight] always indicates the
present use of power." Walter J. Ong, Foreword to PEDRO L. ENTRALGO, THE THERAPY
OF THE WORD IN CLASSICAL

ANTi

urry

at xiii (L.J. Rather & John M. Sharp eds. & trans.,

Yale Univ. Press 1970) (1958).
605 Among feminist scholars, see, for example, Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of ContractDoctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Minow, supra note 20; Margaret J.
Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL.L. REV.1699 (1990); Scales, supra note
387. On the psychological and evocatively aural impact of the first person, see Scheppele,
supra note 462, at 2074 ("Articles [that] break taboos [and] ...speak with the power of '
...engage you in a conversation with this named author, this real person, whose struggles
and thoughts are revealed in the words on the page."). As late as the mid-1980s, however,
adoption of this strategy invited rejection of submissions made even to women's law reviews. See, e.g., Heather R. Wishik, Reverie, 16 N.M. L. REV.495, 500 (1986) (referring to
a first-person article eventually published in the Berkeley Women's Law Journal).
606 For instances of poems quoted in recent feminist legal writing, see Dalton, supra
note 605, at 1010 n.24; Hartigan, supra note 458, at 109, 110; Matsuda, supra note 244, at
622, 623; Minow, supra note 20, at 1908 n.198, 1911, 1913 n.218; Celina Romany, Ain't I a
Feminist?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 23, 31 (1991); Scales, supra note 387, at 1384; Judy
Scales-Trent, Using Literature in Law School: The Importance of Telling and Reading Sto-

ries, 7

BERKELEY WOMEN'S

L.J. 90, 90, 96-97 (1992).

For instances of poems quoted in African American and Hispanic legal writing, see
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL

15 (1992); Calmore, supra note 390,

at 2156; Kate N. Day, Lost Innocence and the Moral Foundation of Law, 1 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 165, 182-83 (1993); Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1886 n.39 (1990); Linda S. Greene, Tokens,
Role Models, and PedagogicalPolitics: Lamentations of an African American Female Law
Professor,6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 87-88 (1990-91); Harris, supra note 596, at 11112; Hobbs, supra note 460, at 511; Neal, supra note 439, at 133 n.11; Adrien K. Wing, Brief
Reflections Toward a Multiplicative Theory and Praxis of Being, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 181, 181 (1990-1991).
607 For instances of parables quoted in Jewish American legal scholarship in particular,
see Burt, supra note 451, at 467, 470; Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Strainingthe
Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve,- 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 157 (1984); Steven
L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2226 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Cognitive Dimension];
Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1115-16 (1989).
608 For instances of songs quoted in feminist legal writing, see Austin, supra note 591, at
576-77; Finley, supra note 21, at 900; Caroline Forell, Stopping the Violence: Mandatory
Arrest and Police Tort Liability for Failure to Assist Battered Women, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 215 (1990-1991); Emily F. Hartigan, Derridoz Law Written in Our Heart!
Land: "The Powers Retained by the People," 67 TUL. L. REV.. 1133, 1195 (1993); Jennifer
Jaff, Against the Flow, 6 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 134 (1991); Mari Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 398
(1987); Scales, supra note 465, at 9 n.26; Maureen A. Sweeney, Between Sorrow and Happy
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presenting significant portions 6°9 and sometimes the entirety of
their writings in self-constructed story,610 dialogue,611 drama,612
parable,613 and poetry.61 4 In these forms, these scholars seem to be
directly speaking to, instead of writing for, the reader.
Endings: A New Paradigm of Adoption, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 329, 329 (1990); Brenda
Waugh, A Theory of Employment Discrimination,40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 113, 129 n.26 (1990).
For instances of songs quoted in African American or Hispanic legal writing, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 54-56,
258 (1987); BELL, supra note 606, at 31, 178; Austin, supra note 591, at 576-77; Derrick
Bell, The Last Black Hero: A Chronicle of InterracialLove and Sacrifice, 8 HARV.BLACKLETrER J. 275, 289 (1991); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357,

1366 (1992); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place,Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 9 (1989).
609 For a lament on the frequent segregation of these portions from the rest of the
"traditional" scholarly text, see Robin West, Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 101 (1989).
610 On the disproportionate importance of stories in outsider legal scholarship generally,
see Delgado, supra note 25; Scheppele, supra note 462. For examples of legal storytelling
by feminists, see Abrams, supra note 449, at 973; Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the
Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989);
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Matsuda, supra note 416, at 1333; Carol
Weisbrod, Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments and Questions on Law and Narrative, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 143.
For examples of African American legal storytelling, see BELL, supra note 606;
Taunya L. Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law Professor, 6
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46 (1990-91); Greene, supra note 606; Lawrence, supra note 41.
For examples of Hispanic legal storytelling, see Delgado, supra note 608; Gerald P.
Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); Olivas, supra note 590; Juan Martinez,
Book Review, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 163 (1992) (reviewing PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS

(1991)).

For examples of "outsider" dialogue, see Culp, supra note 557; Delgado, supra note
557; Delgado supra note 25; Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, The Politics of Workplace Reforms: Recent Works on Parental Leave and a Father-DaughterDialogue, 40
RUTGERS L. REV. 1031 (1988); Dinesh Khosla & Patricia Williams, Economies of Mind: A
Collaborative Reflection, 10 NOVA L.J. 619 (1986). The various "chronicles" of Derrick
Bell and Richard Delgado are too elaborate to be placed in this category; somewhat arbitrarily, I prefer to treat them as stories.
612 E.g., Victor Bolden, Judge Not, That Ye May Not Be Judged: A Dramatic Callfor a
More Enlightened Approach to Judicial Decision-Makingin Race Discrimination Cases, 7
HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 33 (1990).
613 For examples of outsider parable, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RiGHrrs (1991); David Hall, The Constitution and Race: A Critical Perspective
Epilogue, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 425 (1988); Hartigan, supra note 458; Martha Minow, Some Realism About Realism: A Parablefor the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2249 (1989).
614 For examples of outsider poetry, see Mary E. Griffith, Sexism, Language, and the
Law, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 125, 149-51 (1988); Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being
Black and White, Different, and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1989-90); Waugh,
supra note 608, at 113; Heather Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist
Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 71 (1985); Wishik, supra note 605, at 495.
The popularity of original poetry among feminist legal scholars is such that a number of the
leading women's law journals now devote special attention to that form. See, e.g., 16
611
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Outsider scholars have themselves recognized that their
aurally evocative styles and strategies derive a critical measure
(although certainly not all) of their power from their ability to
recollect, and in that process validate, an actual aurality central to
outsider identities and traditions. For instance, Richard Delgado
has noted the link between feminist legal narrative and women's
consciousness-raising which, he notes, "consists, in part, of the
615
[oral] sharing of stories, of tales from personal experience.
Derrick Bell has expressly related the format of his chronicles to
African oral storytelling customs; 616 in And We Are Not Saved, he
moreover associated the antiphonal singing of his Celestial Curia
with the aural patterns of "call-response" preaching that he had
encountered "in black churches when I was a child. '617 Delgado
has analogously connected Hispanic legal stories, chronicles, and
dialogues to "Mexican-American... corridos (ballads) and stories,
passed on from generation to generation." 618 Michael Olivas has
made the same connection, and has also tied his own enthusiasm
for stories to his Catholic upbringing and his period of training in a
Catholic seminary. 619 Robert Cover, the late Jewish American
legal scholar who did so much to encourage legal academics to take
narrative seriously, overtly acknowledged ancient Hebrew civiliza-

HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 275-78 (1993); 1 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 6, 152 (1989); 2 TEX. J.
WOMEN & LAW 145-49 (1993).
615 Delgado, supra note 25, at 2436. More generally, see Humez, supra note 246, at 126-

27 ("[A]ny distinctively female use of literary forms or style is very likely to reflect women's longer and fuller immersion in the world of the spoken word, as well as genderspecific spoken-arts traditions developed in relation to family, social, and work roles.").
616 "The use of stories to make a point is, of course, a well-known African tradition
.Derrick
Bell, The FinalReport: Harvard'sAffirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2382, 2394 (1989). See also Lawrence, supra note 390, at 2278; Neal, supra note 439,
at 134 ("I suspect that-some of the storytelling in the new written scholarship produced by
people of color is an attempt ... to bridge a gap between oral traditions and written
traditions.").
617 BELL, supra note 608, at 55. Somewhat more generally, it has lately been argued that
Bell's use of shifting perspective and self as a subject of interrogation [in Faces
at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism] evokes the blues; form
which deploys the highly individual voice of the artist, as commentator and
participant in shared history and present condition, to connect with, mirror,
affirm, and transform the collective as an act of both individual and community
self-definition.
Cheryl 1. Harris, Book Note, Bell's Blues, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 783, 786 (1993) (reviewing
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM

(1992)).
618 Delgado, supra note 25, at 2436; see also Olivas,'supranote 590, at 440.
619 Olivas, supra note 590, at 425, 427.
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tion's "magnificent use of [that form] to explore great normative
questions. "620
In the process of taking a professional interest in their own
experiences and actually using aural forms as models for their legal
scholarship, a disproportionate number of scholars from "nontraditional" backgrounds have embraced aural legal metaphors. Outsider legal writing has indeed become so infused with aural figures
of speech that Richard Delgado has appropriately (if somewhat
serendipitously) labelled it "voice" scholarship. 621 For instance,
feminist legal scholars have repeatedly used aural metaphors to describe legal phenomena and processes. 622 In 1985, Carrie MenkelMeadow (consciously following feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan) considered "the different voices of lawyering" and proposed a
reconception of legal advocacy as "conversation. ' 62 3 In the same
vein, Clare Dalton suggested that law was a matter of "storytelling. ' 62 4 In 1986, Elizabeth Schneider posited "conversation" as
metaphor for "rights," while Teresa Godwin Phelps offered the
same metaphor as a reconceptualization of legal writing.625 In the
hands of Catherine MacKinnon, 62 6 Martha Minow, 62 7 Mari Matsuda, 628 Mary Ann Glendon 629 Ruth Colker, 631 Carol Rose, 631 and
others,6 3 2 aurally evocative metaphors like "dialogue," "voice,"
"conversation," "storytelling," "listening," and "silencing" have
since become a prominent feature of much of the best and bestknown feminist legal scholarship. A few feminist law professors
have even ventured into the metaphorical terrain of music. Martha
Cover, supra note 449, at 6 n.9.
621 Delgado, supra note 19, at 109.
622 I am certainly not the first to notice this. See, e.g., Eloise A. Buker, 'Lady' Justice:
Power and Image in FeministJurisprudence, 15 VT. L. REV. 69 (1990) (briefly discussing the
prevalence of the metaphors of "voice" and "silence" in feminist jurisprudence).
623 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 387, at 49.
624 Dalton, supra note 605.
625 Phelps, supra note 28, at 1102; Schneider, supra note 28, at 622.
626 See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989).
627 See, e.g., Minow, supra note 20.
628 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra notes 244 & 608.
629 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
For a discussion of Glendon's metaphorical use of "storytelling" and "conversation" in this
book, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Storytelling, 1987 DUKE L.J. 760 (book review).
630 See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE (1992); Ruth Colker, Feminist
Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990).
631 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 449.
632 See, e.g., Alison G. Anderson, Lawyering in the Classroom:An Address to First Year
Students, 10 NOVA L.J. 271 (1986); Hodges, supra note 29; Ramsey, supra note 19.
620
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Minow has noted that "[l]egal language, like a song, can be
hummed by someone who did not write it and changed by those for
whom it was not intended. '633 In her essay PracticalPolyphony,
Carol Weisbrod has suggested that "[t]eaching us to hear the different lines and different narratives is a major emphasis and contribution of feminist jurisprudence. Perhaps it is too soon to judge the
issue of ultimate harmony. The first task is to learn to hear the
different parts." 634 Emily Fowler Hartigan has been still more met-

aphorically ambitious. In a remarkable 1988 article, she wrote:
If law is anything today, it is dispirited ....
Neither law nor
its practitioners sing-or even hum . ... . [T]his article is in-

tended as one more song of change. The words of the chorus to
the song of change are familiar yet demanding ....
The reader may not agree with the voice identified in the
chorus about the law of the land; I claim only to remind the
reader of the voice, and to let the song sing in the reader's mind
.... It is the law of the land singing in her people .... Its

colonial singers did not live the full extent of its truth... but it is
still a song of promising integrity. It contains the seeds of reconciliation with the song as it will sing today.635
A significant number of prominent African American and
Hispanic law professors have also added aural metaphors to their
visualist legal vocabulary. For instance, Jerome Culp, whose work
is notably aimed at defining a "black legal scholarship," has employed multiple aural metaphors to capture the misunderstanding
that exists between black and white scholars in the contemporary
American legal community:
[B]lack scholars have given voice to the interests of people who
were always at the margin of the central legal discourse ....
Can
we make white scholars hear the stories that black scholars are
telling? My answer to this question is a definite "maybe."
White scholars may listen to what scholars of color are saying,
but what they hear is not always what scholars of color speak.63 6

Minow, supra note 20, at 1912.
Weisbrod, supra note 29, at 1018.
Emily F. Hartigan, Law and Mystery: Calling the Letter to Life Through the Spirit of
the Law of State Constitutions, 6 J.L. & RELIGION 225, 225-26, 237-38 (1988) (emphasis
added).
636 Jerome M. Culp, Jr., You Can Take Them to Water but You Can't Make Them Drink:
Black Legal Scholarship and White Legal Scholars, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1021, 1021 (emphasis added).
633
634
635
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Culp has also used strikingly aural figures of speech for political
637
sensitivity ("my story is easier on the ears of white scholars"),
attraction (a colleague's book has "a powerful call on the ears of
the majority professorate"), 638 conflicts between alternative
schools of jurisprudence (a "cacophony of approaches"), 639 and
even Patricia Williams' perception of truth,("[h]er ears hear a different decibel level").' In poetic phraseologies rich in metaphoric
appeals to all the senses, Williams herself has told how her experience at Harvard Law School "muted my voice to inaudibility," has
emphasized the importance of "listening" to the "voices of others"
(sometimes "voices lost in the chasm"), and has explored the "dissonance" between blacks and adherents of Critical Legal Studies
("CLS") debating the subject of rights. 641 Kate Nace Day has used
the familiar "voice" metaphor to describe her legal education:
"Years ago, when I began a study of racism and constitutional law,
I listened to voices .... "2 Lani Guinier has described cordial race
relations as a conversation "in which everyone declares a willingness to listen respectfully to what other people are saying."643 John
Calmore has used jazz saxophonist Archie Shepp's "fire music" as
a metaphor to describe the "oppositional cultural practice" of critical race theory. 64 Richard Delgado has meanwhile adopted a wide
variety of aural or aurally related terms in discussing the making
and understanding of law. Even his more traditional (i.e., nondialogic) articles contain numerous aural-metaphorical references to
"talk," "speaking," "listening," and "audience. ' 645 His pieces on
637 Id. at 1026; see also Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial
Difference: White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1100 (1991).
638 Culp, supra note 636,.at 1028.
639 Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Firing Legal Canons and Shooting Blanks: Finding a Neutral
Way in the Law, 10 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 185, 187 (1991).
640 Culp, supra note 636, at 1033.
641 WILLIAMS, supra note 613, at 55, 150, 154, 201.
642 Day, supra note 606, at 175.
643 Quoted in Dale Russakoff, Lani GuinierIs Still Alive and Talking, WASH. POST, Dec.
12, 1993, Magazine, at 14, 19 (identifying the "metaphor of conversation" as central to
Guinier's thought and legal language),
644 Calmore, supra note 390, at 2134. For another, albeit less-extended, instance of music-as-metaphor in recent African American legal scholarship, see Beverly M.M. Charles,
"The Lord Don't Like No Ugly. "-Racism in America, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 333, 346
(1988) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987)) ("Bell's characters sing a song which harmonizes with the melodies deep within the breasts of the descendents of slaves in this country ....Black people
hear the refrains; we hear Jeremiah's lament that we are not saved .... ).
645 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critiqueof Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 937, 942, 953, 957, 959-62 (1991).
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"outsider scholarship" virtually overflow with identifications
of
' 646
"voice.
and
"hearing"
with
perspective
empowerment and
Finally, a significant number of law professors openly drawing
on their Jewish backgrounds have recently demonstrated an enthusiasm for aurally related legal terminology. Robert Cover, who has
been identified as the prime mover in the reintroduction of Jewish
values to contemporary American legal discourse, 47 was notably
one of the first contemporary legal scholars to regard law as a "narrative, ' ' 4 even a "folktale" (a term more overtly evocative of aural
tradition). 649 Indirectly following in the footsteps of Martin Buber
(with some of whose philosophic work he was personally familiar),650 Cover also pioneered the aural-metaphorical notion of law
as "dialogue." His "dialectical federalism" presumed a meaningful
"dialogue" between the federal and state courts on the matter of
rights. 651 Writing of the Jewish legal tradition, he overtly called law
a "voice"; 652 he described conflict between different jurisprudential
653
schools and authorities as having created a "cacophony" of laws.
Cover's work has been complemented by the writing of Robert
Burt, who like Cover has emphasized the idea of law as "dialogue";
Burt notably introduced this idea in an article examining the
broader relationship between constitutional law and parable.654
Most recently, George Fletcher, another prominent figure in the
developing school of Jewish American jurisprudence,655 has taken
up the metaphor of law as "discourse. "656
646 For instance, in a recent piece, he described the empowerment of minority law
professors as "giv[ing] them a voice strong enough that all could hear." Richard Delgado,
The Inward Turn in OutsiderJurisprudence,34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 741, 767 (1993).
647 Steven Winter has for instance acknowledged the "liberating effect" that Cover's
work had on him: "For a long time, my traditional education in the extensive Jewish canon
was abandoned like a piece of old furniture in a musty-attic. Cover's work has shown me
how the intellectual abundance of these materials can be a profound source of analytic
insight." Winter, Cognitive Dimension, supra note 607, at 2225 n.3.
648 Cover, supra note 449, at 4.
649 Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV.
179 (1985).
650 Minow, supra note 20, at 1913 n.219 (referring to one of Buber's books as assigned
reading in Cover's Yale seminar on Myth, Law and History).
651 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 27.'
652 Robert Cover, Obligation:A Jewish Jurisprudenceof the Social Order,5 J.L. & RELIGION 65, 69 (1987).
653 Id. at 68.
654 Burt, supra note 451, at 487-88. On Burt's tendency in this and other works to employ metaphors drawing on Jewish religious practice or experience, see Thomas L. Shaffer,
Judges as Prophets, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1327, 1338-40 (1989).
655 Stone, supra note 587, at 820 n.30 (discussing the signficance of S'vara, Fletcher's
journal on Jewish law and philosophy).
656 Fletcher, supra note 24.
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Just as some outsider scholars have realized that their aurally
evocative legal styles have roots in the actual aural traditions and
practices of outsider groups, we should recognize that outsiders'
aurally evocative figures of legal speech are at least partly inspired
by the same actually aural sources. Like everyone else, legal scholars from relatively more aural backgrounds are undoubtedly drawn
to metaphorical terms such as "voice," "dialogue," and "conversation" on general cultural and (as we shall see) phenomenological
grounds, but they arguably find those terms additionally attractive
because of the relatively more familiar and hence liberating
resonances the terms create for them. George Fletcher has lately
come to the edge of this realization in observing that "[t]he most
magnificent example of law as discourse is the Jewish tradition, beginning with the Bible, blending into the oral law, finding refinement in the Talmud, and continuing to this day ... as a mode of
study in which argument and analysis become religious activities. ' 657 Analogously, a reader of Lani Guinier's work has speculated that she repeatedly uses the "metaphor of conversation"
because "[a]s the daughter of a white [also Jewish] mother and
black father who talked frankly to her and to each other about
race, this is how she came to understand the subject. 658
The broad relationship between metaphor and cultural praxis
that these commentators are suggesting has implications for other
metaphors and other groups. For instance, it is particularly "sensible," empowering, and even defiant (although certainly not necessary, inevitable, or altogether self-indulgent) for feminist legal
academics-coming from a formerly marginalized American women's culture that has privileged shared storytelling and aural interaction of all sorts-to promote the idea of law as "dialogue" and
to describe injustice as "silencing." It is (similar caveats applying)
likewise particularly "sensible," empowering, and defiant for, say,
Hispanic legal scholars-coming from an Hispanic culture that in
the face of "mainstream" prejudice has prized both its secular oral
traditions and its catechistic Catholic heritage-to write in the idioms of "voice" and "story." In this context, appreciating the specific gender, racial, ethnic, and even religious roots of many of the
purveyors of the new aural metaphors is a necessary (although cer657 Id. at 1632. In this context, Robert Cover's aural metaphors for law-"dialogue,"
"voice," and "cacophony"-become especially appropriate. Behind them one can almost
hear the literal voices of generations of rabbis, forever debating one another in synagogue
and temple.
658 Russakoff, supra note 643, at 16.

1994]

MAKING SENSE OF METAPHORS

tainly not a sufficient) prerequisite to understanding the growing
popularity of those metaphors in American legal language.
C. Law and the Phenomenology of Sound
A third reason for the increased popularity of aural legal metaphors in contemporary American legal discourse has to do with
the correlation between the values of developing "critical" legal
theory and our understanding of the phenomenological biases of
sound. Because of this correlation, many exponents of critical legal
theory have found aural figures of legal speech to be convenient
vehicles of ideological expression.
Critical legal theory, as primarily embraced by feminist legal
scholars, critical race theorists, and a number of intellectually progressive white male jurists of various persuasions, 659 is-for all of
its permutations and combinations-founded on a core group of
values which set their adherents in basic opposition to traditional
legal attitudes and beliefs. Most critical scholars believe that law is,
or at least should be, concrete, relational, subjective, multivariate,
dynamic, process-oriented, and transcendent. Law should be concrete in that judges and jurists should take greater account of situated context 660 and others' actual lived experience 661 instead of
depending upon abstract or theoretical constructs.662 It should be
relational in that it should be more concerned with preventing and
resolving differences by drawing people together in shared interaction and communal commitment instead of driving them apart.6 6 3
It should be subjective to the extent that lawmakers and adjudicators should be more willing to recognize their own biases 664 while
making an effort to compensate for those by empathetically adopting the points of view of the individuals who stand to be affected by
659 This last, and admittedly disparate, group would include (although it is not limited
to) disciples of CLS, civic republicanism, and postmodernism.
660 See generally Cover, supra note 449; Delgado, supra note 19; Michelman, supra note
27; Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990);
Catherine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 (1990).
661 Matsuda, supra note 580, at 2324; Calmore, supra note 390, at 2171.
662 For a feminist version of the attack on abstraction and "grand theory," see Fineman,
supra note 215, at 28-29.
663 'See Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/PostmodernReconstruction of Ethics, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 291 (1985); Hill, supra note 599; Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); West, supra note 609.
664 For a description of the CLS analysis of bias which relates that analysis to an older
realist critique, see David S. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A PartialDefense of Critical Legal
Studies and a Comparative Introduction to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IOWA L.
REV. 287, 292-93 (1987). For a feminist analysis of the problem of bias, see Fineman, supra
note 215, at 31.
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their rulings.665 It should be multivariate insofar as it should recognize the existence and legitimacy of different realities, different
points of view, and different answers to the same legal question.66 6
According to many critical scholars, law should be regarded as dynamic: 667 instead of being understood as a timeless entity, it should
be understood as involving events in time. By the same token, it
should be understood as more of a process than a system. 668 Finally, law should be transcendent in that it should reject the arbitrary limitations of traditional boundaries and categories.669
Each one of these critical values has a counterpart in a traditionally accepted value or quality of sound, which has generally
been regarded as the phenomenological-and, ultimately, epistemological-antithesis of sight. 67° Sound, for example, is assumed
to be concrete. Unlike the image or the written word that we experience as an abstract, disembodied stimulus "out there," sound has
an immediate physicality. Its tone, tempo, volume, and rhythm
give it a complex physical texture. Sound waves literally reach out
from their source to touch us; in certain circumstances-in low reg665 See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Mar
J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as JurisprudentialMethod,
11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989); Minow, supra note 397, at 76, 79-80; Martha L. Minow
& Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passionfor Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 52 (1988). But see
also Massuro, supra note 25.
666 Rather than choosing one point of view over another, courts might recognize
that the existence of multiple, self-believed, plausible accounts is an important
fact of the case that deserves some attention. If a dispute occurs across a
perceptual fault line where people with different backgrounds, understandings
and expectations have a disagreement, then the presence of different versions is
a clue that there is more at stake here than the violation of a particular legal
rule.
Scheppele, supra note 462, at 2097; see also Minow, supra note 397, at 77. CLS scholars
initially broached the concept of multiperspectivity by speaking of traditional law's "indeterminacy," i.e., its inability to provide "one right answer." See Gabel & Kennedy, supra
note 460; Matsuda, supra note 665.
667 One feminist scholar has described this as involving a commitment to "narrativity of
meaning," as opposed to "atemporality." Radin, supra note 605, at 1707.
668 See, e.g., White, supra note 23, at 688. Many feminist legal scholars sensitive to the
significance of process notably describe their works as instances of "methodology" (a dynamic term that highlights process) rather than "theory" (a static term that highlights product). See Fineman, supra note 215, at 27.
669 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:

INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND

7-11 (1990); Finley, supra note 21, at 899, 902; Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1771 (1990);
Radin, supra note 605, at 1707.
670 "Both [sound and sight], of course, are necessary in human living and are complementary. The issue here is simply that the stress on one or the other develops quite different intellectual systems." P. JOSEPH CAHILL, MENDED SPEECH: THE CRISIS OF RELIGIOUS
STUDIES AND THEOLOGY 35 (1982).
AMERICAN LAW
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isters, or at high amplification-we can actually feel sound as physical vibration. Sound, moreover, imposes its concreteness on us by
immersing and surrounding us in its field. 67 1 The resultant sense of
intimate involvement is only heightened by the fact that although
we can shut our eyes, withdraw from touch, and close our mouths
at will, we cannot shut our ears: 672 in this context, sound makes us
part of the real world whether we choose to be or not.673 Finally,
because sound is not a very effective "distance" sense, understanding and appreciating sound (or, conversely, communicating
through sound) generally requires us to approach its source (or its
desired object). We are thereby encouraged to experience aurality
in a concrete situation. For example, aural speech "is addressed by
a real, living person to another real, living person at a specific time
in a real setting which includes always much more than mere
words. "674
Sound is also presumed to encourage relation, interaction and
ultimately, community: in the words of Walter Ong, "[s]ound always tends to socialize. ' 675 Sound socializes because, in the first
place, it is hard for anyone to ignore a sound. Sounds that we
make ourselves tend to evoke responses much more successfully
than most of our visible or tangible activities.676 Perhaps others
recognize that in speaking we have invested energy and effort and
have .revealed something intimate of ourselves that deserves acknowledgement.677 Sounds made by others, in turn, not only surround, but actually penetrate and invade us. 678 Because sound
affects us in this way, and also perhaps because we cannot turn our
backs on sound, we feel the urge to respond or react. We generally
experience this response as an important completion of ourselves-ignoring the aural stimulus (or being unable to respond to
it) frequently leaves one with a gnawing sense of isolation. Ii the
second place, sound socializes because its communicative depen671 Ihde, supra note 322, at 249.
672 JULIAN JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BI-

CAMERAL MIND 96 (1976).
673 "Sight isolates, sound incorporates." ONG, supra note 174, at 72.
674 Id. at 101.
675 WALTER J. ONG, RHETORIC, ROMANCE AND TECHN4OLOGY

284 (1971); see also
& GILLIGAN, supra note 251, at 20 ("Voice is inherently relational."); McLUHAN,
supra note 1, at 241 ("[Tjhe world of sound is essentially a unified field of instant
relationships.").
676 ONG, supra note 75, at 123.
677 Lori Breslow, The Mediated "I": The Consequences of Communications Technology
for the Conceptualization of the Self 39 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, New York
University) (on file with author).
678 IHDE, supra note 81, at 79; see also LEVIN, supra note 538, at 32.
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dence on physical proximity679 draws and keeps people together. 68 0
It thereby facilitates mutual involvement,68 ' an involvement which
in some sense may be said to "suspend the self." Psychologist Julian Jaynes has expressed this point most provocatively:
Consider what it is to listen and understand someone
speaking to us. In a certain sense we have to become the other
person; or rather, we let him become part of us for a brief second. We suspend our own identities, after which we come back
to ourselves and accept or reject what he has said.682
Sound tends to be regarded as a subjective sense in that an
individual coming (necessarily) close to a sound is likely to evaluate it in light of the identity and character of its physical origin.
This is especially true when the sound is speech. An "objective"
assessment of spoken words alone is difficult. Spoken words are
carried by a personal voice; they are mouthed by a personal presence from which they cannot be readily detached. 683 In such a context, objective "meaning" merges with subjective "interpretation,"
68 4
and objective "knowledge" merges with subjective "opinion.
Because of the physical closeness of most aural relationships and
the resultant difficulty in achieving objectivity in such a context,
persons in aural contact tend to develop more of a feeling for one
another and may be better able to empathetically appreciate each
other's position. Even in extreme cases, "addressing ...and listening to one's enemy, experientially reveals that one's enemy is truly
human. This understanding counteracts the strong tendency in disputes to objectify one's enemy ... 685
Sound has been considered multivariate in that it can accommodate a variety of different realities at the same time. Sound arThe area that the unaided ear can effectively cover in the course of daily living
is quite limited. Up to twenty feet the ear is very efficient. At about one hundred feet, one-way vocal communication is possible, at somewhat slower rate
than at conversational distances, while two-way conversation is very considerably altered. Beyond this distance, the auditory cues with which man works begin to break down rapidly.
HALL, supra note 370, at 41.
679

680 DAVID REISMAN, THE ORAL TRADITION, THE WRITTEN WORD, AND THE SCREEN
IMAGE 34 (1956).
681 "[L]istening,...

unlike sight, involves a turning toward the Other. An epistemology
of listening compels us towards dialogue rather than detachment." O'Fallon & Ryan,
supra note 22, at 896-97.
682 JAYNES, supra note 672, at 97.
683 On the relationship between sound and presence, see ONO, supra note 75, at 114.
684 See generally David R. Olson, The Cognitive Consequences of Literacy, 27 CANADIAN PSYCHOL. 109 (1986).
685 Lipkin, supra note 453, at 109.
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guably. accomplishes this in two ways. First, it is not as
uniperspectival-i.e., as directionally selective-as sight. Recall
that to see something, we have to turn ourselves towards it, and
having done so, we cannot see in other directions. We can, in other
words, see only one frame of "reality" at a time. When we listen,
however, we can simultaneously appreciate sounds emanating from
in front of us, behind, above, and below. All of these sounds from
different sources are available for our attention all at once.686 We
become conscious of multiplicity. In this context, it is doubtless
significant that so-called "multiperspectival art," visual art that depicts an object from several apparently contradictory perspectives
simultaneously, has been repeatedly associated with cultural experiences dominated or increasingly influenced by aurality. In explaining a carving done by a member of the Tsimishian aboriginal
culture of the Canadian Northwest, it has for instance been said
that "what we ought to be asking ourselves is how the artist's hand
might have been guided by the multidirectional world of the ear
rather than the unidirectional world of the eye, given that [the artist's] culture is an oral-aural one. ' 687 Modern multiperspectival
"cubism" has likewise been described as "one of the painterly
forms of acoustic space. "688 Second, sound may be considered multivariate insofar as different sounds can be simultaneously combined in the same space without suppressing their component
'
parts. Thus it has been noted that "music is not like vision. 689
Unlike visual colors, musical tones "may be combined without
losing their individuality. What you end up with is a chord, something new, which has its own sound but in which the individual
tones are also distinct and identifiable. It's not a blending ... but

something of a different order."' 691 Harmony and choral "polyphony" depend on such a mixing. In this way as well, the sense of
sound may be more tolerant and even celebratory of difference
than is the sense of sight.
We also understand sound as dynamic: "Sound dances
timefully within experience. Sound embodies the sense of time. 692
A sounded musical note or a spoken word is not a fixed object, but
686 ONG,

supra note 75, at 129.

687 David Howes & Constance Classen, Sounding Sensory Profiles, in VARIETIES, supra

note 48, at 257, 265.
688 MARSHALL McLUHAN & ERIC McLUHAN, LAWS OF MEDIA: THE NEW SCIENCE 55

(1988).
689 ACKERMAN,

supra note 166, at 219.

690 See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
691 ACKERMAN, supra note
692 lHDE, supra note 81, at

166, at 219-20.
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an event. It exists only to go out of existence. Sound, moreover,
discloses an event: it is the product of a "doing" of some sort, be
that someone walking, a river running, rain falling, or a machine
working.693 It is a disclosure that may itself take time; while sight is
apparently instantaneous, sound is relatively slow (witness the phenomenon of "echo"). 69 4 Both Plato and Aristotle considered
sound uniquely time-bound because of its delay in spreading over a
distance. 695 In this context, a hearing-oriented world is a world
necessarily focused on the ideas of "duration" and "becoming."
Because sound is both an event in time, and is based on ah
event in time, it is said to favor the idea of process rather than the
idea of system. It is uniquely suited to the understanding and communication of events following one another. Literary critic Northrop Frye realized this when he concluded that while systematic
patterns of meaning were in the domain of the eye, narrative was in
the domain of the ear (consider, for instance, how much less compelling is a visualized narrative-in a book or a graph-compared
to an aurally told tale where one cannot skip to the conclusion or
readily go back to the beginning).696 In the context of a similar
understanding, feminist philosopher of science Evelyn Fox Keller
has commented that "[kinowledge likened to the sense of hearing
• . . might well lend itself more readily to a process view of
697
reality."
Finally, we frequently consider sound to be transcendent. As
we have already seen, vision enables us to recognize sharp distinctions and boundaries: the dividing line is a classic visual construct.
Sound, by contrast, is poorly suited to the task of delimitation.
"Auditory space," we are told, "[is] a sphere without fixed boundaries, space made by the thing itself, not space containing the
thing. '698 Because sound floating on the air lacks the precision of
the line set on the page, aural differentiations are more often experienced as differentiations of degree rather than of kind. It is
easier to distinguish between high and low volume of a given sound
than it is to distinguish, at the edge of aural experience, between
supra note 108, at 137; ONG, supra note 75, at 112.
In this context, "[w]hat... sound immediately discloses is not an object but a dynamical event at the locus of the object, and thereby mediately the state the object is in at the
moment of that occurrence." JONAS, supra note 108, at 137.
695 CHIDESTER, supra note 368, at 7.
696 See the discussion of Frye, id. at 12.
697 Keller & Grontworski, supra note 87, at 221.
698 Carpenter & McLuhan, supra note 45, at 67.
693 JONAS,
694
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sound and silence. In this context, sound creates an arena of mutual involvement instead of a division of experience.
In a previous section of this Article, I argued that the correlation between traditional legal theory and the values of vision may
be ascribed to the cultural context in which American law has
grown up, to the sensory biases of the groups that hive dominated
American law to this point, and to the medium used to express and
develop traditional American legal theory. The apparent correlation between critical legal theory and the values of sound may be
explained in somewhat similar fashion. First of all, critical legal
theory has grown up in a more contemporary, and hence, more
aurally oriented cultural environment; 699 in this situation, critical
theory has arguably, if unwittingly, absorbed values and biases that
sound is spreading, through American culture as a whole. Second,
critical legal theory has been significantly shaped by individuals
coming from American gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups
which, relative to others, have had more respect for aural expression and experience. The relative aurality of these groups has arguably disposed their members towards values which sound
presumably favors. Given the inclination and opportunity, a growing number of these individuals are now applying the same values
to American legal thought. For instance, the relative aurality of
American women may be largely responsible for their traditional,
if hardly exclusive700 or essential, 70 1 association with the concrete
and contextual, the relational, the subjective, and the processbased.7 °2 Feminist legal scholars seeking to draw on women's lived
See supra notes 401-69 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Friedell, supra note 587, at 944-49 (discussing the similarity between "feminist" values and traditional Jewish legal values); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in ContemporaryFeminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 1135 (1990) (emphasizing the correspondence between contemporary feminist values and the values embraced by medieval men); Sherry, supra note 387 (pointing out that
"feminist" or "feminine" values have much in common with "republican" values that were
articulated by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English and American males); and Williams, supra note 388 (noting the overlap between "women's" values and the values articulated by some of the twentieth century's most culturally and intellectually progressive
men). It is extremely interesting to note that all of the male groups with which feminists
seem to share a common normative ground have lived in cultural environments significantly infused or re-infused with aurality.
701 Williams, supra note 388, at 806 ,(disputing-in light of their nonexclusivity-the
notion that any values can be labelled essentially "feminine" or "feminist" per se).
702 See generally BELENKY ET AL., supra note 251, at 93-99, 149; NANCY CHODOROW,
699

700

THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER
(1978); GILLIGAN, supra note 255; JEAN B. MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF
WOMEN (1976); ANNE W. SCHAEF, WOMEN'S REALITY: AN EMERGING FEMALE SYSTEM IN
THE WHITE MALE SOCIETY

(1981); Bate, supra note 241, at 303-05; Bonnie J. Dow & Mari
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experience have certainly played a key role in making these values
an integral part of critical jurisprudence.7 °3 The relative aurality of
African American culture (although again neither exclusive nor essential) has arguably done much to attract African Americans to
similar ideals; 704 a number of African American legal scholars are
now incorporating these into their own brand of critical writing.70 5
The aurality of Jewish religious experience may equally have encouraged Jews to emphasize context, relation, subjectivity, multivariance, and dynamism in their tradition, 70 6 emphases that are
becoming newly evident in the critical works of many Jewish
American legal scholars.70 7 Third, sound has been brought directly
to bear on the development of critical theory insofar as much of
that theory has been conceived and elaborated not in writing, but
in the aural argument, debate, and discussion of scholarly conferisthe
If, indeed "the meim
medium ite
ences, seminars, and symposia. 708ed"h
B. Tonn, "Feminine Style" and PoliticalJudgment in the Rhetoric of Ann Richards,79 Q. J.
SPEECH 286 (1993); Patricia A. Sullivan, Women's Discourse and Political Communication:
A Case Study of CongresspersonPatriciaSchroeder, 57 W. J. COMM. 530 (1993).
703 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989); Christina A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1980); Elizabeth M. Schneider et al., "Feminist
Jurisprudence"-The1990 Myra Bradwell Day Panel, 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5, 11-13
(1991); West, supra note 663; and the works of other feminist legal scholars cited supra
notes 659-69.
704 For example, on the importance of subjective commitment and personal perspective
in African American culture, see KOCHMAN, supra note 287, at 20-25; Henry L. Gates, Jr.,
Introduction to BEARING WITNESS: SELECTIONS FROM AFRICAN-AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 3 (Henry L. Gates, Jr. ed. 1991). In a recent law review
article, Charles Lawrence indirectly suggested a personal connection between aurality and
subjectivity in these terms:
I feel an immediate kinship with the tradition that [African American historian
Vincent] Harding describes and names "the Word." It is a tradition of teaching, preaching, and healing ....
By contrast I am struck by the strong sense of alienation that I have felt
from the role of "scholar".... I sense that the primary source of my resistance
to this role lies in the question as to whether the character of this tradition is in
direct opposition to that of the Word. The scholar is "objective."... He is
guided by an orthodoxy that equates objectivity with emotional disengagement,
cognitive distance, and moral indifference.
Lawrence, supra note 390, at 2238 (footnote omitted). Lawrence goes on to discuss African Americans' cultural concern with personal perspective and subjectivity. Id.
705 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 613; Calmore, supra note 390; Culp, supra note 390;
Lawrence, supra note 390.
706 See generally BOMAN, supra note 85; Friedell, supra note 587.
707 See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Precedentand Authority in Antonin Scalia'sJurisprudence,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685 (1991); Cover, supra note 449; Cover supra note 649; Fletcher,
supra note 24; Jacobson, supra note 326.
708 Note, for instance, the jurisprudential impact of the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies, first held in 1977 and later reconvened annually; the annual Feminism and Legal
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message" (or at least part of it), critical legal theory may be said to
have both literally and figuratively echoed the circumstances of its
birth and development. Taking this point together with the others,
it would seem that the overlap between critical legal ideology and
aural phenomenology is not at all coincidental.
The apparent compatibility of critical legal ideology and aural
phenomenology has had at least two significant consequences for
contemporary American legal scholarship. To begin, it has played
a supporting role in encouraging critical legal scholars to experiment with scholarly formats which indirectly and directly draw on
aural experience. Setting ideas in story or poetry evokes, if not
necessarily duplicates, phenomenological circumstances that may
indirectly reinforce the critical concepts or values (concreteness,
relation, subjectivity, process, etc.) which are being explicitly articulated.7 "9 Perhaps this is another reason why these and other
related forms are "powerful means for destroying [the existing]
mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and
shared understandings against a background of which legal and
political discourse takes place."71 0
The same apparent compatibility of ideology and phenomenology has drawn many exponents of critical legal theory to aural
legal metaphors. The concrete, subjective nature of law is handily
captured by the terms "voice" and "story." The idea of law both as
relation and process is neatly communicated by the terms "listenTheory Conferences run by Martha Fineman; the Conference on Critical Race Theory,
1989; and a variety of other "critical" gatherings mentioned in Coombs, supra note 586, at
692. On the intersection of aural and visual, oral and written in this type of environment,
see generally Deborah Tannen, The Commingling of Orality and Literacy in Giving a Paper
at a Scholarly Conference, 63 AM. SPEECH 34 (1988).
709 Thus, "feminist legal writers who have written about particular injuries increasingly
include some version of the narrative [i.e., the story] of their own victimization. We do
this, I think, because of our conviction that these narratives are essential to the substantive
analysis we are trying to convey." West, supra note 609, at 107 (footnotes omitted).
710 Delgado, supra note 25, at 2413. Using actual sound (speech or song) to communicate or insinuate critical concepts or values is even more ideologically provocative. As
Gary Minda has observed in the context of music:
knowing the words, singing along and having your body rhythmically in tune
with the music can create an experience which goes beyond the abstract, analytical descriptions of what the song ... can mean when considered alone on a
printed page. The intersubjective feelings evoked by listening to the music...
can be a way for experiencing counterculture-anexperience of social relations
which is different from the everyday experiences captured by one's "professional" life as a lawyer, law student or law professor.
Minda, supra note 454, at 490 (footnote omitted). Over the last twenty years, a number of
law professors-Paul Wohlmuth at San Diego, Karl Johnson and Ann Scales at New Mexico, and John Calmore at Loyola-have played music and sung songs in the classroom for
precisely this reason.
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ing," "dialogue," and "conversation." 1 "Polyphony" telegraphs
712
the multivariate character-literally, the many-voicedness -of
law. By choosing these and other aurally inspired terms,7 1 3 critical
legal scholars have indirectly but effectively challenged the traditional legal understandings that have so often been supported and
even rooted in visual legal language.714 This aural language is arguably so powerful, however, that mere casual usage may have the
same "subversive" result: an innocent tendency to describe law as
"talk" may, for instance, indirectly support and even encourage the
notion that law is concrete, dynamic, and subjective. In this sense
711 "The metaphor[ ]... of... conversation enable[s] a conception of community connections forged through the exchange of words in the struggle for meaning." Minow, supra
note 20, at 1881. In the discipline of psychology, Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan have
analogously written:
Our effort to find ways of speaking about human experience in a manner that
re-sounds its relational nature . . . as well as the ever-changing or movingthrough-time quality of the sense of self and the experience of relationship, has
led us to shift the metaphoric language psychologists traditionally have used in
speaking of change and development. from an atomistic, positional, architectural, and highly visual language of structures, steps, and stages to a more..
musical [i.e., aural] language of movement and feeling ....
BROWN & GILLIGAN, supra note'251, at 23.
712 The terms "polyphony" and "polyphonic" "are applied to 'many-sound' or 'manyvoiced' music, i.e., music in which instead of the parts marching in step with one another,
... they move in apparent independence and freedom though fitting together harmonically." PERCY A. SCHOLES, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO Music 820 (John 0. Ward ed.,
10th ed. 1970).
713 For a rare instance of legal icholars deliberating at length on the theoretical appropriateness and utility of an aural metaphor ("listening"), see O'Fallon & Ryan, supra note
22.
714 Thus, "feminist and minority legal scholars have used voices and story-telling as metaphors to argue for a jurisprudence grounded in the reality of personal and social experience." Martha I. Morgan, Founding Mothers: Women's Voices and Stories in the 1987
NicaraguanConstitution,70 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990). On the normative (as opposed to the
sociological) attraction of aural metaphors for feminists generally, see Love, supra note
255, at 95:
In their efforts to avoid the trio distance/domination/normalization, feminist
epistemologists mix metaphors, opening vision up to, imbricating it with,
voice(s). The sound of voices draws them away from the epistemological terrain of the foundationalist/antifoundationalist debate. They move toward politics, towards the extra-foundational space that debate reveals. However, the
continued dominance of visual imagery, the association of knowing with seeing,
obscures and slows that movement. An exploration of differences between
these senses suggests that voice is a better metaphor for a political epistemology and the democratic politics accompanying it.
Both these comments may profitably be compared with the metaphoric strategy
adopted earlier in this century by "critical" Continental philosophers such as Martin
Heidegger: "Ocular metaphors presuppose distance and detachment, and Heidegger is
constantly replaying them in aural terms which stress the belonging of Dasein to Being....
Ocular metaphors give way to aural ones in order to regain our sense of the primordial
belonging of thought to Being, of man to world." Caputo, supra note 505, at 255.
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aural legal metaphors-like aurally evocative forms of legal scholarship-may themselves be profoundly "counter-hegemonic."
CONCLUSION: LAW RE-VIEWED

I began this Article with the proposition that the growing recourse to aural as opposed to visual metaphors as a means of communicating legal ideas represents a significant-if nascentreconfiguration of American legal discourse. After devoting Part I
of the Article to emphasizing the importance of metaphors as both
consequences and causes of cultural and legal change, I argued in
Part II that the traditional prominence of visual metaphors in
American jurisprudence has been a product of three factors: first,
the traditional, largely writing-induced visuality of American culture as a whole; second, the historical domination of the American
legal community by members of American gender, racial, ethnic,
and religious groups which have been more writing-dependent and
hence more respectful of visual expression and experience; and
third, the perceived "fit" between the values of traditional legal
theory and the values said to be supported by visual phenomenology. In Part III of the Article, I suggested that there are three
complementary reasons for the turn towards aural legal metaphors
which has recently become so evident in the academy, if not yet in
the profession. First, under the impetus of new communications
technologies, American culture as a whole is turning away from its
traditional visual bias and is becoming much more aurally oriented.
Second, a growing number, of American law professors from formerly marginalized, relatively less writing-dependent, and therefore more aurally oriented gender, racial, ethnic, and religious
groups are increasingly willing, able, and even eager to plumb their
own experiences-and, in the process, their aural traditions-for
scholarly inspiration. Third, there appears to be a significant and
convenient overlap between the substantive values embraced by
exponents of critical legal theory and the values we perceive to be
encouraged by sound.
If American legal language is being reconfigured today, however, what is to prevent it from being transformed tomorrow? Why
should the incipient trend I have here identified and discussed not
continue to the point where, in the future, the domination of aural
legal metaphors becomes as overwhelming as the domination of
visual legal metaphors was yesterday?
Here, one might offer several answers. First, it may be argued
that insofar as legal metaphors are shaped by circumstance, neither
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American culture nor American law will probably be able to sustain a complete or near-complete transition to aurally based legal
language.715 Aural technology may have surged in the last century
or so, but as I have repeatedly noted in this Article, visual technology has hardly stood still for it. The same age which has given us
the telephone, the radio, and the tape recorder has also given us
inexpensive photography, motion pictures, television, and the computer. The last three of these "visual" technologies have actually
joined sound to sight, promoting a trend towards sensory synthesis
that has culminated in today's "multimedia" technology. In this
new environment, American culture is likely to embrace both sight
and sound rather than encourage a definitive turn from one sense
to the other., By the same token, it is not likely to generate or
support a legal discourse that would consistently prefer aural. over
visual metaphors. The likelihood of metaphoric transformation is
decreased even further by the certainty that the composition of the
American legal academy (not to mention the American legal profession) will in the foreseeable future remain mixed along a variety
of gender, racial, ethnic, and religious lines, thereby ensuring the
continued participation in American legal discourse of individuals
coming from a variety of relatively more visual and relatively more
aural traditions. Insofar as individuals of all backgrounds remain
willing and able to draw consciously or subconsciously on their
own historical experiences for intellectual inspiration, it is likely
that some will continue to favor visual legal metaphors,, while
others will turn to aural legal language. Diversity will allow for
difference.
Apart from what is likely to happen, one might argue that a
complete shift from visual to aural figures of legal speech in American legal discourse would be inadvisable, even for those persons
who have thus far gained or been empowered by the increased
popularity of aural legal metaphors. In the guise of liberating and
validating the relatively more aural experiences of individuals from
traditionally marginalized American gender, racial, ethnic, and
religious groups, such a transformation might ironically do much to
legitimate and validate the circumstances of their marginalization.
For instance, when feminist legal scholars embrace aural metaphors such as "dialogue" and "conversation," are they not coining
715 To this extent I would disagree with Richard Rorty, who has argued that "[a] historical epoch dominated by Greek ocular metaphors may, I suggest, yield to one in which the
philosophical vocabulary incorporating these metaphors seems as quaint as the animistic
vocabulary of pre-classical times." RORTY, supra note 536, at 11.
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a legal language in large part born of the very conditions of subordination and oppression that they seek to challenge and change?
Do not their words-for all their obvious appeal-at some level
accept and endorse the sensory limitations that others (in this instance, men) have traditionally imposed on them? 716 In this context, the true liberation of individuals from marginalized
backgrounds arguably requires that they not arbitrarily limit themselves to-or preemptively define themselves by-aural metaphors
7 17
that others have in some sense chosen for them.
Undue reliance on aural metaphors might even distance outsider legal theorists from other important aspects of their own cultural histories and experiences. No human culture-however
constituted-is ever completely visual or aural, and we all run the
risk of misunderstanding and distorting ourselves if we try to redefine the world-or law-along a single sensory line. Here, the historical experience of male, white, Anglo, and Protestant Americans
may serve as both a lesson and a warning: in allowing themselves to
have been drawn so strongly to visuality, many individuals from
these backgrounds have largely forgotten or failed to appreciate
the not-insignificant degrees of aurality inherent in their own traditions-an aurality which they are only now rediscovering in an increasingly aural age. Their extreme indulgence of the visual has
thus come at a critical cost not only to others, but to themselves.
A complete shift from visual to aural legal metaphors is moreover unnecessary, even to accomplish or propel the value changes
that exponents of critical legal theory in particular may desire. It is
true that we have traditionally regarded the values associated with
sound as more compatible with critical legal theory than the values
associated with sight. This would seem to suggest that visual legal
metaphors are almost by definition inadequately expressive of critical ideas and therefore deserve rejection by critical theorists. One
716 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 39 (1987) ("I
am critical of affirming what we have been, which necessarily is what we have been permitted, as if it is women's, ours, possessive.").
717 For a discussion of the importance of "reclaiming the visual" in feminism in particular, see Ellen L. Fox, Seeing Through Women's Eyes: The Role of Vision in Women's Moral
Theory, in EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST ETHICS:. THEORY AND PRACTICE 111 (Eve B. Cole
& Susan Coultrop-McQuin eds., 1992); Diane Shoos, The Female Subject of PopularCulture, 7 HYPATIA 215 (1992); see also Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of PartialPerspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575, 582
(1988) ("1 want a feminist writing of the body that metaphorically emphasizes vision again,
because we need to reclaim thatsense to find our way through all the visualizing tricks and

powers of modem sciences. and technologies that have transformed the objectivity
debates.").
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must wonder, however, whether the perceived shortcomings of visual legal metaphors are due to some inherent "essence" of visuality
or whether they are simply a function of how we have traditionally
understood sight. Perhaps sight does not have a phenomenological
essence. 718 Perhaps it embraces a multiplicity of contradictory values-values which are brought out by different visual media. For
instance, perhaps it is our dependence on the visual medium of
writing that encourages us (although it certainly does not force us)
to believe that sight abstracts, disengages, and objectifies. Writing
tends to cut us off from the physical world; traditionally conceived,
it facilitates the separation and mutual noninvolvement of writer
and reader, and it enables the reader to assess visual information
without being burdened by the presence and personality of the
writer. But what if-perhaps under the impetus of television, film,
and video technology-one were to understand sight more through
the lens, say, of gesture? 719 In those circumstances, might not
"sight" be considered to favor dynamism, multivariance, relation,
and subjectivism? 720 Would not a focus on gesture give vision a
meaning in time? Would not the visual perception and interpreta72
tion of movement facilitate the recognition of multiple "truths"? '
Would not its personalized energy and power invite reciprocation? 72 2 Would it not facilitate the association of message and mesSee generally DON IHDE, TECHNICS

82-92 (1979); MARTIN JAY, FORCE
(1993); Neil
Evernden, Seeing and Being Seen: A Response to Susan Sontag's Essays on Photography,
68 SOUNDINGS 72 (1985); Stephen Houlgate, Vision, Reflection and Openness: The Hegemony of Vision from a Hegelian Point of View, in MODERNITY, supra note 75, at 8. In the
legal literature, see ROSE, supra note 64, at 273.
719 On the modern TV- and film-inspired resurgence of gesture as a, and even the, visual
medium, see Edmund Carpenter, The New Languages, in EXPLORATIONS IN COMMUNICATION, supra note 45, at 162, 170-71. For a brief discussion of the phenomenological qualities of gesture (comparing those with the qualities traditionally associated with sound), see
ONG, supra note 75, at 147.
720 If television is ocularcentric--and in many ways it is-it nevertheless revisions
the eye. The eye of ego consciousness, the eye of the reader of the book, arises
within a cultural-historical moment in which the ego as disembodied spectator
is invited to keep his or her eye, singular, fixed, and distant, upon the world....
The television eye, the ocularcentrism of the television experience, is of a quite
different sort ....
[T]he eye of television consciousness is re-minded of the
body. Seduced by images, a seduction which is to be sure not without its
problems, the eye of the television body is an emotional vision, a vision that is
moved at a body level.
Romanyshyn, supra note 75, at 341.
721 As it.arguably did in Marcel Duchamp's painting Nude Descending a Staircase and
Giacomo Bella's Dog on a Leash.
722 Thus, the frequently experienced temptation to "exchange" gestures with an obnoxious or vulgar fellow-motorist ....
718
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senger?723 If these things are so, then perhaps sight and, by
implication, visual legal metaphors, are in the abstract potentially
compatible with critical theory.
By the same token, a total embrace of aural legal metaphor
might not be sufficient to the purpose of promoting the aims of
critical legal theory. Perhaps sound too is ultimately without a
phenomenological essence, regardless of the values that we currently associate with it. For instance, we regard sound as concrete,
relational, subjective, and dynamic, but we may do so because we
still envisage ourselves experiencing sound in the context of faceto-face encounters. What would happen, however, if we ceased
thinking of sound in this traditional fashion, and under the influence of ongoing technological change began to view it (as we are
increasingly coming to experience it) as a product of technologya product of the radio, the television, the telephone, the tape recorder, and the computer.724 It could be argued that this technologically based sound could easily embrace and implicitly support
values very different from those that we have hitherto associated
with the aural.7 25 For instance, relative to face-to-face conversation, technologically based discourse radically distances and
decontextualizes those who are party to it. Insofar as it can be unyielding, technological sound can cut off or preempt interaction
rather than facilitate' it. 726 In the same vein, technological sound is
not necessarily subjectifying: indeed, the power of its electronic
723 A phenomenologically compatible alternative to reconceiving vision in terms of gesture could involve reconceiving the act of seeing itself as an active mutual "glanc6" instead
of a fixed, passive "gaze." Foran extended discussion of the idea of the "glance" and its
distinct phenomenological implications, see Deena Weinstein & Michael Weinstein, On the
Visual Constitutionof Society: The Contributionsof GeorgSimmel andJean-PaulSartre to a
Sociology of the Senses, 5 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 349 (1984). On movies and television (with
their hard.cuts and constant perspective shifts) as promoters of a visual experience made
up of discrete glances, as opposed to a fixed view or gaze, see 'Trwhitt, supra note 374, at
95.
724 "[T]he spoken word, the new orality, must face up to the technical apparatuses that
support it and diffuse it with a rare efficiency, but at -the same time condition and coopt it
.... "FRANCo
FERRAROTTI, THE END OF CONVERSATION: THE IMPACT OF MASS MEDIA
ON MODERN SoCIETY 39 (1988).
725 See generally Raymond Gozzi, Jr. & W. Lance Haynes, Electric Media and Electric

Epistemology: Empathy at a Distance, 9 CRITICAL STUD. IN MASS COMM. 217 (1992);
Dyson, supra note 505, at 95-117.
726 Thus, the loudspeaker or the incessant voice of the radio, both of which have historically been associated with the'power of dictatorial regimes. On the use of these aural
instrumentalities in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, see SCHAFER,
supra note 474, at 91-92 In a more contemporary context Schafer has observed that "the
intense amplification of popular music does not stimulate' sociability so much as it eipresses the desire to experience individuation ... aloneness... disengagement." Id. at 96;
see also ACKERMAN, supra note 166, at 187.
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amplification can make it brutally objectifying. 27 Finally, instead
of being dynamic, technological sound can be static-something
that can be frozen in time, manipulated, and transferred for replay.
In this context, prominent aural legal metaphors such as "voice,"
"speaking," and "listening" (and even "dialogue" and "conversation") that now seem unequivocally positive and supportive of the
critical agenda may prove capable of evoking ambivalent or even
negative values which would be fatal to their critical purpose. Arbitrarily limiting ourselves to aural figures of legal speech would
therefore be as inadvisable as rejecting visual legal metaphors out
of hand.
It seems that into the foreseeable future, American legal discourse will-and, to avoid being painted into a cultural, sociological, or phenomenological corner, probably should-continue to
embrace metaphors evoking sight as well as metaphors evoking
sound. While we listen with new attention to the "voice" and "conversation" of the law, we can still "observe" and "review" it. In the
long run, such an inclusive and potentially synergistic reconfiguration of American legal discourse will help to ensure that, in a new
era, American law remains figuratively and literally sensible.

727

[Alural perception and oral expression neither presuppose nor guarantee a
more 'personal' idea or use of knowledge. That the spoken word ... lends itself
less easily to apersonal forms of fixation and transmission than images or print,
can no longer be taken as a truism. New techniques available to record (and
process) spoken language . . . make the old divisions harder to maintain ....
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